Animal Rights: Related Articles

This article examines the public policy debate over control of stray animal populations, in particular, feral cat colonies. The author, director of a feral cat advocacy group, explains that many of the individuals who act as caretakers for feral cat colonies are caught in a conundrum as to whether they should come "out" as caretakers or remain in secrecy. Much of the current legal policy for animals stems from antiquated animal control laws that do not accurately reflect the attitude of the country toward companion animals.

This artlicle discusses the history of the Universal Declaration and recent attempts to modify the Declaration.

The primary goal of this paper is to act as a heuristic device, to suggest an unconventional but practical perspective on the evolution of international law. Upon surveying discourse on the history of international law, texts of treaties, and declarations and writings of influential philosophers of law and morality, an antiquated perspective of humanity is apparent. A convention in international law, and a reflection of a common idea which feeds the foreboding trend of how humans relate to the planet, treats humanity as distinctively separate from the Earth’s biodiversity. Though environmental law is beginning to recognize the necessity of conserving biodiversity, a subjugating conceptualization of other species has inhibited the development, application, and legitimacy of the principle of sustainability. The belittling view of other species in relation to ourselves also creates inconsistencies within international law and undermines the integrity and sophistication of its development. International human rights law is especially affected.

This overview examines the historical philosophical figures who have contributed to the modern animal rights and welfare movement.

In this essay the author claims that mythic rejection of violence harms animals and their advocates in the following ways: (1) it lays the foundation for the claims of institutional (ab)users of animals that they do not and would not treat animals cruelly or violently because they are participants in the mainstream values of the society; (2) it results in traumatic silencing of advocates because of public disbelief that so much violence against animals could be occurring in a society that abhors violence; (3) it creates broad-brush oppositional categories such that animals’ advocates can be painted as violent actors in a society that rejects violence; and (4) it hinders full consideration among advocates as to what advocates themselves consider “violent” means of protecting animals for fear that such discussion might allow for any amount of violence and, thereby, discredit animals’ advocates and their cause.

In this discussion, panelists explore the many viewpoints society holds with respect to nonhuman animals. The discussion broadly covers ethics and what constitutes ethical behavior in this regard. The question dealt with is, largely, what is the appropriate ethical model to use when arguing that animals deserve better treatment and expanded rights? Unlike parallel movements for human civil rights or women’s equality, the animal rights movement has much greater hurdles to overcome when it comes to arguing that animals deserve equal treatment under the law. In an attempt to address this question, the dialogue touches upon many areas of human thought. The panelists take on diverse fields such as philosophy, science, anthropology, environmentalism, and feminism and use them to understand the past and present state of animal law. The analytical tools of these several disciplines are also applied to animal law in an attempt to develop a better model for the future.

This article details the legal work currently being done to prevent animal cruelty as well as suggestions for future goals.

For animal advocates, one of the most significant barriers to the courtroom is standing. In order to litigate on behalf of an animal’s interests in federal court, the advocate must first establish standing by meeting three requirements: (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact, (2) the injury must be causally connected to the act about which the plaintiff is complaining, and (3) the court must be able to redress the injury. When it comes to non-human animals, how does an advocate demonstrate an injury to establish standing? In this panel, experts in animal litigation discuss the concept of establishing legal standing for animals and animal advocates; the panelists’ own experiences, including specific cases and creative methods used; and the future of legal standing for animals.

In this book review, Mr. Henry Cohen reviews "An American Trilogy: Death, Slavery, and Dominion on the Banks of the Cape Fear River" by Steven M. Wise.

This Essay challenges laws’ hegemonic humanist boundaries by analyzing the challenges involved in mainstreaming posthumanist subjects into the legal curricula. Posthumanist subjects in legal education are perceived as marginal and unworthy of serious discussion and scholarship.

The article begins in Part I of by examining species difference as a social construction similar to race, gender and other identity and hierarchy markers historically understood as biological. In Part II, while not claiming identicalness in the trajectories of different oppressions, the author discusses how the discursive construction of species difference bears a close resemblance to that of gender and race narratives. The article concludes by calling upon our affective responses to imagine animals as possible candidates for personhood and rights, and, further, to question why being human should be a qualification for justice.

In the third panel of the NYU Symposium, distinguished animal law professionals discuss various causes of action which may be used on behalf of animals in the courtroom. Panelists talk about traditional forms of standing, make suggestions for innovation using existing laws, and discuss visions of how they would like to see the law develop as it pertains to standing for animals.

Animal protection laws have traditionally categorized animals according to the manner in which humans use them. Animals have been categorized as companion animals, animals used in medical testing, animals raised for slaughter, and wildlife, and the protection afforded to animals has been ostensibly commensurate to their use categorization.

This Article focuses on two alternative strategies that provide legal protection for animals without relying on human use as their primary mode of categorization. First, the Article looks at protecting animals as a single category, in particular through the use of constitutional provisions. The Article then looks at a species-based model that seeks to extend some traditional “human rights” to Great Apes.

Ultimately, the Article concludes that the species-based model provides a more effective alternative to the use-based model, since it provides an alternate means of categorization that shifts focus to the needs and capacities of animals. While generalized protection at the constitutional level may be rhetorically effective, it does not offer an alternative form of legal category that would allow for precision in legal rule-making.

This Article proposes a new use of existing property law concepts to change the juristic personhood status of animals. Presently, animals are classified as personal property, which gives them no status or standing in the legal system for the protection or promotion of their interests. Professor Favre suggests that it is possible and appropriate to divide living property into its legal and equitable components, and then to transfer the equitable title of an animal from the legal title holder to the animal herself. This would create a new, limited form of self-ownership in an animal, an equitably self-owned animal.