Divorce or Custody

Displaying 31 - 40 of 68
Titlesort descending Summary
In re Marriage of Berger and Ognibene-Berger Joe Berger appeals from the provisions of the decree of divorce from Cira Berger, including the court’s grant of Max, the family golden retriever, to Cira. He argues that it would be more equitable to grant him ownership of Max because Cira already owns another dog, Sophie, and the parties’ son, who lives with Joe, is very attached to Max. The district court made their decision based on which party would be more available to care for the dog. This court affirms that decision, citing evidence that Max is licensed to Cira, only Cira’s name is in the dog’s ‘GEO tracker’ device, and Cira got Max medical attention even when Max was in Joe’s care. The court specified that they need not determine a pet's best interests when deciding custody.
In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER

In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights.

In re Marriage of Piskalns The parties both appealed from the district court’s orders distributing the marital estate upon the parties’ divorce. Kara Pilskalns claimed that the court erred when it granted ownership of Maggie, the couple’s dog, to Andrew Pilskalns. This court affirms the decision, declining to use the best interest of the child standard for the distribution of pets as they are marital property.
In re Marriage of Stewart


Dog which had been gift from husband to wife was awarded to husband in divorce decree; wife appealed.  Appeals court found that the trial court did not err, considering both "the property division as a whole" and that the dog had accompanied husband to work each day.  Court held that a dog is personal property whose best interests need not be considered.

In re Marriage of Tevis-Bleich
A couple had agreed to a divorce settlement where they each had visitation rights with their dog; the trial court approved of the arrangement.  The wife later tried to have that section removed from the decree, but the trial court held that they did not have jurisdiction to make such a change.  The appellate court affirmed the decision, which left visitation intact
Juelfs v. Gough

In this case, the husband and wife had agreed to shared ownership of their dog, which the lower court incorporated into its order.Based on danger the dog faced by other dogs in the wife’s home and increased contention between the parties, the lower court next gave the husband custody with an order for the wife’s visitation, and finally awarded sole custody to the husband.


The state’s Supreme Court affirmed the modified order.

Lyman v. Lanser This case is an appeal concerning an agreement to share possession of a dog between a couple that had ended their relationship. The lower court granted the plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals vacated the order, then this appeal followed. The parties purchased the dog together while they were still a couple, and agreed to share the dog if they broke up. After the relationship eventually ended, the couple shared the dog on a two week alternating basis. Eventually, one party maintained custody of the dog and denied the other party access to the dog, so plaintiff filed this action for conversion and breach of contract, seeking specific performance of the custody agreement for the dog. The court here found that the dog is jointly owned property, the lack of a written contract does not bar the plaintiff from specific performance, and that the judge's order of specific performance was a suitable remedy since monetary damages would not allow plaintiff access to his shared property. Therefore, the court reversed the order vacating the preliminary injunction and denied the defendant's petition for relief from the preliminary injunction.
M.E.R. c/ B.A.B. del C.| Divorcio por presentación conjunta - Popeye and Kiara - Argentina In August 2022, Amorina Bascoy and Emmanuel Medina jointly petitioned for divorce after ten years of marriage. The couple did not have children but shared their life with Popeye and Kiara, their two beloved dogs. The couple filed their agreement regarding the division of marital assets and the care of Kiara and Popeye, together with the communication agreement regarding their care and visitation time, where visitation dates and times would be assessed flexibly by both spouses. In this instance, the family judge recognized the agreement reached by the spouses regarding the care of their beloved dogs, where each divorcee would keep the custody of a dog according to each dog's preference. In addition, in her holding, the judge stated that "although our legal system has not yet advanced in such a way that it can anticipate and/or regulate the situation in which members who also make up the family and have joined it -will be after the termination of the relationship, in this case, two dogs, POPEYE and KIARA-, this brings a reality that cannot be denied and a question that must be answered but those of us that have an obligation to provide a response because, it is known, that everything that is not prohibited by law is otherwise permitted, even in the absence of specific rules that establish it." the judges continues "Thus, we can say that it is known that animals, especially domestic ones, are sensitive beings, who feel, miss, rejoice, suffer, and who acquire habits, the reason why it is undoubted that the change that will produce the separation of the spouses, will also affect them. It will be their owners, then, who are in a better position, to look out for the dogs' interests. Such an understanding has been accepted in some countries, such as Spain, in the same way as in our jurisprudence. This case joins the set of cases in Argentina, such as the Tita and Sidney cases, and other countries in the region where the consideration of animals as non-human persons is becoming more common among judges."
Matter of Marriage of Niemi Douglas Niemi appealed the trial court's order granting Mariah Niemi visits with their two dogs, which were awarded to Douglas as his separate property in a dissolution proceeding. Douglas and Mariah were married for 27 years and had two large dogs who were each about two years old. During the petition for legal separation, Mariah asked for 10 hours a week of visitation with the dogs because they were "family members." Following the trial, Mariah continued to emphasize her desire to have access to the dogs and the court ultimately awarded the dogs to Douglas as separate property, but allowed Mariah visits with the dogs three times a week. Douglas appealed that award, contending that the trial court abused its discretion by awarding visitation of his separate property. Mariah countered with the fact a court has discretion to grant her access to this "special classification" of property. Here, the Court of Appeals agreed with Douglas, finding that the lower court had no authority under Washington law to compel a party to produce separate property after a marital dissolution. The court also held that is not the province of the court to recognize a special category of personal property when the statute has not done so. Finally, the court observed that such agreements about visitation with animals would lead to continuing supervision and enforcement problems in the court system. Because the trial court exceeded its authority in awarding visitation rights, this court reversed and remanded the issue for the trial court to strike the provision related to visitation and maintenance costs for the dogs.
ME - Divorce - § 953. Disposition of property In 2021, Maine amended its divorce laws to allow a judge to consider other factors in awarding ownership of companion animals to one party. These factors include things like (1) the well-being and basic daily needs of the companion animal; (2) the amount of time each party has spent with the companion animal during the marriage tending to the companion animal; the ability of a party to continue to own, support and provide adequate care for the companion animal; (3) the emotional attachment of a party to the companion animal; (4) the emotional attachment of any child in the household to the companion animal and the benefit to the child of the companion animal's remaining in the primary residence of the child; (5) any domestic violence between the parties or in the household of the parties; and (6) any history of animal abuse or other unsafe conditions for the companion animal.

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