Results
Displaying 5921 - 5930 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Dirk Kempthorne | 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 2245321 (C.A.D.C.) |
The Humane Society of the United States sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves. The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List. After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the appeal moot. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling. |
Case |
| VA - Research - Chapter 52. Humane Cosmetics Act | VA Code Ann. § 59.1-571 - 574 | VA ST § 59.1-571 - 574 | This Virginia law states that, beginning July 1, 2022, no manufacturer shall sell or offer for sale within the Commonwealth any cosmetic, if the cosmetics manufacturer knows or reasonably should know that the cosmetic or any component thereof was developed or manufactured using cosmetic animal testing that was conducted on or after January 1, 2022. Limited exceptions exist. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter is subject to a civil penalty of $5,000 and an additional $1,000 for each day the violation continues. Such penalty shall be collected by the Attorney General and the proceeds shall be deposited into the Literary Fund. | Statute |
| People v. Zamora | 175 N.E.3d 700 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | 2020 IL App (1st) 172011 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | Defendant Juan Zamora was found guilty of failing to provide humane care and treatment for, and abusing, his 10 dogs in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act. On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the it generally showed that he treated his dogs well and they had not sustained physical or psychological injuries. Additionally, he argues that section 3(a)(4) of the act, which criminalizes the failure to provide “humane care and treatment,” is unconstitutionally vague. The conviction stems from defendant's conduct with his 10 pit bull type dogs. When the investigating officer executed a search warrant on defendant's residence, they found the ten dogs heavily chained in the basement standing on newspaper completely saturated with feces and urine, along with breeding harnesses and training treadmills indicative of dog fighting. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant suggests the evidence showed he was a "considerate dog owner with healthy dogs." However, the court was unconvinced, finding the slates of the metal and wooden makeshift cages were not appropriate for indoor or outdoor housing. Further, the accumulation of dog waste also supported the officer's testimony and the presence of dog fighting supplies supported a conclusion that "defendant's treatment of the dogs reflected something other than mere companionship." As to the vagueness challenge, the court found that defendant did not demonstrate that section 3(a)(4) fails to sufficiently enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct the statute criminalizes or that it fails to provide police officers and the courts explicit standards. In fact, the court found that "defendant did not demonstrate compassion, sympathy or consideration for the dogs when he failed to provide an adequate habitat or ensure that bodily waste did not accumulate" and that this conduct fell squarely in the conduct addressed by the law. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment and rejected defendant's claims on appeal. | Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine | 991 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2014) | 119 A.D.3d 1202; 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05395; 2014 WL 3511059 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) | Petitioners seek, among other things, a declaration that force-fed foie gras is an adulterated food product and an order prohibiting the state respondents from allowing foie gras into the human food supply. Pre-answer motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that petitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court granted dismissal upon such ground and petitioners appealed. Petitioner Stahlie contended he had standing based upon allegations that he occasionally ate foie gras at parties and other events and that this might increase his risk of developing secondary amyloidosis. The court, however, found the risk of exposure to be minimal and the indication of harm uncertain since Stahlie had no underlying medical conditions that might be related to an increased risk of secondary amyloidosism, that his exposure to foie gras was infrequent, and that he did not cite a situation of any person ever suffering secondary amyloidosis that was linked to foie gras. The Animal Legal Defense Fund argued that since it used its resources to investigate and litigate the alleged conduct of the state respondents, it had standing. The court, however, found that a finding of standing under this situation would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction. Lastly the court found that petitioners had not alleged ‘a sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the state to allow for State Finance Law § 123-b standing.’ The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. | Case |
| AL - Ordinances - Article 5. Powers as to Health, Sanitation, and Quarantine | Ala. Code 1975 § 11-47-130 to 132 | AL ST § 11-47-130 to 132 | This set of laws authorizes all cities and towns to regulate animals and animal related conditions that pose a threat to the public health. | Statute |
