Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TN - Impound - Rabies. § 68-8-109. Observation; confinement or quarantine. | T. C. A. § 68-8-109 | TN ST § 68-8-109 | This Tennessee statute provides that if any animal has bitten any person, is suspected of having bitten any person or is for any reason suspected of being infected with rabies, the animal may be required to be placed under an observation period either by confinement or by quarantine for a period of time deemed necessary by the commissioner or rules of the department. | Statute |
| Kanoa Inc., v. Clinton | 1 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (1998) |
Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). |
Case | |
| Hanrahan v. Hometown America, LLC | 90 So.3d 915 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) | 2012 WL 2327814 (Fla.App. 4 Dist.) |
While walking his dog one evening, the plaintiff's husband was attacked by fire ants. In an attempt to remove the ants off his person, the plaintiff's husband collapsed in the shower. Two days later, he died. As a representative for her husband's estate and in her own capacity, the plaintiff filed a negligence suit against her landlord. After the trial court granted the landlord's motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff appealed. Affirming the lower court's decision, the appeals court reasoned that since the landlord did not harbor, possess, or introduce the fire ants onto the premises, the landlord owed no duty to the plaintiff. |
Case |
| Rhoades v. City of Battle Ground | 2002 WL 31789336 (Wash.App. Div. 2) | 114 Wash.App. 1062 (2002) (Not Reported in P.2d) |
In this case, exotic animal owners appeal a summary judgment order dismissing their various constitutional challenges to a City of Battle Ground ordinance that prohibits ownership of such animals within city limits. Specifically, the owners contended that the ordinance violated their right to equal protection under the constitution because it treats those who keep exotic pets within the City differently from those who keep dangerous dogs. The court held that it was within the city's police power authority to enact these laws if they were supported by a rational relationship. In fact, the court found that the local legislative body may draw a different conclusion from the Washington Supreme Court in areas of public safety and the exercise of the local government's police powers provided it does not conflict with the general laws of the state. ( Note : publication of case ordered Feb. 7, 2003 in 115 Wash.App. 752, 63 P.3d 142 ). |
Case |
| Mills v. State | 848 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App. 1993). |
In an animal cruelty conviction, the law requires that sentences arising out of same criminal offenses be prosecuted in single action and run concurrently. |
Case | |
| DE - Invasive/non-native - § 802. Non-native wildlife injurious to native wildlife, agriculture, and other interests | 7 Del.C. § 802 | DE ST TI 7 § 802 | This Delaware statute leaves to the discretion of the state whether to authorize an entity or persons to take, harvest, or capture any species of non-native wildlife that is or has the potential to become injurious to native wildlife. | Statute |
| AU - Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 (NSW) | Exhibited Animals Protection Act 1986 |
This Act deals with the exhibition of animals at marine or zoological parks, circuses and other places. It regulates the exhibition of all vertebrate animals in zoos, circuses or mobile displays regardless of whether they are native, exotic or domestic.
A person must have an approval to keep and exhibit an animal, and this is subject to qualifications, experience or any other term or condition that may be considered necessary |
Statute | |
| State v. Warren | 439 P.3d 357 (Mt. 2019) | 2019 MT 49; 395 Mont. 15; 2019 WL 926113 (Mt. 2019) | Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court. | Case |
| WA - Hunting - 77.15.210. Obstructing the taking of fish, shellfish, or wildlife--Penalty | West's RCWA 77.15.210 - 220 | WA ST 77.15.210 -220 | This set of laws represents Washington's hunter harassment provisions. Under the section, a person is guilty of obstructing the taking of fish, shellfish, or wildlife if the person harasses, drives, or disturbs fish, shellfish, or wildlife with the intent of disrupting lawful pursuit or taking, or if the person harasses, intimidates, or interferes with an individual engaged in the lawful taking. Violation is a gross misdemeanor. | Statute |
| Coos County Board of County Com'rs v. Kempthorne | 531 F.3d 792 (9th Cir., 2008) | 08 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7939, 2008 WL 2522202 (C.A.9 (Or.)) | The issue here is whether FWS has an enforceable duty promptly to withdraw a threatened species from the protections of the ESA after a five-year agency review mandated by the Act found that the species does not fit into a protected population category. The species at issue here are murrelets-small, dove-sized birds that feed primarily on sea life and nest in coastal mature and old-growth forests. This Court concluded that Coos County has not alleged a failure to perform a nondiscretionary act or duty imposed by the ESA, whether premised on the petition process deadlines or on the agency's more general duty to act on its own determinations. | Case |