|Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke||289 F.Supp.3d 103 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018)||Plaintiffs Buffalo Field Campaign and other environmental groups petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to add the Yellowstone bison population to the federal endangered species list. After the Service made a threshold “90–day” determination that Buffalo Field's petition failed to present sufficient scientific evidence that listing the bison may be warranted, Buffalo Field brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Service's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Service applied an improper standard when evaluating Buffalo Field's petition, granted Buffalo Field's motion for summary judgment, denied the Service's cross-motion, and remanded the case for the agency to conduct a new 90–day finding using the proper standard. In particular, the court observed that the Service "simply picked a side in an ongoing debate in the scientific community," thereby in inappropriately heightening the standard of evaluation for a 90-day petition. Because of that, the court agreed with the Service that remand is the appropriate remedy as opposed to to directing the Service to begin a 12-month review.|
|Bundorf v. Jewell||142 F.Supp.3d 1133 (D.Nevada,2015)||Plaintiffs, individuals and environmental organizations, challenged a decision by the Bureau of Land Management's (BLM) to authorize two rights-of-way for the Searchlight Wind Energy Project (“Project”) in southern Nevada (on BLM land) under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). After the District Court remanded to the BLM for further explanation, the plaintiffs moved for a permanent injunction. Plaintiffs raised claims that the activity violated the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), among other federal statutes. In effect, the plaintiffs argue that when the Court remanded for further explanation, it essentially reached the merits of their NEPA and ESA claims "by identifying explanatory gaps in the Remand Order." This then necessitated vacatur of the Record of Decision (“ROD”), Final Environmental Impact Statement (“FEIS”), and the Biological Opinion (“BiOp”). On appeal, the Court agreed with plaintiffs that clarification of the Remand Order is appropriate to include the ROD, the FEIS, and the BiOp with vacatur. Otherwise, the court notes, the Federal Defendants would get "two bites at the same apple . . . to fill the analytical gaps the Court identified in the Remand Order." The Federal Defendants must address the gaps related to: "(1) the density of desert tortoises, the adverse effects on desert tortoise habitat due to noise, and the remuneration fees and blasting mitigation measures for desert tortoises; (2) the status of FWS's recommendations regarding eagle take permitting and an Eagle Conservation Plan; and (3) BLM's conclusions about risks to bald eagles, protocols for golden eagle surveys, and risks to and mitigation measures for bat species."|
|Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc.||131 P.3d 1248 (Kan.App., 2006)||
This Kansas case presents an issue of first impression as to the proper measure of damages recoverable for injury to a pet dog. The plaintiff's dog, a 13-year old dog of negligible market value, suffered a dislocated hip after being groomed at defendant's establishment. The appellate court found the lower court's award of damages based on the veterinary bills was proper where the bills were not disputed and represented an easily ascertainable measure. Specifically, the court held that when an injured pet dog with no discernable market value is restored to its previous health, the measure of damages may include, but is not limited to, the reasonable and customary cost of necessary veterinary care and treatment. The court was unconvinced by defendant's "hyperbolic" claim that such an award would lead to a floodgate of high-dollar litigation on behalf of animals with low market values.
|Burgess v. Taylor||44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001)||
Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive.
|Burkholder v. Department of Agriculture||--- A.3d ----, 2021 WL 4780651 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Oct. 14, 2021)||In this Pennsylvania case, James Burkholder, d/b/a Whispering Spring Kennel (Burkholder), petitioned for review of an adjudication of the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) that imposed a $19,500 civil penalty on Burkholder for transferring two dogs in excess of the annual limit under his Class IV kennel license in December of 2017. Burkholder raises two arguments: first, the Dog Law does not specify that transfers of more than 60 dogs by a private kennel constitute violations; and two, the penalty imposed is excessive and unreasonable. This court first noted that a Kennel Class IV license clearly does not allow him to transfer more than 60 dogs and thus any transfers in excess violate the Dog Law. As to the excessive penalty argument, the court first examined the distinction between separate and ongoing violations of the Dog Law because it raised a question of first impression under the Dog Law. Relying on the distinction in other contexts, particularly regarding penalties imposed by the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC), the court found that a kennel owner holding too many dogs could remedy the violation simply by transferring the excess dogs. The problem here is that, where an owner has transferred more dogs than his license allows, there is no way to correct the violation. Thus, said the court, a per-day fine is improper. "Each unauthorized transfer of a single dog is a single violation of the Dog Law, not a continuing violation, because it is not ongoing in nature and such transfers can be feasibly segregated into discrete violations so as to impose separate penalties." The court concluded that the Department erred as a matter of law by imposing ongoing penalties for two discrete unauthorized transfers. The order of the Department as to the excess transfers of dogs was affirmed, but the portion as to the amount of the penalty was vacated. The matter was remanded for further proceedings.|
|BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL||59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899)||
In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare.
