|Boosman v. Moudy||
In this Missouri case, an action was brought on behalf of a child who was bitten by a dog (a large dog of the malemute breed). After the lower court entered judgment against the dog owner, the owner appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's evidence demonstrated that the dog had become ill-natured and had acquired the persistent menacing habit of growling, bristling and snapping at people. Such behavior was repeatedly brought to the attention of the owner's wife prior to time dog bit child. This evidence, together with owner's evidence that his daughter had encouraged the dog to play tug-of-war with her clothing, supported the verdict in favor of the plaintiff that the injury to child resulted from the propensity of the dog to do bodily harm, either in anger or from playfulness.
|Detailed Discussion of Missouri Great Ape Laws||The following discussion begins with a general overview of the various Missouri state statutes and regulations affecting Great Apes. It then analyzes the applicability of those laws to the possession and use of apes for specific purposes, including their possession as pets, for scientific research, for commercial purposes, and in sanctuaries. The discussion concludes with a compilation of local ordinances which govern the possession and use of apes within geographic subdivisions of the state.|
|Gromer v. Matchett||
|Humane Society of United States v. State||
On May 13, 2011, Animal Welfare Organizations sought a declaratory judgment against the State of Missouri and the Missouri Department of Agriculture stating that Senate Bill (SB) 795 violated the Missouri Constitution by amending a bill to change its original purpose. The trial court found the Animal Welfare Organization's cause of action was moot and granted the State and the State Department's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, in an en blanc opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court found the repeal and reenactment of § 273.327 in SB 161 rendered moot any decision as to whether SB795 was properly enacted. The lower court's decision was therefore affirmed.
|Luethans v. Washington University||Plaintiff, a licensed veterinarian, appeals from the circuit court's order dismissing his case in a wrongful discharge case. Plaintiff contends that as an at-will employee he stated a cause of action for wrongful discharge under Missouri's public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine. Specifically, he pleaded that he was retaliated against and discharged because he performed a regulatory protected activity, i.e., reporting violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2143. The court agreed and reversed and remanded.|
|Malane Wilson v. City of St. Louis; Dian K. Sharma, Health Commissioner, City of St. Louis Department of Health and Hospitals; R||
This action concerns the release of a dog who was impounded and classified as “dangerous” without a chance for his owner to argue against the action. Plaintiff Malane Wilson filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction, a petition for declaratory judgment, and a petition for replevin against the City of St. Louis and the Animal Regulation Center, among others. The subject of the petitions concerned her American Pit Bull Terrier named Max who was seized by agents of the Animal Regulation Center as an apparent “dangerous dog.” Plaintiff contends that Max’s alleged actions in killing the neighbor’s dog did not qualify under the St. Louis City Ordinance as a “dangerous dog.” Further, plaintiff was not given any legal or administrative hearing once her dog was seized, contrary to due process requirements. She also sought in her declaratory petition to have the ordinance declared illegal, void, and unconstitutional for its failure to adequately define “dangerous dog” and “potentially dangerous dog.”
The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction was not granted. Thus, the City was enjoined from killing or otherwise harming Max. They were also ordered to release Max, remove his “dangerous” designation, and have him instead classified as “potentially dangerous.” The plaintiff was required to comply with enclosure and other safety requirements for Max.
|Miles ex rel. Miles v. Rich||
|Missouri Farmers Ass'n v. Kempker||
|Missouri Veterinary Medical Bd. v. Gray||
|MO - Assistance Animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws||