Cases
Case name |
Citation![]() |
Summary |
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Hodge v. State | Hodge v. State, 79 Tenn. 528 (1883). |
The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The indictment charged that the defendant unlawfully and needlessly mutilated a dog by setting a steel-trap in a bucket of slop and catching the dog by the tongue, and that great pain and torture were unlawfully and needlessly inflicted upon the dog. Defendant argued that a dog had been invading his property and destroying hens' nests for a long time. Witnesses testified that the dog had a bad character for prowling about through the neighborhood at night. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that defendant had a right to protect his premises against such invasions, and to adopt such means as were necessary for that purpose. There was no evidence that the slop used by defendant was such as was calculated or likely to lure dogs away from the premises where they belonged on to his premises or within his enclosures. If the dog was in the habit of committing the depredations, defendant had a right to set a steel-trap for the purpose of capturing him, and if, while committing the nightly depredations the dog was thus caught and mutilated, it was not needless torture or mutilation within the meaning of the Act, and the jury should have been so instructed. The court reversed defendant's conviction for cruelty to animals and granted a new trial. |
Grise v. State | Grise v. State, 37 Ark. 456 (1881). |
The Defendant was charged under the Arkansas cruelty to animal statute for the killing of a hog that had tresspass into his field. The Defendant was found guilty and appealed. The Supreme Court found that the lower court commited error by instructing the jury that all killing is needless. The Court reveresed the judgment and remanded it for further consideration. |
Griffith v. State | Griffith v. State, 43 S.E. 251 (G.A. 1903). |
Defendant was indicted under Ga. Penal Code § 703, which prohibited one from instigating, engaging in, or doing anything furtherance of the an act or cruelty to a domestic animal. Ga. Penal Code § 705 defined cruelty as every willful act, omission or neglect, whereby unjustifiable physical pain, suffering, or death is caused or permitted. The court affirmed the conviction, finding that the law provided that a domestic animal, such as a horse, should be sheltered and cared for by his owner. The jury was authorized to find that the defendant willfully abandoned the horse by turning the horse out to the elements, and failing to feed, shelter, or care for the animal. Such conduct was "willful." The court affirmed the judgment of the superior court on the jury's conviction of defendant for cruelty to animals. |
Glover v. Weber | Glover v. Weber,183 Wash.App. 1044 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2014) |
In this case, Sylvia Weber filed suit against Monika Glover for injuries sustained when Weber’s daughter fell off a horse owned by a third party and boarded on Glover’s land. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Weber. Glover appealed the trial court’s decision, arguing that she was immune from liability under the Equine Activities statute. The court of appeals reviewed the issue and reversed the trial courts decision and granted summary judgment in favor of Glover. The main issue of the case whether or not Glover fell under the definition of “equine activity sponsor” provided in the act. Weber argued that Glover was not an “equine activity sponsor” because she was not participating in a public or group-based equine activity or a professional equine activity. The court of appeals disagreed with Weber’s argument and determined that noting in the plain language of the statute requires the equine activity to be public or group-based or professional to be covered under the statute. For this reason, the court of appeals found that Glover was considered a “equine activity sponsor” under the act and was therefore immune from liability. |
F. c/ Sieli Ricci, Mauricio Rafael s/ maltrato y crueldad animal | FUNDAMENTOS DE SENTENCIA Nº1927 | "Poli" was a mutt dog that was tied to the bumper of a car by the defendant and dragged at high speed for several miles. Poli sustained severe injuries as a result of being dragged by the car. After the incident, the defendant untied her and left on the road to die. The defendant was found guilty of the crime of animal cruelty, under "ley 14.346." the judge held that this law "protects animals as subjects of rights, and the defendant's conduct was not against an object or a "thing," but rather against a subject deserving of protection." The defendant was sentenced to 6 months of suspended imprisonment for the crime of "animal mistreatment and cruelty." In addition, the judge ordered the defendant to provide food weekly for the animals in A.M.P.A.R.A (The ONG that filed the police report), with the purpose of giving the defendant the opportunity to learn firsthand that “all animals in general, and dogs, in particular, are sentient beings, that have feelings, suffer, cry, and that their right to live, freedom, and integrity has to be respected…” this, with the purpose to prevent the defendant from committing animal cruelty crimes in the future. |
Freel v. Downs | Freel v. Downs, 136 N.Y.S. 440 (1911) |
Cleveland H. Downs and Walter Smith were informed against for cruelty to animals, and they move to quash complaints. Complaint quashed against defendant Smith, and defendant Downs held to answer.
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C., M. M. M. s/ Denuncia Maltrato Animal; seguidos contra E. P. S., D.N.I. N° X- Causa Tita | Fallo 481/2021 | This court decision has two important aspects, where the judge recognizes families as multispecies, and non-human animals as sentient beings and subjects of rights. The facts of this case arose from a fatal encounter between the police officer and "Tita," a Pitbull-mix family dog, in March 2020 in the Province of Chubut in Argentina. "Tita" attacked an on-duty police officer, and, when Tita was walking away, the officer shot her in front of her family. The injury was so severe that Tita had to ultimately be put down. The judge, in this case, found that Tita was a non-human person and a daughter to her human family, as she and other companion animals had adapted so well to the family life, that it had turned the family into a multispecies one. Therefore, the loss of Tita was an irreparable one. The judge further stated that in today's world animals are not "things," they are sentient beings and they have the right that their life is respected. The holding of the court was also based on the case of Sandra, the orangutan, and the Universal declaration of animal rights. The police officer was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment, professional disqualification for two years, and to pay the attorney and court fees for the crimes of abuse of authority and damages. However, he was acquitted of the animal cruelty charges. Update: In September 2022, the Chubut's criminal chamber of the Superior Court of Justice (the highest tribunal in the province) heard the case on appeal. The court affirmed the verdict of the Trelew’s criminal chamber that set aside the guilty verdict entered against the police officer. The highest tribunal found that, at the incident, Tita was unleashed and unmuzzled. Also, she was aggressive toward the officer, barking and charging at him before he shot her. The tribunal concluded that the officer found himself in imminent danger, which justified his actions, and therefore, he was not guilty as he acted to defend himself. The tribunal found that Sandra's case and the Universal declaration of animal rights did not apply to Tita's case because there were circumstances in which it is necessary to end the life of an animal, and Sandra’s case was brought up as a habeas corpus on behalf of a hominid primate. The recognition of “subject of rights” was granted to Sandra based on the genetic similarity of her species to humans, which is 97%, as opposed to canines’ which is only 75%. It is important to note that the tribunal did not say anything in regard to the status of Tita as a member of her multispecies family. |
M.E.R. c/ B.A.B. del C.| Divorcio por presentación conjunta - Popeye and Kiara - Argentina | Expte. N° SI-29770-2022 | In August 2022, Amorina Bascoy and Emmanuel Medina jointly petitioned for divorce after ten years of marriage. The couple did not have children but shared their life with Popeye and Kiara, their two beloved dogs. The couple filed their agreement regarding the division of marital assets and the care of Kiara and Popeye, together with the communication agreement regarding their care and visitation time, where visitation dates and times would be assessed flexibly by both spouses. In this instance, the family judge recognized the agreement reached by the spouses regarding the care of their beloved dogs, where each divorcee would keep the custody of a dog according to each dog's preference. In addition, in her holding, the judge stated that "although our legal system has not yet advanced in such a way that it can anticipate and/or regulate the situation in which members who also make up the family and have joined it -will be after the termination of the relationship, in this case, two dogs, POPEYE and KIARA-, this brings a reality that cannot be denied and a question that must be answered but those of us that have an obligation to provide a response because, it is known, that everything that is not prohibited by law is otherwise permitted, even in the absence of specific rules that establish it." the judges continues "Thus, we can say that it is known that animals, especially domestic ones, are sensitive beings, who feel, miss, rejoice, suffer, and who acquire habits, the reason why it is undoubted that the change that will produce the separation of the spouses, will also affect them. It will be their owners, then, who are in a better position, to look out for the dogs' interests. Such an understanding has been accepted in some countries, such as Spain, in the same way as in our jurisprudence. This case joins the set of cases in Argentina, such as the Tita and Sidney cases, and other countries in the region where the consideration of animals as non-human persons is becoming more common among judges." |
Expte. N° HC-656/21 - Habeas Corpus en favor del Tortugo Jorge | Expte. N° HC-656/21 | Jorge is an 80-year-old turtle living in the Municipal Aquarium of Medoza, Argentina. In 2021, three animal lawyers filed a habeas corpus on behalf of Jorge, arguing a violation of the turtle’s right to his locomotive freedom and a violation of Mendoza’s law 7.887, 2018, which prohibits the exhibit of animals in circuses or other events. The lawyers stated that Jorge had to be relocated to a more natural environment where he could live the last years of his life, raising concerns for his age and health. After learning that the government is turning the aquarium into a biodiversity center and after consulting with several experts, the tribunal denied the Habeas Corpus as it found the controversy was moot. It also rejected the idea of releasing Jorge into the wild. However, it is important to mention that the tribunal did not oppose his relocation into a sanctuary so long as his physical integrity was protected. |
AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia | EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15 | “Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ. |
Resolucion No. 07, 2023 - Kira's case - Peru | Expediente: 00045-2023-1-0905-JR-PE-02 | The plaintiff brought this case on behalf of one of her dogs, Kira. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals. |