| Christine Valpiani and Anthony Valpiani, husband and wife, plaintiffs v. Lisa K. Reising, D.V.M. a Washington State veterinarian |
This King County, Washington motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of several of plaintiff's claims as well as a limitation to the damages that are recoverable. Plaintiffs claim that the negligence of defendant-veterinarian caused the death of their dog (defendant admitted negligence so the issue here centers on damages). The court held that plaintiffs may assert claims for loss of use, but not loss of companionship. |
Pleading | ||
| Butcher v. Gay | 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 771 (Cal.App.5.Dist.) | 29 Cal.App.4th 388 (Cal.App.5.Dist.) |
Plaintiff alleged that she had contracted Lyme disease "as a result of exposure to infested ticks" on respondent's property, and that respondent had "failed to spray the area, post signs or prevented [sic] domestic dog(s) from coming into contact with the plaintiff - jumping in her lap - thereby exposing her to a vector of the disease without her knowledge. Court found no duty toward the plaintiff and allow the motion for summary judgment against the plaintiff to stand. |
Case |
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - CHHATTISGARH AGRICULTURAL CATTLE PRESERVATION ACT, 2004 | 25 of 2006 | The Act, specific to the state of Chhattisgarh, prohibits the slaughter of agricultural cattle—cows, calves, bulls, bullocks and male and female buffaloes. The law criminalizes the possession and sale of beef, and the transport of agricultural cattle from the state for the purpose of slaughter. The state government shall make rules for the economic rehabilitation of persons affected by the Act. | Statute | |
| City of Columbiana v. Simpson | --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 4897158 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-4086 (2019) | Richard G. Simpson, Appellant, lived in a residential district in Columbiana, Ohio. Simpson kept eight hens, a chicken coop, and an enclosure on his property for approximately seven years. On July of 2016, Simpson was informed that keeping chickens in the district he lived in was a zoning violation, however, Simpson found no prohibition in the Code regarding the keeping of chickens in a residential district. The city sent Simpson violation notices and instructed him to remove the chickens from the property. Simpson appealed the violation to the Planning Committee. On June 20, 2017 the City Council voted to place a resolution on the ballot for voters to decide whether chickens could be kept in residential districts. The resolution failed at the general election. A second notice was sent to Simpson and Simpson refused to remove the chickens from his property. The City instituted an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on March 13, 2018. The trial court held that the keeping of chickens was prohibited in the City’s residential districts and that the city ordinances were valid on their face and were not arbitrarily or capriciously applied. Simpson appealed. Simpson argued that keeping the chickens did not constitute an agricultural use or poultry husbandry because he kept them as a hobby and therefore does not violate any of the city ordinances. The Court did not agree and concluded that the keeping of chickens fell within the definition of agriculture and was, therefore, prohibited based on the ordinances. Simpson next argued that since he acquired the chicken and coop prior to the City applying the prohibitions, it was a legal non-conforming use and that the zoning code contained no language that would have put him on notice that such property was not permitted on his real property. The Court concluded that there was no error by the trial court in holding that Simpson’s use of his land was not a legally conforming use. Finally, Simpson argued that the one of the city ordinances was arbitrary and unreasonable because there was no evidence of the chickens, coup, or enclosure constituting a nuisance. The Court concluded that a city is not required to show that a property owner’s proposed use constitutes a nuisance in order to establish the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court found that the ordinance was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and bears a substantial relation to the public health. The ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power. The Court ultimately held that the City ordinance prohibited the keeping of chickens in residential districts. The prohibition was inferred from reading the ordinance in concert with other Code sections. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. | Case |
| In the Matter of the Application of Richard M. COPLAND, as an Executor of the estate of Lenore Lewis Abels, Deceased | 988 N.Y.S.2d 458 | 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24172 | Co-executor of an estate petitioned the Westchester County Surrogate's Court for a decree in accordance with EPTL 7–8.1[d] reducing the amount of money to be transferred from the estate to the trustees of a testamentary pet trust established under the decedent's will. Since the decedent gave very specific instructions as to how she wanted her cats to be cared for and the petition was in opposition to the decedent’s wishes, the court denied the reduction. | Case |