|Burns v. Leap||645 S.E.2d 751 (Ga.App., 2007)||
In this Georgia case, the plaintiff-invitee was knocked into a barbed wire fence by horse that was being boarded by the property owner, suffering injuries as a result. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's order of summary judgment, finding that, under dangerous-animal statute, the property owner did not know of any vicious propensity on part of horse. Further, the invitee failed to show that horse had a vicious propensity and therefore could not prevail on premises-liability claim.
|Bushnell v. Mott||254 S.W.3d 451 (Tex.,2008)||
In this Texas case, the plaintiff (Bushnell) brought an action against the defendant (Mott) for her injuries sustained when defendant's dogs attacked plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, and held that the owner of a dog not known to be vicious owes a duty to attempt to stop the dog from attacking a person after the attack has begun, and Mott's behavior after the attack had begun raises an issue of material fact whether Mott failed to exercise ordinary care over her dogs.
|Butcher v. Gay||34 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 (Cal.App.5.Dist.)||
Plaintiff alleged that she had contracted Lyme disease "as a result of exposure to infested ticks" on respondent's property, and that respondent had "failed to spray the area, post signs or prevented [sic] domestic dog(s) from coming into contact with the plaintiff - jumping in her lap - thereby exposing her to a vector of the disease without her knowledge. Court found no duty toward the plaintiff and allow the motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff to stand.
|Cabinet Resource Group v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service||465 F.Supp.2d 1067 (D. Mont. 2006)||
The Forest Service builds roads in National Forests, and has to determine what density of road coverage is safe for grizzly bear survival in making its Land Use Plan. Here, the Land Use Plan did not violate the Endangered Species Act, because an agency action is not required to help the survival of an endangered species, it simply may not reduce the likelihood of survival and recovery of the endangered species, grizzly bears. However, because the Forest Service relied upon a scientific study with acknowledged weaknesses to make its road standards, but failed to adequately address those weaknesses in its Final Environmental Impact Statement, the Forest Service violated NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act).
|California Veterinary Medical Ass'n v. City of West Hollywood||61 Cal. Rptr. 3d 318 (2007)||This California case centers on an anti-cat declawing ordinance passed by the city of West Hollywood in 2003. On cross-motions for summary judgment the trial court concluded West Hollywood's anti-declawing ordinance was preempted by section 460 and entered judgment in favor of the CVMA, declaring the ordinance invalid and enjoining further enforcement. On appeal, however, this Court reversed, finding section 460 of the veterinary code does not preempt the ordinance. Although section 460 prohibits local legislation imposing separate and additional licensing requirements or other qualifications on individuals holding state licenses issued by agencies of the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA), it does not preclude otherwise valid local regulation of the manner in which a business or profession is performed.|
|Californians for Humane Farms v. Schafer||Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4449583 (N.D.Cal.) (Not Reported in F.Supp.2d)||
Plaintiff, a nonprofit ballot committee established to sponsor Proposal 2, a State ballot initiative that would result in prohibiting the tethering and confinement of egg laying hens and other farm animals, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Secretary of Agriculture, alleging a violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, after Defendant approved a decision by the American Egg Board (the “Egg Board”) to set aside $3 million for a consumer education campaign to educate consumers about current production practices. The United States District Court, N.D. California granted Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, finding that Plaintiff was likely to succeed on the merits, direct harm to Plaintiff was likely to occur if the injunction was not granted, and that the public interest would be served by granting the preliminary injunction.
|Callahan v. Woods||736 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1984)||
Plaintiff alleged the requirement that his infant daughter receive a social security number as a prerequisite to obtain public benefits infringed on his free exercise of religion. Since the court held that the the social security number requirement substantially interfered with plaintiff's free exercise of religious beliefs, the compelling interest test was applied to determine constitutionality of the regulation. This substantial burden/compelling interest test became the model for infringement of religious exercise claims, including those under the BGEPA. For application of this test to religious challenges to the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act .
|Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station||632 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii, 1981)||
The plaintiffs' dog died after being left in a hot van during transport from the Hawaii Quarantine Station to the veterinarian's office. The court held that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to witness the dog's death to recover for serious mental distress and that medical testimony was not necessary to substantiate plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress. In affirming the trial court's award for damages for the loss of property (the dog), the court held that the trial "court correctly applied the standards of law . . . and the issues of whether the damages were proximately caused by the defendant and have resulted in serious emotional distress to the plaintiffs are therefore within the discretion of the trier of fact."
|Campbell v. Supervalu||2007 WL 891682 (N.D.Ind.)||North District Court of Indiana dismissed a claim that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) preempted the plaintiff's state law claims. While a past court decision held that FMIA preempted state attempts to regulate meat inspection, this case was distinguishable because the suit focused on an alleged act of negligence that fell outside inspection of meat and because the state is not placing additional or different requirements then those set by FMIA.|
|Carbasho v. Musulin||618 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2005)||
Owner's dog was killed by a negligently driven car. The owner sued to recover damages for loss of companionship. The court held that dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable.
|Caribbean Conservation Corp., Inc. v. Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Com'n||838 So.2d 492(Fla. 2003)||
The petitioners' challenge is whether the Legislature can require the newly created Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) to comply with the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), when adopting rules or regulations in respect to those species of marine life that are defined as endangered, threatened, or species of special concern. The petitioners are not-for-profit groups and individuals who allege several statutory sections unconstitutionally usurp the constitutional authority of the FWCC to regulate marine life. The FWCC and the Attorney General (respondents) disagree and argue that the Legislature can require the application of the APA and that the statutes that delineate power to the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) are constitutional. The issue was whether the creation of the FWCC also gave it power to regulate endangered, threatened, and species of special concern or whether that power remained with the DEP. The court found that such power remained with the DEP regarding endangered and threatened species of marine life. However, it could discern no statutory basis in effect on March 1, 1998, for the DEP having regulatory or executive power in respect to a category of marine species designated "of special concern" so that portion of the challenged statutes was held unconstitutional.
|Carl v. Resnick||714 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1999)||
In this Illinois case, plaintiff Judy Carl was riding her horse on a trail in the Cook County Forest Preserve when the horse upon which defendant was riding pinned its ears back, turned its body toward plaintiff's horse, and kicked plaintiff and her horse. One hoof struck plaintiff's leg, causing her injury. In interpreting the state's Equine Act, the court observed that plaintiff's complaint against defendant was not barred by the Equine Act unless plaintiff's recreational riding of her own horse on a public trail was one of the limited activities sought to be encouraged by the Act. After determining that there was no conflict between the Illinois EALA and Animal Control Act, the court reversed the trial court's order denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and entered summary judgment for plaintiff on Count I as to liability under the Animal Control Act (510 ILCS 5/16 (West 1995)).
|Carpenter v. State||18 N.E.3d 998 (Ind. 2014)||After being convicted by a Superior Court bench trial and having the Superior Court’s judgment affirmed by the Court of Appeals, defendant appealed the admission of evidence recovered from his home after officers entered it without a warrant in pursuit of an aggressive and bloody dog. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that the entry was unreasonable under the Indiana Constitution and that the evidence obtained pursuant to a subsequent search warrant was inadmissible. The Superior Court's judgment was therefore reversed.|
|Carpenters Indus. Council v. Salazar||734 F.Supp.2d 126 (D.D.C., 2010)||
Plaintiffs, Carpenters Industrial Council, among several, averred that the FWS, in designating the owl as a "threatened species," violated the National Environmental Policy Act, the ESA, and the Administrative Procedure Act. Defendant, the FWS, confess legal error as to the northern spotted owl’s 2008 Critical Habitat Designation and 2008 Recovery Plan and ask that the court: (1) remand and vacate the 2008 Designation; (2) remand the 2008 Plan; and (3) order the FWS to revise its recovery plan and, if necessary, thereafter complete a new critical habitat designation. First, as to Defendant’s request to remand the designation, the court held that it, in fact, has such authority to do so, and such action is moreover appropriate, since the Washington Oversight Committee erred in proffering "jeopardizing" advice to the FWS. However, as to the whether the 2008 Designation may be vacated, the court concluded that it lacked the authority to do so "at this stage of the litigation." As to whether the 2008 Recovery Plan may be vacated, the court held that, given the interconnectedness of the 2008 Designation and the 2008 Plan, remand is appropriate.
|Carrasquillo v. Carlson||880 A.2d 904 (Conn.App., 2005)||
A Connecticut motorist brought a negligence action against a dog owner, seeking to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he took evasive action to avoid hitting dog. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, granted the dog owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the record was adequate for appellate review; the dog owner exercised reasonable control while walking dog; the statute allowing imposition of fine or imprisonment or both on owner of dog that interferes with motor vehicle did not apply; and the dog owner demonstrated that motorist would be unable to cure legal defects in complaint even if permitted to replead.
|Carrelli v. Dept. of Natural Resources||Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1268163 (Ohio App. 12 Dist.,2010)||
Wildlife rehabilitation permit applicant was denied a permit by the Ohio Department of Natural Resource’s Division of Wildlife. She requested an administrative hearing to challenge the denial of her application. On appeal, the court held that because wildlife rehabilitation permit applicants do not possess a private property interest in wildlife or in receiving a rehabilitation permit, the state may deny a permit based on its own discretion, so long as the decision to deny the permit is reasonably related to the state’s legitimate government interest. Therefore, even when an applicant possesses the proper credentials required to obtain a permit, the state may deny the permit in protecting the state’s legitimate government interest.
|Carroll v. Cnty. of Monroe||712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013)||The Plaintiff-Appellant appeals a decision/order by the lower court to deny her motion to set aside the jury verdict or grant a new trial. At the original trial, a jury found plaintiff failed to prove her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the shooting of her dog during the execution of a search warrant was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff's dog was shot during a "no-knock" search warrant at plaintiff's residence, but the warrant team was aware that a dog would be present during the search. On appeal, this court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial because she failed to provide any “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to show that the jury would find in her favor. The court believed that it was unlikely that a jury would find in her favor because of the fact that the dog was killed during a “no-knock” search of the home and the dog “quickly and aggressively” ran towards the police officer after he entered the home. Although the court agreed that the officers should have advised a plan to deal with the dog in a non-lethal way, it maintained that a jury would unlikely find that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable given the circumstances of this case. Affirmed.|
|Carroll v. County of Monroe||712 F.3d 649 (2nd Cir. 2013)||Upon executing a no-knock warrant by using a battering ram to break through the front door of the plaintiff’s home, police encountered the plaintiff’s dog. An officer claimed the dog was growling, barking, and quickly and aggressively approaching him. He then fired one shot from his shotgun, striking the dog and killing him. Prior to the execution of the warrant, the officers were aware that a dog would be present and did not discuss a plan for controlling the dog or neutralizing the dog by any non-lethal means. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit against the police officers and municipality, alleging violations of her Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgement and held that the issue of whether the officer acted reasonably was a question for the jury.|
|Carroll v. Rock||469 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. App., 1996)||
After plaintiff's cat escaped while at the defendant's animal hospital, Rock sued Dr. Carroll d/b/a The Animal Care Clinic for conversion or breach of bailment and emotional distress, seeking punitive damages and attorney fees. The court agreed with Carroll that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on punitive and vindictive damages, as vindictive or punitive damages are recoverable only when a defendant acts maliciously, wilfully, or with a wanton disregard of the rights of others. Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim also must fail because defendant's conduct was not outrageous or egregious.
|Carroll v. State||922 N.E.2d 755 (Ind.App., 2010)||
Defendant Lee Carroll appealed his sentence after the trial court accepted his plea of guilty to two counts of class A misdemeanor dog bite resulting in serious bodily injury. While the court noted that Defendant's lack of criminal history was a mitigating factor, the "great personal injury" suffered by the victim far exceeded any mitigation. On each count, the trial court sentenced Carroll to 365 days, with four days suspended, and ordered “both” to “run consecutive to one another.” On appeal, Defendant argued that any consideration of the his dogs' breed was improper. However, the court found that the other evidence was sufficient to support his sentence (in a footnote the court addressed it directly: "We need not address whether the trial court erred to the extent it found the breed of his dogs to be an aggravator..."). The court was not persuaded that the nature of the offenses or the character of the offender justified revising his sentence.