Decision No. 11, 2024 - Zorro Run Run (Peru) | EXPEDIENTE : 04921-2021-0-1801-JR-DC-03 | In this case, the city of Lima was keeping a wild Andean fox, Run Run, in a zoo, after he had been seen around neighborhoods in the area. Biological welfare groups, as well as civilians, were upset to hear about Run Run’s poor treatment and filed a suit against the city for his release. The court discussed ideas of one's duty to respect nature, national character and biodiversity, and natural preservation. In this landmark decision, Peru granted Run Run his autonomous rights. |
Sentencia Resolucion No. 11, Zorro Run Run, 2024 - Peru | EXPEDIENTE : 04921-2021-0-1801-JR-DC-03 | En este caso, la ciudad de Lima mantenía a un zorro andino salvaje, Run Run, en un zoo, después de haberlo visto por los barrios de la zona. Los grupos de bienestar biológico, así como los civiles, se disgustaron al enterarse del mal trato que recibía Run Run y presentaron una demanda contra la ciudad para que lo liberara. El tribunal debatió ideas de respeto, biodiversidad y conservación natural y, en una decisión histórica, concedió a Run Run derechos de autonomía. |
Juan Enrique Martín Pendavis Pflucker v. Cañete, Exp No. 00949-2022-PA/TC - Peru | EXP. N.° 00949-2022-PA/TC | This case is about pet ownership and a person’s constitutional rights within vacation rental spaces. The majority opinion reasoned that the rental space was permitted to prohibit pets, as it was doing so as an expression of the cohabitors’ shared wills, and therefore, does not violate the plaintiff’s rights as he willingly entered the property. The court noted how service animals are working animals, and not just “pets,” whose presence is required for their owners to enjoy the full accessibility of the property in question, and cannot be prohibited. The dissenting opinions discussed topics of animals as property, constitutional freedoms, and animal welfare, and argued that the plaintiff’s claim should be founded. |
Sentencia Jane Margarita Cósar Camacho y otros contra Resolucion De Fojas 258 - Perros guia - Espanol- Peru (2014) | Exp No. 02437-2013 | La demandante, una mujer con discapacidad visual, presentó una demanda constitucional contra la decisión emitida por la Quinta Sala Civil de la Corte Superior de Justicia de Lima el 15 de enero de 2013. Esta decisión negó la acción de amparo después de que los demandados le negaran la entrada a la perra guía de la demandante en sus supermercados. El Tribunal Constitucional ordenó que se permitiera a las personas ciegas ingresar a los supermercados con sus perros guía. |
R (on the application of Patterson) v. RSPCA | EWHC 4531 | The defendants had been convicted of a number of counts of animal cruelty in 2011, to include unnecessary suffering pursuant to Section 4, and participation in a blood sport under Section 8 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Mr Patterson was found to have breached an attached disqualification order under Section 34 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006, on which this appeal is based. The order covered all types of animals for a period of five years. This prohibited him from owning, keeping, participating in the keeping of, or being a party to an arrangement under which he would be entitled to control or influence the way in which animals are kept. A number of animals were found and seized at the home. The appeal was allowed on the basis that Mr Patterson was not entitled to control or influence the way in which the animals were kept by his wife on the facts. |
James v. RSPCA | EWHC 1642 | Defendant was charged with unnecessary suffering towards three horses found in terrible conditions. It was held that where a protected animal is found in distress, a veterinarian's certificate need not be in writing for a constable or inspector to exercise powers under Section 18 of the Animal Welfare Act 2006 (namely seizure and detention). Oral certification of suffering will suffice in certain circumstances, for example where the protected animal requires urgent treatment and there is not sufficient time to produce a written certificate. |
Decision STL12651-2017 | Decision STL12651-2017 | The Labor Cassation Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice decided on an action of ‘tutela’ filed by la Fundación Botánica y Zoológica de Barranquilla, Fundazoo against the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, Luis Domingo Gómez Maldonado, Corpocaldas and others. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants had violated their rights to due process and right to defense, as well as the principle of legality and contradiction, when the Defendant ordered the transfer of the spectacled bear ‘Chucho’ from the Barranquilla zoo to a natural reserve in Narino. Plaintiff sought to leave without effect Decision AHC4806 2017 that granted habeas corpus to ‘Chucho’, the spectacled bear, allowing the bear to stay at the Barranquilla Zoo, which according to Plaintiffs, is able to provide Chucho with all the requirements for his well being, including veterinary care, food, companionship and infrastructure. The Labor Chamber decided for the Plaintiff and left without effect the decision of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, arguing that the Civil Chamber had ruled based on norms that did not apply to the specific case, to a point that the effects of such application had resulted in an interpretation that completely deferred to what the legislative had intended. The Civil Chamber, the court said in its reasoning, wrongly applied the procedure of habeas corpus, which led to the violation of the due process of law of the Plaintiffs, as ‘Chucho’ has no legal capacity to be a party in a legal procedure. The labor chamber explained that from a constitutional view, the granting of habeas corpus for the protection of animals was not proper, as it is established to protect the right to freedom of persons, which is the basis for a society. For that reason, it can only be attributable to human beings that can be individualized. This rules out the other beings to use this mechanism, including legal persons, as it would erode the real essence of this legal mechanism, the court stated. Furthermore, the magister judge states that the legal treatment that has been given to animals corresponds to the sentients beings, which implies their protection, rather than persons. This means that humans have the responsibility to respect animals, but does not imply that animals can fight for their freedom through the mechanism of habeas corpus, in these cases the defense of animals cannot be resolved by giving them the status of persons, but rather through judicial mechanisms such as popular actions (for the protection of collective and diffuse rights and interests), or with preventive material apprehension |
Decision Condor Arturo No. 01901-2013-0204, 2014 - Ecuador | Decision Condor Arturo No. 01901-2013-0204 | This is the case of Arturo, an Andean condor. Prior to his demise, Arturo had been rehabilitated and released after being rescued by the Ministry of the Environment. Arturo was shot and killed by a hunter in the province of Napo, in Ecuador. The Office of the Attorney General and the Ministry of the Environment charged the hunter with committing an environmental crime, emphasizing the case's public interest, as Arturo belonged to a critically endangered species protected by national laws and international treaties. In addition, the Ministry of Environment stated that Arturo was protected under the Rights of Nature. For its killing, the defendant received a prison sentence of six months. The court reasoned that it is within the national interest to prosecute the defendant and protect the country’s environment, including its wildlife. |
Decision AHC4806-2017 | Decision AHC4806-2017 | (Original case in Spanish below; English translation attached as pdf). The Supreme Court of Justice rules in favor of the spectacled bear, ‘Chucho’, granting him the habeas corpus after the bear’s attorney challenged the lower court decision that denied it. Chucho is a 22 year old spectacled bear that was born and raised in semi-captivity. He lived for 18 years in a natural reserve in the city of Manizales with his sister. After his sister died, Chucho became depressed and started escaping. The environmental authorities thought that it would be in the best interest of the bear to relocate him, for which they decided to move him to a zoo in the northern of Colombia. Unfortunately, the living conditions of Chucho were diminished, as he went from living in semi-captivity to living into a smaller area. Attorney Luis Domingo Maldonado filed an habeas corpus in representation of the bear that was denied on first instance by the civil chamber of the Superior Tribunal of Manizales. Attorney Luis Domingo Maldonado argued that the current legal system did not have a specific proper mechanism that allowed the taking of immediate and urgent measures to protect the rights of animals as sentient beings to retire them for centers of captivity when they have spent their lives in natural reserves. He also used as examples the precedents from Brazil and Argentina where a chimpanzee and an orangutan were granted habeas corpus. Attorney Maldonado sought that the court order the immediate and permanent relocation of Chucho to the natural reserve ‘La Planada’, located in the Department of Narino. The Civil Chamber reversed the decision on first instance, and ordered the relocation of Chucho from the zoo in Barranquilla to a more appropriate location of semi-captivity conditions. In its reasoning, the magistrate judge stated that animals are entitled to rights as sentient beings, not as humans, and that the idea is to insert a morality of respect to counter a global ecological public order where the tendency of men is to destroy the habitat. After long considerations, the chamber stated that it is necessary to modify the concept of ‘subject of rights’ in relation with nature, understanding that who is subject of rights is not necessarily correlatively-bound to have duties. “The legal, ethical and political purpose is the unavoidable need to create a strong conscience to protect the vital environment for the survival of men, conservation of the environment and as a frontal fight against the irrationality in the man-nature relationship.” |
Decision 09171-2015-0004, Shark fins, 2016 - Ecuador | Decision 09171-2015-0004 | This case concerns defendants who illegally fished for, and captured, vulnerable-classified sharks within Ecuadorian territories using illegal fishing gear and fishing methods. The court discussed the presence and importance of natural reserves, including marine life reserves, and the inherent rights of nature. The court found that the defendants’ fishing was aimed at capturing sharks for profit and confirmed their criminal prison sentences in all respects as described in the lower court. |
Decision 09171-2015-0004, 2016 - Aletas de Tiburon, Ecuador | Decision 09171-2015-0004 | Este caso se refiere a los acusados que pescaron y capturaron ilegalmente tiburones de categoría vulnerable en territorio ecuatoriano utilizando artes y métodos de pesca ilegales. El tribunal discutió la presencia e importancia de las reservas naturales, incluidas las reservas de vida marina, y los derechos inherentes a la naturaleza. El tribunal consideró que la pesca de los acusados tenía como objetivo la captura de tiburones con fines lucrativos y confirmó sus condenas penales en todos los aspectos descritos en el tribunal inferior. |
Davis v. A.S.P.C.A. | Davis v. A.S.P.C.A. 75 N.Y. 362 (1873). |
Plaintiff hog slaughterers challenged the trial court (New York) judgment in favor of defendants, American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals and director, in an action seeking to enjoin defendants from arresting them for cruelty to animals pursuant to 1867 N.Y. Laws 375. The hog slaughterers asserted that they were innocent of the alleged statutory violations. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants, denying the request of the hog slaughterers for an injunction to prevent defendants from arresting them for violating a statute prohibiting cruelty to animals. |
