|Title||Citation||Alternate Citation||Agency Citation||Summary||Type|
|U.S. v. Fullmer||584 F.3d 132 (C.A.3 (N.J.), 2009)||2009 WL 3273955 (C.A.3 (N.J.))||
In an issue of first impression, this Court considered whether the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (AEPA) was unconstitutional either on its face or as-applied to defendants. The defendants in this case were an animal rights organization ("SHAC") and six associated individuals. The defendants engaged in direct action ranging from electronic civil disobedience to destroying property at the homes of individuals associated with Huntingdon Life Sciences (a research corporation that performs animal testing for other companies). Defendants argued that the statute has a chilling effect on speech because protestors will refrain from all speech, even protected speech, due to the ambiguity of what the statute proscribes. Thus the Court found that the government provided sufficient evidence to prove that the defendants conspired to violate the AEPA.
|CA - Lien, veterinary - Chapter 6. Other Liens.||West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 3051, 3052||CA CIVIL § 3051, 3052||
These California laws concern possessory liens for services, which includes veterinary proprietors and veterinary surgeons. Under Section 3051, a person who is in lawful possession of an article of person property and renders service or safekeeping to the owner has a lien on that property for compensation due. The section then specifically states that, ". . . veterinary proprietors and veterinary surgeons shall have a lien dependent on possession, for their compensation in caring for, boarding, feeding, and medical treatment of animals." The companion section states that the person holding the lien under Section 3051, if not paid the amount due within 10 days, may sell such property at public auction by giving at least 10 days notice.
|European Union - Research - Protection of Animals||Official Journal L 358, 18 December 1986, pp. 1-28||COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (86/609/EEC)||The aim pursued by this Directive is to ensure the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative provisions in the Member States for the protection of animals used for research avoid affecting the market. In this directive, an experiment not entailing the use of animals is preferred over one that does if that experiment can obtain the same result and is reasonably and practically available. Furthermore, each Member State shall ensure that experiments using animals considered as endangered under Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Fauna and Flora and Annex C.I of Regulation (EEC) No. 3626/82 are prohibited unless they are in conformity with the above-mentioned Regulation and the objects of the experiment are research aimed at preservation of the species in question, or essential biomedical purposes where the species in question exceptionally proves to be the only one suitable for those purposes.||Administrative|
|AR - Exotic Pets, Large Carnivores - Subchapter 5. Ownership and Possession of Large Carnivores||A.C.A. § 20-19-501 - 511||AR ST § 20-19-501 to 511||
This Arkansas subchapter concerns the ownership and possession of large carnivores. Under the law, a large carnivore is defined as a bear, lion, or tiger. A person may possess a large carnivore only if he or she was in possession of the large carnivore on or before August 12, 2005 and the person applies for and is granted a permit for personal possession for each large carnivore not more than one hundred eighty (180) days after August 12, 2005. Except for these "grandfathered" possessors and other entities (zoos, USDA permittees, veterinary hospitals, etc.) it is illegal for anyone to own, possess, breed, or transfer ownership of a large carnivore.
|Journal of Animal Law Table of Contents Vol 6||
Published by the students of Michigan State University College of Law
Journal of Animal Law Vol. VI (2010)
The table of contents is provided below.
|United States v. Daniels||377 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1967)||
Defendant sought review of a decision from a United States district court, which during a second trial convicted defendant of armed robbery. Armed with a gun defendant went to the teller's window and handed the teller a cloth bag with a note saying that it was a holdup. Two photographs were admitted into evidence that showed agents in the relative positions of defendant and the savings and loan employees at the time of the robbery. The court found no prejudicial effect in the admission of the photographs especially in light of the positive identification of defendant by the teller in the courtroom.
