Divorce or Custody
Displaying 21 - 30 of 62
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| Grey v. Johansson | This suit was filed after Grey and Johansson entered into a disagreement about who was the rightful owner of Johansson’s late wife’s horse, Navy. Grey was Johansson’s lawyer and was left responsible for caring for and handling all sales regarding her horses after her death. Grey filed suit for fraud and defamation against Johansson after he publicly referred to Grey as a “horse stealer.” Ultimately, the court held that Grey did not produce enough to evidence to establish a case for either fraud or defamation against Johanasson. Although Johanasson did call Grey a “horse stealer,” the court found that this comment was protected by judicial privilege. |
| Hament v. Baker | The custody of an eleven year old German wirehaired pointer was the central issue in this Vermont divorce case. While both parties testified to their strong emotional ties to the dog and to the care that each spouse provided, the Superior Court awarded custody to the husband. The wife appealed the Superior Court’s decision arguing that the court erred in refusing a joint arrangement, that the court’s finding was not supported by the evidence, and that this finding provided an arbitrary basis for award. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Vermont held that the family court division could consider factors not set out in 15 V.S.A. § 751(b); specifically, the welfare of the animal and the emotional connection between the animal and each spouse. The court found that both parties were afforded an opportunity to put on evidence regarding both factors without restriction in the Superior Court. The Supreme Court of Vermont also held that the Superior Court was correct in its statement that the family division could not enforce a visitation or shared custody order for companion animals. Unlike child custody matters, the court said, there is no legislative authority for the court to play a continuing role in the supervision of the parties with respect to the care and sharing of a companion animal. The Superior Court’s decision of awarding custody to the husband was therefore affirmed. |
| Harby v. Harby | This Florida case involves an appeal of a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. With respect to animal law, the wife appealed the trial court's distribution of family dogs, Liberty and Nico, to the former husband. According to testimony, the dogs were bonded to each other. The former wife testified that the family adopted Liberty "to be an emotional support dog" and was her constant companion. The former wife testified that she cared for the dogs when they were adopted in 2013 and 2014 until the parties separated in 2017. Since that separation, the dogs have been in the husband's possession and care. The trial court determined that the dogs were marital property and that the wife appeared to be in good health with no physical or mental disabilities. Further, both parties agreed the dogs should not be separated from each other and the court found the dogs had been in the husband's possession since the parties separated. On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court's distribution of the family dogs to Former Husband was arbitrary, capricious, and unsupported by the record. In particular, the wife contends that one of the dogs is her emotional support animal and former husband expressed no desire or claim for the dogs in testimony. The court first observed that Florida is not one of the handful of states with statutes that give pets a special property status in distribution of marital assets. Instead, animals are considered personal property. Here, the court found both parties have cared for the dogs at times and the husband cared for them after the parties separated in 2017. And, while the court found that Liberty was "emotionally comforting," there was no evidence that the former wife had a disability and that Liberty provided emotional support to alleviate an effect of such disability. Thus, the role Liberty played was to provide comfort and companionship like most household pets. Since the trial court also considered each party's sentimental interest in the pets, including the children's attachment since they resided primarily with the former husband, there was no showing that the court abused its discretion in awarding the dogs to former husband. Thus, the appellate court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion by awarding the family dogs to the former husband. |
| Hogan v. Hogan | This case is an appeal of a judgment granting an Alabama divorce. With regard to animal law, the husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the couple's two dogs. Specifically, the husband argues that one of the dogs was given to him as a gift and is therefore his separate property. He also suggests that because the dogs lived with him since his wife moved out of the marital property (from 11/2012 until 02/2015), he is the "proper owner" of the dogs. While this court noted that evidence concerning ownership was disputed at trial, the evidence is undisputed that the wife entered the marriage with one of the dogs. The second dog was given to both parties by the wife's niece. In examining Alabama law, the court observed that it has long been held that dogs are property. Thus, evidence of ownership can come from documentary title (like a dog license or registration) or possession. Here, the court was persuaded by the testimony that when the wife moved out, she moved into an apartment and was unable to take the dogs with her. No evidence was presented that the wife's circumstances changed to allow her to keep the dogs, and there was no showing that the wife sought court intervention to regain possession of the dogs. Thus, the court stated the following: "Based on the presumption stated in Placey, supra, that the ownership of a pet is presumed to be in the person who possesses it, and given the wife's failure to present evidence indicating that she was in a position to take the dogs, we conclude that the evidence does not support the trial court's decision to award the dogs to the wife. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment awarding the dogs to the wife is reversed." |
| Houseman v. Dare |
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| How to Apply the “Best Interest of the Pet” Standard in Divorce Proceedings in Accordance with Newly Enacted Laws | |
| IL - Divorce - Act 5. Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act | Effective January 1, 2018, the Illinois Legislature amended several provisions under Act 5, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act. Under the Joint Simplified Dissolution Procedure, the amendments added the following requirement to the conditions that must be present to do a simplified dissolution: (k) The parties have executed a written agreement allocating ownership of and responsibility for any companion animals owned by the parties. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." Under Part V, "Property, Support and Attorney Fees," three sections were amended. Section 5/501 deals with temporary relief and amendments in 2018 added subsection (f): "Companion animals. Either party may petition or move for the temporary allocation of sole or joint possession of and responsibility for a companion animal jointly owned by the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal." In Section 5/502 on amicable settlement agreements between parties, the following provision was added to subsection (a): "The parties may also enter into an agreement allocating the sole or joint ownership of or responsibility for a companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act. Any agreement pursuant to this Section must be in writing, except for good cause shown with the approval of the court, before proceeding to an oral prove up." Finally, under § 503 on "Disposition of property and debts," amendments added this subsection: "(n) If the court finds that a companion animal of the parties is a marital asset, it shall allocate the sole or joint ownership of and responsibility for a companion animal of the parties. In issuing an order under this subsection, the court shall take into consideration the well-being of the companion animal. As used in this Section, “companion animal” does not include a service animal as defined in Section 2.01c of the Humane Care for Animals Act." |
| In re Marriage of Berger and Ognibene-Berger | Joe Berger appeals from the provisions of the decree of divorce from Cira Berger, including the court’s grant of Max, the family golden retriever, to Cira. He argues that it would be more equitable to grant him ownership of Max because Cira already owns another dog, Sophie, and the parties’ son, who lives with Joe, is very attached to Max. The district court made their decision based on which party would be more available to care for the dog. This court affirms that decision, citing evidence that Max is licensed to Cira, only Cira’s name is in the dog’s ‘GEO tracker’ device, and Cira got Max medical attention even when Max was in Joe’s care. The court specified that they need not determine a pet's best interests when deciding custody. |
| In re MARRIAGE OF Kimberly K. Enders and Michael A. BAKER |
In this case, Michael A. Baker appealed the trial court’s decision regarding property distribution and visitation rights with regard to his two dogs, Grace and Roxy, following his divorce from Kimberly K. Enders. The trial court awarded custody of both dogs to Enders and denied Baker any visitation rights. In making its decision, the trial court relied on a New York case in which the New York Supreme Court did not allow dog visitation. (Travis v. Murray, 42 Misc.3d 447, 977 N.Y.S.2d 621, 631 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.2013). The New York Supreme Court refused to apply the “best interests of the dog” standard and instead applied a “best for all standard,” holding that “household pets enjoy a status greater than mere chattel.” Baker appealed the trial court’s decision arguing that Illinois courts have the authority to order pet visitation. On appeal, the court determined that there was no case law to suggest that an Illinois court had ever addressed the issue of dog visitation. As a result, the court found that the trial court was well within its discretion to apply the standard used in the New York case. Additionally, the court of appeals applied the statutory definition of “dog owner” in Illinois and determined that Enders was the dogs’ rightful owner. The Illinois statute defined owner as “any person having a right of property in an animal, or who keeps or harbors an animal, or who has it in his care, or acts as its custodian.” The court found that because the dogs were left in Ender’s care following the divorce, she is the one who “keeps or harbors” the dogs and is therefore the owner. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision and denied Baker visitation rights. |
| In re Marriage of Piskalns | The parties both appealed from the district court’s orders distributing the marital estate upon the parties’ divorce. Kara Pilskalns claimed that the court erred when it granted ownership of Maggie, the couple’s dog, to Andrew Pilskalns. This court affirms the decision, declining to use the best interest of the child standard for the distribution of pets as they are marital property. |