Amparo Directo D.A.- 454/2021 - Mexico | DA 10417/2021 | The administrative tribunal in Mexico City recognizes companion animals as family members, protected under Article 4 of their Constitution. Citing the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunal stated that there are different types of families that are protected constitutionally, which includes some families that consider domestic animals their members. This is the decision to an Amparo against a resolution issued by the Institute of Administrative Verification (Instituto de Verificación Administrativa) holding that the owner of a pet boarding facility providing grooming and training services lacked the land use permits to have the commercial establishment. The owner of the pet boarding argued that she would only use 20% of her home for these purposes. After citing comparative law from countries such as Spain, Colombia, and Brazil, the court stated that “currently pets are considered sentient beings that are also part of the family nucleus and require attention and care. Therefore, the service provided by the Amparo promoter has become necessary for people or families also made up of domestic animals, who are looking for a place [to] care for their pets when they are away from their home for a long time” and, as such, these types of families ought to be considered by the authorities. The court stated that domestic animals “play a role of protection, support, company, affection, and care towards humans. Even the reciprocal attachment relationship between people and domestic animals is clear in multispecies families because they are treated as part of the family. They are, in a few words, members of it. Hence the name multispecies or interspecies family.” |
Resolution N° 07, 2023, Caso Kira - Peru | CUARTO JUZGADO PENAL UNIPERSONAL TRANSITORIO SEDE CARABAYLLO, Resolucion No. 7, 2023 | The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the defendant, arguing the defendant committed a crime against his patrimony and cruel acts against animals under the criminal code. The plaintiff attended a social gathering with her children and left their two dogs, Kira and Logan, playing outside. The plaintiff returned to their home to find that their neighbor, the defendant, had committed an act of bestiality against Kira. The court discussed several constitutional questions and theories of punishment. It weighed the factors of what the defendant had done to Kira with his lack of prior record and low chance of recidivism. The court decided that the defendant was to serve 17 months of incarceration and was required to pay civil fines for the suffering of both the plaintiff and Kira. Rooted in the issue of animal welfare, too, was its holding in prohibiting the defendant from “keeping” animals to further reduce the risk of recidivism. Ultimately, the court based its decisions on grounds of animal welfare and condemnation of cruelty towards animals. |
Karnail Singh and others v. State of Haryana | CRR-533-2013 High Court of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh | The fact of the case arose in 2004 and related the transportation of cows from one province to another in violation of restrictions on the export of cows for meat slaughter. An opinion on that case was given in 2013, then a revised petition was submitted to this court, and several years later this opinion was given. Much of the 100 pages did not deal with the events of the case, but with the jurisprudence of animal rights. The ultimate holding of the judge directed a state agency to enforce a number of very specific standards for the transportation of animals. The Punjab and Haryana High Court declared, in this exceptional judgment, that animals and birds have legal rights, just as humans. It further declared citizens as the “guardians of [the] animal kingdom” with a duty to ensure their welfare and protection. Justice Rajiv Sharma, in his order, said, “All the animals have honour and dignity. Every specie[s] has an inherent right to live and is required to be protected by law. The rights and privacy of animals are to be respected and protected from unlawful attacks. The Corporations, Hindu idols, holy scriptures, rivers have been declared legal entities, and thus, in order to protect and promote greater welfare of animals including avian and aquatic, animals are required to be conferred with the status of legal entity/legal person. The animals should be healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, able to express innate behaviour without pain, fear and distress. They are entitled to justice. The animals cannot be treated as objects or property.” |
Corte Suprema Rol N°50.969-22 | Corte Suprema Rol N°50.969-22 | In July 2022, the Interspecies Justice Foundation filed the first writ of habeas corpus for a non-human animal in Chile. The petition urged the court to recognize Sandai, a 28-year-old orangutan to be recognized as a non-human person and subject of rights, and therefore, to end his captivity in Buin Zoo in Chile. The plaintiff argued that Sandai lived in conditions unfit for his species. One of the expert testimonies submitted to the court stated that “Sandai’s body language reflects a depressed, defeated, and vulnerable emotional and psychological state, which is normal if we consider the conditions in which Sandai is being kept.” The Chilean Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court denying the admissibility of the habeas corpus filed on behalf of Sandai. In dismissing the appeal, the court stated that the constitution in its article 19 refers to persons and that in accordance with the Royal Spanish Academy, persons are individuals of the human species. Therefore, Sandai does not meet the legal requirements to be protected under this legal mechanism. Thus, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals of San Miguel on July 27. Furthermore, with the purpose of protecting the well-being of Sandai, the Supreme Court ordered the Livestock Service (SAG) to adopt all appropriate measures to guarantee that the Buin Zoo complies with the law, specifically attending to Sandai’s case, stating: “that the deprivation of his liberty does not cause him suffering and any other alteration of its normal development, verifying that they have the appropriate facilities for his species, avoiding all mistreatment and deterioration of his health”. |
Cornett v. Red Stone Group, Inc. | Cornett v. Red Stone Group, 41 N.E.3d 155 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015) |