|Carter v. Ide||188 S.E.2d 275 (Ga.App. 1972)||
This Georgia case involves an action for injuries received by a boy after he was attacked by the defendant's dog. The lower court granted summary judgment to the defendant and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held that where there was no showing that the dog ever so much as growled at a human being before the attack, the owner of dog was not liable for injuries. Evidence that the dog previously chased a cat and had engaged in a fight with another dog was insufficient to show the owner's knowledge of the dog's vicious tendencies toward humans to create liability for the owner.
|Carter v. Louisiana State University||520 S.O.2d 383 (La. 1988).||
Plaintiff horse owner sought review by writ of the judgment of the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, State of Louisiana, which held in favor of defendants, a veterinarian and his insurer, in the owner's action for veterinary malpractice that had arisen from the amputation of a horse's tail. The court held defendants were not exculpated from liability under La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:2794 and La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 2316, 2320, where the horse had his tail wrapped too tightly resulting in avascular necrosis from loss of blood supply, gangrene, and amputation. The court held in favor of the owner, reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and reinstated the judgment of the trial court (including $34,000 in damages).
|Carter v. Metro North Associates||255 A.D.2d 251, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 10266 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,1998)||
In this New York case, a tenant sued his landlords for injuries after he was bitten on face by pit bull owned by another tenant. The lower court denied the landlords' motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment for tenant on issue of liability. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that the trial court erroneously took judicial notice of vicious nature of breed of pit bulls as a whole. In fact, the court found that the IAS court "erred in circumventing the requirement for evidence concerning the particular animal by purporting to take judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." Thus, the landlords were not strictly liable for the tenant's injuries where there was no evidence indicating that the dog had ever attacked any other person or previously displayed any vicious behavior.
|Carter v. Metro North Assocs.||680 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (N.Y.App.Div.1998)||In this case, a tenant sued her landlord for injuries sustained when the tenant was bitten on the face by a pit bull owned by another tenant. The court held that before a pet owner, or the landlord of the building in which the pet lives, may be held strictly liable for an injury inflicted by the animal, the plaintiff must establish both (1) that the animal had vicious propensities and (2) that the defendant knew or should have known of the animal's propensities. In this case, there was no evidence that the pit bull had vicious propensities, nor did any of the evidence support a finding that the landlord had, or should have had, knowledge of any such propensities. The appellate court found the lower court erred when it took "judicial notice of the vicious nature of the breed as a whole." The court noted that there are alternate opinions and evidence that preclude taking judicial notice that pit bulls are inherently vicious as a breed. The trial court order was reversed, judgment for plaintiff vacated, and complaint dismissed.|
|Carver v. Ford||591 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1979)||
The owners rented a stall from the tort victim for their heifer. The heifer escaped into the yard and crashed into a gate whereupon the gate then hit the tort victim in the mouth and broke several teeth. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that the heifer was not running at large, that the heifer escaped from its stall through no fault of the owners, that strict liability for trespass under Okla. Stat. tit. 4. sec. 98 (1965) was not applicable, and that any liability of the owners was required to be predicated upon negligence.
|Cascadia Wildlands v. Dep't of Fish and Wildlife||300 Or.App. 648 (2019)||Oregon Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Respondent") removed the species Canis lupus (gray wolf) from the list of species protected under the Oregon Endangered Species Act (OESA). Cascadia Wildlands, Center for Biological Diversity, and Oregon Wild ("Petitioners") sought judicial review of the amendment to Oregon law. The Petitioners contended that the decision to delist exceeded the commission’s statutory authority and did not comply with applicable rulemaking procedures. After the Petitioners filed their petition, the Oregon legislature passed House Bill 4040 which ratified the administrative rule that the Respondent promulgated delisting the gray wolf. The Respondents argued that the passage of the bill made the Petitioners' petition for judicial review moot. The Petitioners argued that the Oregon law ratifying the administrative rule had no legal effect and was merely an expression of legislative agreement. The Court held that the legislature using the word “ratify” in the statute indicated that they intended to confirm that the Commission’s rule delisting the gray wolf was legally satisfied, therefore, rendering judicial review moot. The Petitioners also contended that the statute violated the separation of powers because the statute performed an entirely judicial function by neither appealing nor amending the statute. Petitioners asserted that evaluating whether a particular agency satisfied requirements of law is a fact-specific inquiry which is reserved for the court. The Court held that the statute did not violate the separation of powers. The Court ultimately held that the Petitioners' rule challenge was moot. The petition for judicial review was ultimately dismissed.|
|Casillas v. Schubauer||714 N.W.2d 84 (2006)||
Ramona Casillas and Delora Stickelman brought this negligence action after suffering injuries when Casillas' vehicle collided with an eighteen-hundred pound Black Angus bull owned by Ted Schubauer. The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remanded the action for trial. The court held that, under these circumstances, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Schubauer could have reasonably anticipated the black bull would escape and stray onto Highway 83 where Schubauer knew the black bull escaped from a corral when confined with another bull on a prior occasion. Further, the court found there is a split of authority as to whether and to what extent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to cases involving collisions between motorists and domestic animals. Therefore, it is for the circuit court to determine whether Casillas and Stickelman are entitled to an instruction on res ipsa loquitur in light of the substantive law and the evidence at trial.
|CASO 02437-2013 JANE MARGARITA CÓSAR CAMACHO Y OTROS CONTRA RESOLUCION DE FOJAS 258||CASO 02437-2013||Plaintiff, a blind woman, brought a constitutional grievance against the decision issued by the Fifth Civil Chamber of the Superior Court of Justice of Lima on January 15, 2013. This decision denied the action of protection after Defendants denied entry of Plaintiff's guide dog at their supermarkets. The Constitutional Tribunal ordered that the blind were allow to enter to the supermarkets with their guide dogs.|
|Castillo Condominium Ass'n v. U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban Development||821 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2016)||In 2010, the Castillo Condominium Association learned that Carlo Giménez Bianco (Giménez), a condominium resident, was keeping a dog on the premises and warned him that he would be fined unless he removed the dog. Giménez, who suffered from anxiety and depression, advised the board of directors that he planned to keep his emotional support dog and that he was entitled to do so under federal law. As a result of the conflict, Giménez was forced to vacate and sell his unit and he filed a complaint of disability discrimination with the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). HUD filed a charge of discrimination against the Association under the Fair Housing Act. An administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that the Association had not violated the Act because Giménez failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffered from a mental impairment. The ALJ’s decision was appealed to the Secretary, who found that Gimenez suffered from a cognizable disability. The Court of Appeals, First Circuit, held that substantial evidence supported the Secretary's finding that the Association's refusal to allow Gimenez to keep an emotional support dog in his condominium unit as a reasonable accommodation for his disability violated the Fair Housing Act. The Association’s petition for review was denied and the Secretary’s cross petition was granted.|
|Cat Champion Corp. v. Jean Marie Primrose||149 P.3d 1276 (Or. Ct. App. 2006)||
A woman had 11 cats which were in a state of neglect and were taken away from her and put with a cat protection agency. Criminal charges were dropped against the woman when it was found she was mentally ill and incapable of taking care of herself or her cats. The court found it could grant the cat protection agency ownership over the cats so they could be put up for adoption, even though the woman had not been criminal charged, and had not forfeited her cats.
|Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13 “Incidente de apelación en autos G. B., R. s/inf. ley 14346”||Causa Nº 17001-06-00/13||This is an appeal of a decision in first instance where the lower court gave the custody of 68 dogs to the Center for Prevention of Animal Cruelty. The 68 dogs were found in extremely poor conditions, sick, malnourished, dehydrated under the custody of the Defendant. Various dogs had dermatitis, conjunctivitis, otitis, sparse hair and boils, lacerations, pyoderma and ulcers. The officers that executed the search also found the decomposing body of a dead dog inside the premises. The lower court determined the defendant had mental disabilities, which did not allow her to comprehend the scope of her acts, for which she was not found guilty of animal cruelty. However, the court determined that she was not suited to care for the dogs. The Defendant appealed the decision arguing that the dogs were not subject to confiscation.|
|Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply||848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004)||
Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute.
|Cavel Intern., Inc. v. Madigan||500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007)||
The issue on appeal was whether Illinois' prohibition of horsemeat for human consumption was preempted by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) or in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that the statute was neither preempted nor in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause
|Celinski v. State||911 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. App. 1995).||
Criminal conviction of defendant who tortured cats by poisoning them and burning them in microwave oven. Conviction was sustained by circumstantial evidence of cruelty and torture.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Badgley||335 F.3d 1097 (C.A.9 (Or.),2003)||
The Center for Biological Diversity and eighteen other nonprofit organizations appealed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. The Center claimed the Secretary of the Interior violated the Endangered Species Act by making an erroneous, arbitrary, and capricious determination that listing the Northern Goshawk (a short-winged, long-tailed hawk that lives in forested regions of higher latitude in the northern hemisphere and is often considered an indicator species) in the contiguous United States west of the 100th meridian as a threatened or endangered species was not warranted. In the absence of evidence that the goshawk is endangered or likely to become endangered in the foreseeable future, the court found the FWS's decision was not arbitrary or capricious and affirmed the summary disposition.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. California Fish & Game Com'n||2008 WL 4055216 (Cal. App. 3 Dist.)||
The California Fish & Game Commission (Commission) rejected a petition by the Center for Biological Diversity (Center) to add the California tiger salamander to the Commission’s list of endangered species under the California Endangered Species Act (CESA), on grounds that the petition lacked sufficient information to indicate that the listing may be warranted. The Court of Appeal, Third District, California, held that the Trial Court did not err in directing the Commission to enter a decision accepting the Center’s petition, as inferences drawn from evidence offered in support of the petition clearly afforded sufficient information to indicate that listing action may be warranted. The Court found that information in the administrative record indicating that the salamander species “does not breed prolifically, is vulnerable to several significant threats, has lost most of its original habitat, and has been displaced by a hybrid from a significant portion of its range” was not outweighed by the Commission’s evidence and arguments regarding the introduction of artificial ponds which could provide increased breeding habitat, and the listing of the species under the Federal Endangered Species Act.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Chertoff||Slip Copy, 2009 WL 839042 (N.D.Cal.)||
Plaintiff, the Center for Biological Diversity, brought an action against Defendant, the United States Coast Guard, alleging that Defendant violated the ESA by failing to consult with the NMFS to ensure that Defendant’s activities in the Santa Barbara Channel and other shipping lanes off the California Coast would not harm the continued existence of threatened and/or endangered species after Defendant amended Traffic Separation Schemes (“TSS”) and a number of blue whales were subsequently struck by ships and killed. On the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment, the United States District Court , N.D. California dismissed Plaintiff’s claims pertaining to Defendant’s implementation of or actions under the TSS in the approaches to Los Angeles – Long Beach and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Defendant’s alleged violations of the ESA arising out of Defendant’s implementation of or actions under the TSS in the Santa Barbara Channel.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Haaland||--- F.3d ----, 2021 WL 2232487 (9th Cir. June 3, 2021)||This case is a challenge to a decision by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") reversing its previous decision that the Pacific walrus qualified for listing as an endangered or threatened species under the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (“ESA”). In 2008, the Center for Biological Diversity (“Center”) petitioned the Service to list the Pacific walrus as threatened or endangered, citing the claimed effects of climate change on its habitat. In 2011, after completing a species status assessment, the Service issued a 45-page decision ("Decision") that found the listing of the Pacific walrus was warranted, but it declined to list the species because it found the need to prioritize more urgent listings. A settlement between the parties in 2017 required the Service to submit a proposed rule or a non-warranted finding. In May of 2017, the Service completed a final species assessment ("Assessment") that concluded some of the stressors to the species had "declined in magnitude" and the walruses had adjusted, which culminated in "a terse 3-page final decision that the Pacific walrus no longer qualified as a threatened species." As a result, in 2018, the Center filed this action alleging that the 2017 Decision violated the APA and ESA. The District Court granted summary judgement to the Service and this appeal followed. The Ninth Circuit first observed that, while the Assessment contains some new information, it does not explain why this new information resulted in an about-face from the Service's 2011 conclusion that the Pacific walrus met the statutory criteria for listing. The Service contends the appellate inquiry must be limited to the 3-page Decision document from 2017. However, the Court noted that a review of the reasons offered by the Service in its appellate briefing illustrates why the Court cannot conduct the required appellate review without reference to the previous Assessment. The agency's new policy contradicts its prior policy (the Decision document which was 40+ more pages longer than the Assessment and includes citations and other data). The Ninth Circuit now holds that the Service did not sufficiently explain why it changed its prior position. As a result, the Court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Service and remanded it to the District Court to direct the Service to provide a sufficient explanation of its new position.|
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Henson||Slip Copy, 2009 WL 1882827 (D.Or.)||
Defendants brought a motion to stay in an action brought by Plaintiffs seeking re-initiation of consultation under ESA with respect to the Oregon Department of Forestry’s Habitat Conservation Plan promulgated in 1995 and their Incidental Take Permit obtained in 1995, which allows incidental taking of Northern Spotted Owls for sixty years in connection with timber harvest in the Elliot State Forest. The United States District Court granted Defendants’ motion, finding that the potential harm and likelihood of damage to Plaintiffs if the action is stayed is low. The court also found that Defendants showed an adequate likelihood of hardship in having to go forward without a stay. The stay would likely result in the action ultimately becoming moot and/or at the very least greatly simplified, therefore saving judicial time and resources.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne||2008 WL 1902703 (N.D.Cal. 2008)||
Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity (CBD) seeks to compel Defendants to perform their mandatory duty under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) to publish a final listing determination for the polar bear. Plaintiffs have filed a summary judgment motion seeking an injunction and declaratory judgment to this effect. The action began back in 2005 when CBD petitioned to list the polar bear as endangered under the ESA. Plaintiffs' action arises from Defendants' failure to issue a final listing determination and critical habitat designation by January 9, 2008-within one year of publication of the proposed rule-as required by the ESA (16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)). Since Defendants missed this non-discretionary deadline, and there was no dispute of material fact, summary judgment was granted by the court.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne||2008 WL 4542947 (N.D.Cal.)||
Plaintiffs brought various claims against Defendants relating to Defendants’ final rule designating the polar bear as a threatened species under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and Defendants’ promulgation of a special rule under section 4(d) of the ESA, allowing certain activities with respect to the polar bear that might otherwise be prohibited. The United States District Court, N.D. California tentatively granted a non-profit organization’s motion to intervene with respect to the action challenging Defendants’ section 4(d) rule as contrary to the ESA, finding that although the Organization did not show that the current Plaintiffs will not adequately represent the Organization’s interest, a decision for Defendants could jeopardize the Organization’s interests and the Organization’s motion was timely.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne||Slip Copy, 2008 WL 4543043 (N.D.Cal.)||
In an action alleging multiple violations of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) pursuant to Defendants’ final rule designating the polar bear as threatened and promulgation of a special rule under section 4(d) of the ESA, Defendants Kempthorne and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service brought a motion to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Intervenor-Defendant Arctic Slope Regional Corporation brought a separate motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and Intervenor-Defendant Alaska Oil and Gas Association filed a motion with the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (MDL Panel) seeking to transfer the case to the D.C. District Court . The United States District Court, N.D. California denied the motion to transfer the case to the District of Alaska, and decided to take the motion to transfer to the District of Columbia into submission and rule on it once the MDL Panel has issued its decision on whether to transfer the case to the District of Columbia.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Kempthorne||607 F.Supp.2d 1078 (D.Ariz.,2009)||
Cross motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ claim against Defendants, the Secretary of the Interior and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, alleging that the Secretary’s failure to designate critical habitat and prepare a recovery plan for the jaguar was unlawful under the ESA. The United States District Court, D. Arizona granted Plaintiffs’ motion in part and denied Plaintiffs’ motion in part, finding that Defendants’ determination that designation of a critical habitat would not be prudent must be set aside because it did not appear to be based on the best scientific evidence available as required by the ESA, and that Defendants’ determination not to prepare a recovery plan must also be set aside and remanded for further consideration because the determination was inconsistent with Defendants’ own policy guidance and long-standing practice concerning the distinction between foreign and domestic species.
|Center for Biological Diversity v. Lohn||483 F.3d 984 (C.A.9 (Wash.), 2007)||
This case questions whether the federal government's policy for listing killer whales under the Endangered Species Act is invalid. The Fish and Wildlife Service initially issued a proposed ruling that listing the Southern Resident was “not warranted” because the Southern Resident was not “significant” to its taxon. The district court set aside the Service's “not warranted” finding, and ordered the Service to reexamine whether the Southern Resident should be listed as an endangered species and to issue a new finding within twelve months. After again being challenged by plaintiff, the Service issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered (as opposed to threatened) species. The Service contends that this case is now moot because it has, since the district court's decision, issued a proposed rule that recommended listing the Southern Resident as a threatened species and ultimately has issued a final rule listing the Southern Resident as an endangered species. This court agreed, and thus vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the case as moot.