|State v. DeFrancesco||668 A.2d 348 (Conn. 1995)||235 Conn. 426(1995)||
After the USDA went to the defendant’s house to perform a prelicense inspection for an Animal Welfare Act permit for a rabbit, the USDA discovered the defendant also kept a Bengal cat, a Jungle cat and a Bobcat on the premises; the USDA then notified the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) about the three cats. After the defendant’s attempt to sell the three cats, the DEP confiscated them and placed them in the care of an expert; the DEP also charged the defendant with three misdemeanor violations of General Statutes section 26-40a. After trial and appellate court determinations, the Connecticut Supreme Court found the three cats to be included on the list of prohibited felidae in General Statutes section 26-40a and found General Statutes section 26-40a did not violate Due Process.
|State v. Wilson||--- P.3d ----, 2019 WL 4955178 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2019)||Defendant Robert Wilson appeals his conviction of first degree animal cruelty, which arose from an incident at an archery club when Wilson shot a large dog in the hindquarters (70lb. "Dozer") with an arrow after that dog attacked Wilson’s small dog ("Little Bit"). (Dozer recovered from his injuries.) Wilson argues that his action was lawful under RCW 16.08.020, which states that it is lawful for a person to kill a dog seen chasing, biting, or injuring a domestic animal on real property that person owns, leases, or controls. The trial court declined to give defendant's proposed jury instruction based on this statutory language, finding that it only applied to stock animals and not when a dog was injuring another dog. The court did, however, permit the common law defense that allows owners to take "reasonably necessary action" in defense of their animals, which the State must then disprove beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, this court noted that no Washington court has interpreted RCW 16.08.020 in a published case. Under common law cases that allow a person to kill an animal to defend his or her property, the court found those cases require the killing be "reasonably necessary." While the parties dispute whether the statute requires that the actions be "reasonably necessary," the appellate court first found Wilson was still not entitled to a dismissal of charges because he could not establish that the location where he shot the arrow at Dozer was land that he "owned, leased, or had control over" per the statute. As to the Wilson's next argument that the trial court erred in not giving his proposed instruction for RCW 16.08.020, the appellate court agreed. While the trial court found that the statute only applied to stock animals, the appellate court noted that the law does not define the term "domestic animal." Using the plain dictionary meaning for "domestic" - "belonging to or incumbent on the family" - and for "domestic animal," this court stated that "Little Bit certainly belonged to Wilson's family" and a dog fits the meaning of "domestic animal." Finally, the court found that the "reasonably necessary" requirement from the common law cases on shooting domestic animals cannot be grafted onto the statutory requirements of RCW 16.08.020. Thus, the trial court's refusal to give defendant's proposed instruction based on RCW 16.08.020 cannot be grounded in the reasonably necessary common law requirement. The trial court's refusal to give the proposed instruction was not harmless. As such, the appellate court reversed Wilson's conviction and remanded the action for further proceedings.||Case|
|IL - Cruelty - CRUELTY TO ANIMALS LAW (ANIMAL PROTECTION)||CRUELTY TO ANIMALS LAW (ANIMAL PROTECTION), 5754-1994||
This law represents Isreal's anti-cruelty law. The law provides that no person shall torture, treat cruelly or in any way abuse any animal. It also states that no person shall incite one animal against another or organise a contest between animals. The cutting into live tissue of an animal for cosmetic purposes is also prohibited.
|WI - St. Francis - Breed - § 180-5 Dangerous and Vicious Dogs||ST. FRANCIS, WI., MUNICIPAL CODE § 180-5 (2008)||
In St. Francis, Wisconsin, no person may harbor, keep or maintain any pit bull that was not registered and licensed by October 1, 2001. Any person having knowledge that another has an unregistered pit bull must file a sworn affidavit with the Municipal Court Clerk. Owners of pit bulls that are allowed must comply with all provisions applicable to dangerous dogs, such as securely confining the dog, displaying a dangerous dog sign, and if off of the premises, keep the dog muzzled and on a leash. A violation may result in impoundment of the dog, as well as a forfeiture of up to $1,000.