Cornett filed suit against Red Stone Group, Inc. alleging negligence and premise liability. Cornett argued that Red Stone Group maintained a defective gate and fence that led to the Red Stone Group's horses escaping and trampling Cornett which caused her serious injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Red Stone Group on the basis of that it was immune from liability under the equine activities statute. Cornett appealed the court’s decision and the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. Ultimately, the court of appeals needed to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was immune from liability under the statute. In order to determine whether or not Red Stone Group was covered under the statute, the court of appeals looked to the language of the statute. After looking at the language of the statute, the court of appeals found that Cornett was an “equine activity participant” at the time of her injury and therefore Red Stone Group could not be liable for her injuries. Finally, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and granted summary judgment for Red Stone Group. |
Auto 547, 2018 | Constitutional Court. Auto 547, 2018 | The court held unconstitutional Law C-041, 2017, which held bullfighting and other exceptions in article 7 of this law should be prohibited as they are cruel and inhumane. However, Law C-041 deferred its effects and gave Congress a two-year deadline to allow Congress to rule on the issue. On Auto 547, the Court held, “Congress is the only body that has the power to prohibit traditional practices that involve animal abuse.” |
Commonwealth v. Turner | Commonwealth v. Turner, 14 N.E. 130 (Mass. 1887). |
Defendant released a fox from his possession and a number of other people then released various dogs, which pursued and killed the fox. Defendant was charged and brought to trial. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that there was no such crime, which the trial court denied. Defendant also moved to dismiss for lack of evidence, which the trial court also denied. Defendant was convicted and he appealed. The court found that there was a statutory basis for the charge and that the word "animal" in Mass. Pub. Stat. ch. 207, § 53 encompassed wild animals in the custody of a man. The court denied the exceptions brought by defendant and affirmed the order of the trial court, which convicted defendant of willfully permitting a fox to be subjected to unnecessary suffering. |
Commonwealth v. Brown | Commonwealth v. Brown, 66 Pa. Super. 519 (1917). |
The defendant was convicted of cruelty to animals for the use of acid on some horses' feet. The defendant appealed the descision because the lower court had found the Commonwealth's circumstantial evidence to be enough to submit the question of quilt to the jury. The Superior Court found that some of the evidence was improperly admitted by the lower court. Thus, the Superior Court reversed the judgement. |
Commonwealth v. Thorton | Commonwaelth v. Thorton, 113 Mass 457 (1873) |
The defendant was convicted of causing his dog to be bitten, mangled and cruelly tortured by another dog. The defendant appealled and the Supreme Court affirmed. |
Com. v. Hake | Com. v. Hake, 738 A.2d 46 (1998) |
Dog owner appealed conviction of harboring a dangerous dog that attacked a child in violation of the Dangerous Dog Statute. The Commonwealth Court held that the statute imposes strict liability for the dog’s first bite if a dog inflicts severe injury on a human being without provocation. |
R. v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council, ex parte Tesco Stores Ltd. | CO/467/93 |
Although a local authority may not adopt a policy of not enforcing certain laws or not enforcing them against certain types of parties, it may nevertheless make rational choices with respect to the use of its enforcement powers in order to deploy its limited resources in the most efficient and effective manner. |
Barrington v. Colbert | CO/1273/97 |
A net was placed over one opening of a land drain and a terrier dog sent into the other entrance with the objective of prompting a fox to run into the net. Magistrates acquitted the defendants of doing an act causing unnecessary suffering to the fox contrary to the Protection of Animals Act 1911, s 1(1)(a). The Divisional Court dismissed the prosecutor's appeal, holding that, applying Rowley v Murphy [1964] 2 QB 43, the fox was not a "captive animal" within the meaning of s 15(c) of the 1911 Act, mere confinement not being sufficient, and was therefore outside the protection of that Act. |
Bandeira and Brannigan v. RSPCA | CO 2066/99 |
Where a person has sent a dog into the earth of a fox or sett of a badger with the result that a confrontation took place between the dog and a wild animal, and the dog experienced suffering, it will be open to the tribunal of fact to find that the dog has been caused unnecessary suffering and that an offence has been committed under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Animals Act 1911. |
Causa Rol C-1533-2021, 2022 - Igor and Bambu- Chile | Causa Rol 1533-2021 | The parties were in a relationship where they adopted two dogs, Igor and Bambu. The pair eventually split, and disagreed about what to do regarding the custody and ownership of the dogs. Plaintiff brought this action after being prohibited by Defendant from seeing the dogs and requested that he be recognized as co-owner with all rights therein. The court applied a three-part test to cease Defendant’s free enjoyment of the dogs, in which it decided that Plaintiff was entitled to ownership in the community with Defendant. In doing so, the court discussed aspects of the dogs’ place within legal contexts, such as their status as property, and the unique bonds formed between owner and pet. |
Causa Rol C-1533-2021, 2022 - Bambu & Igor- Chile | Causa Rol 1533-2021 | Las partes mantuvieron una relación durante la cual adoptaron dos perros, Igor y Bambú. Con el tiempo, la pareja se separó y discreparon sobre qué hacer respecto a la custodia y propiedad de los perros. El demandante interpuso esta demanda después de que la demandada le prohibiera ver a los perros y solicitó que se le reconociera como copropietario con todos los derechos sobre los mismos. El tribunal aplicó una prueba de tres partes para poner fin al goce gratuito de los perros por parte de la demandada, en la que decidió que el demandante tenía derecho a la propiedad en comunidad con la demandada. Para ello, el tribunal analizó aspectos del lugar que ocupan los perros en el contexto jurídico, como su condición de propiedad y los únicos vínculos afectivos que se establecen entre el propietario y la mascota. |
Causa Penal No. 15241-2022-00006 | Causa Penal No. 15241-2022-00006 | Following the Estrellita case (Constitutional Court decision No. 253-20-JH/22), in 2022, the owner of "Cuqui Brown," a two-fingered sloth filed a habeas corpus petition following his seizure by the authorities. In this case, the court denied the habeas corpus and held that the plaintiff violated "Cuqui Brown's" rights established in Estrellita's case. |
Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346 | Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 | This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the authorities were not entitled to seize the animals. |
Causa No. 09209202301263 - Ecuador | Causa No. 09209202301263, Unidad Judicial de Familia, Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia Norte con Sede en el Cantón Guayaquil, Provincia del Guayas (2023) | Plaintiffs filed a Habeas Corpus claiming the violation of the rights to freedom, life, integrity, the free development of animal behavior, and the right to health of all animals housed at Narayana Aventura Park. Plaintiffs argued that the animals were in a malnourished and in inadequate captivity conditions. The Narayana Aventura Park sells itself as a rescue center and keeps various exotic, endemic, and domestic animals. They denied any violations to the rights of the animals, stating that the animals were provided the minimum welfare conditions required by the law. In addition, they contended that the park was acting in accordance to the law and had all the permits required by the authorities to keep the animals. After thorough examination of the case and careful consideration of applicable laws and jurisprudence, the judge granted the habeas corpus. This ruling acknowledges the significant impact on the rights of exotic, endemic, and even the farm animals under the park's care. Grounded in Article 89 of the Constitution of Ecuador, as well as jurisprudence from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Judgment No. 253-20-JH/22, the judge arrived at this conclusion. However, attending to the recommendations issued by the experts, the court decided to let the animals stay at the park, instructing the enhancement of the enclosure and diets of all animals within a three-month period after the judgment. This decision was appealed by the defendant, and it is currently under review. |
Causa No. 09209202301263 | Causa No. 09209202301263, Unidad Judicial de Familia, Mujer, Niñez y Adolescencia Norte con Sede en el Cantón Guayaquil, Provincia del Guayas (2023) | Los demandantes interpusieron un Habeas Corpus argumentando la vulneración de los derechos a la libertad, vida, integridad, libre desarrollo del comportamiento animal y derecho a la salud de los animales alojados en el Narayana Aventura Park. El argumento principal se centró en el estado grave de desnutrición en el que se encontraban los animales, así como en las condiciones de confinamiento inadecuadas a las que estaban sujetos. El Narayana Aventura Park se presenta como un centro de rescate que alberga una variedad de animales exóticos, endémicos y domésticos. Su represéntate negó cualquier violación a los derechos de los animales, asegurando que se les proporcionaban las condiciones mínimas de bienestar requeridas por ley y contaban con todos los permisos necesarios. Tras un exhaustivo análisis del caso y una cuidadosa consideración de las leyes aplicables al caso, la juez decidió conceder el Habeas Corpus a favor de los animales alojados en el Parque reconociendo que si hubo un impacto significativo en los derechos de los animales bajo el cuidado del parque. La juez llegó a esta conclusión basándose en el Artículo 89 de la Constitución de Ecuador, así como en la jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y la Sentencia No. 253-20-JH/22 (Caso de Estrellita). No obstante, siguiendo las recomendaciones de los de la comisión de peritos en el caso, el tribunal permitió que los animales permanecieran en el parque y ordenó la readecuación de los espacios y las dietas de todos los animales del parque dentro de un plazo de tres meses tras el fallo de cuerdo a las sugerencias en dichos expertos. Es importante anotar que el demandado apeló esta decisión y actualmente está en proceso de revisión. |
Decision N.°0507-12-EP, 2015 Shrimp Farm in Cayapas - Ecuador | CAUSA No. 0507-12-EP | In this case, the defendant, the Ministry of the Environment, appeals decisions from the lower court concerning the plaintiff's shrimp farm. The farm was located on a nature reserve, and the plaintiff sued for protective action, arguing that the Ministry's administrative resolution ordering the closing of the farm violated his property rights and due process. The lower court held in favor of the shrimp farm. The Ministry subsequently filed an Extraordinary Writ of Protection with the Constitutional Court, held that the lower court's decision had infringed upon the defendant's right to due process, invalidated the lower court's ruling, and remanded the case for further proceedings. |
Caso 02437-2013, Jane Margarita Cósar Camacho Y otros Contra Resolucion De Fojas 258 - Service dogs- Peru (2014) | Caso 02437-2013 | Plaintiff, a visually impaired woman, brought a constitutional grievance against the decision issued by the Fifth Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima on January 15, 2013. This decision denied the action of protection after Defendants denied entry of Plaintiff's guide dog at their supermarkets. The Constitutional Tribunal ordered that the blind were allowed to enter to the supermarkets with their guide dogs. |
Jippes v. van Landbouw | Case C-189/01(ECJ) |
Jippes, an ECJ case from 2001, involved a legal dispute over the hoof and mouth pandemic ravaging Europe at the time. To stem spread of the disease, the EU passed a community directive banning the use of preventative vaccinations and mandating compulsory slaughter. The plaintiff—or “applicant,” as plaintiffs are referred to in Europe—owned a variety of farm animals, and, loathe to kill them, argued that European law embraced a general principle that animals were shielded from physical pain and suffering. Such a principle, the applicant argued, could only be overridden when absolutely necessary; and the compulsory slaughter directive was in direct conflict with this principle. The ECJ, however, rejected the applicant’s argument, holding that the Animal Welfare Protocol of 1997 did not delineate any new important animal-friendly principles in European law, but merely codified old ones. |
Georgia Aquarium v. Pritzker | Case 1:13-cv-03241-AT (2015) | In this case, the District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the Georgia Aquarium’s application for a permit under the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) to import 18 beluga whales from Russia’s Sea of Okhotsk for public display. The Aquarium challenged the defendant National Marine Fisheries Service's (NMFS) decision to deny a permit to import the beluga whales as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court found that defendant National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) was correct in following the statutory mandate of the MMPA after it found that the Sakhalin-Amur stock of the whales is likely declining and is experiencing adverse impacts in addition to Russian live-capture operations. Further, some of the beluga whales destined for the import were potentially young enough to still be nursing and dependent upon their mothers. |
Sentencia C-1192, 2005 | C-1192/05 | Decision C-1192/05 decides on a claim of unconstitutionality against Articles 1, 2, 22 and 80 of the Taurine Regulatory Statute ley 916 of 2004. In this occasion, the court upheld the constitutionality of this law confirming bullfighting as an artistic expression allowed by the Constitution: “A manifestation of Colombia’s diversity, as intangible good that symbolizes one of the many historical-cultural traditions of the Nation.” The Court stated that since bullfighting is a cultural manifestation of the nation, children do not need to be protected from this practice. The Court believes “children should be provided the opportunity to attend these events so that they can learn and judge for themselves if bullfighting is an art form, or an outdated violent practice. For that reason, the statute does not violate the fundamental rights of children. The court also held that bullfighting is not part of the interpretation of Article 12 that corresponds to the prohibition of torture. The text of the norm speaks about violence and cruel treatment as an “anthropological vision of the human being” the court asserts. With this decision, the Constitutional Court affirms that animals, in this case bulls, are not entitled to any rights. The court considered tradition and culture of a higher value than animal protection. |
Auto Interlocutorio Numero Veinte: QUATTROCCHIO WANDA S/ MALTRATO ANIMAL | Auto Interlocutorio Numero Veinte: QUATTROCCHIO WANDA S/ MALTRATO ANIMAL | Este es un caso de crueldad animal en el que Wanda Quattrochio presencio al demandado golpeando con un látigo a los perros del vecino. Wanda filmó el incidente y presentó una denuncia por crueldad animal. El demandado estaba a cargo del cuidado de los perros mientras su dueño estaba fuera. Cuando las autoridades llegaron a la casa para confiscar a los animales, encontraron a seis perros en pequeñas jaulas sucias, con agua sucia y sin comida. Luego de considerar los testimonios de los testigos y otras pruebas, el juez concluyó que el acusado había infringido los artículos 1 a 3 de la ley de protección animal (Ley 14.346) y fue procesado por el delito de crueldad animal. En su análisis del caso, la jueza afirmó que los animales no son cosas ni recursos sino seres vivos con potencial de ser "sujetos de vida". |
AUTO 1928 de 2022 | AUTO 1928 de 2022 | In Colombia, municipalities are not allowed to prohibit bullfighting. It is a power reserved for Congress. Bogota attempted to regulate the practice through ordinance 767 in 2020. Since the city was not allowed to prohibit bullfights, it regulated them by prohibiting the use of sharp objects and killing of the bulls in the ring. In addition, they required that 30% of the publicity of the event be focused on educating the public on the suffering of bulls. It imposed a 20% tax and decreased the number of annual bullfights allowed from 8 to 4. During this time, no bids were sent to use "Plaza Santamaria" (Bogota's bullfighting stadium) because owners and sponsors of this practice did not agree with such requirements. Thus, Plaza Santamaria did not hold any bullfights since 2020. In December 2022, the Constitutional Court ordered the city to refrain from taking any action conducing to the violation of decision T-296 of 2013 and ordered the opening of Plaza Santamaria “to allow bullfights to take place in the usual conditions as an expression of cultural diversity and social pluralism,” effectively ordering the city to do what’s necessary for the comeback of bullfighting to the capital. |
ASOCIACION DE FUNCIONARIOS Y ABOGADOS POR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES Y OTROS CONTRA GCBA SOBRE AMPARO | ASOCIACION DE FUNCIONARIOS Y ABOGADOS POR LOS DERECHOS DE LOS ANIMALES Y OTROS CONTRA GCBA SOBRE AMPARO” | Argentina’s Juzgado No. 4 on Contentious Administrative and Tax Matters of the City of Buenos Aires held on October 21, 2015 that Sandra, an orangutan that had lived at the Buenos Aires Zoo for over 20 years, is a non-human person subject to rights, based on the precedent of the Argentina’s Federal Chamber of Criminal Cassation of December 18, 2014 and Ley 14.346, 1954. The court ruled that “Sandra has the right to enjoy the highest quality of life possible to her particular and individual situation, tending to avoid any kind of suffering that could be generated by the interference of humans in her life." In its holding, the court also stated that the Buenos Aires government has to guarantee Sandra’s adequate condition of habitat and the activities necessary to preserve her cognitive abilities. The amicus curiae experts Dr. Miguel Rivolta, Héctor Ferrari and Dr. Gabriel Aguado were instructed to prepare a binding report resolving what measures had to be adopted by the government in relationship to Sandra. |