|FL - Initiatives - Amendment 13, Ban on Wagering on Dog Races||Amendment 13||A proposed revision relating to ending dog racing; creating new sections in Article X and Article XII of the State Constitution to prohibit the racing of, and wagering on, greyhounds and other dogs after a specified date.||Statute|
|CA - Impound - § 53074. Seizure and impoundment of dogs on private property||West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 53074||West's Ann. Cal. Gov. Code § 53074||
This California statute provides that animal control officer shall not seize or impound a dog on its owner's property for violation of a leash ordinance or issue citations for the violation of such ordinance when the dog has not strayed from the owner's private property. However, if the dog has strayed from the property and later returned to it, an officer may issue a citation if the owner is present or impound the dog if the owner is not present. In the latter circumstance, the officer must leave a notice of impoundment at the residence.
|Moser v. Pennsylvania Soc. for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals||Slip Copy, 2012 WL 4932046 (E.D. Penn.)||
After the defendants confiscated mare without a warrant and required that the plaintiff surrender another mare and a few other animals in order to avoid prosecution, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for violating the U.S. Constitution, the U.S. Civil Rights Act and Pennsylvania statutory and common law. However, the plaintiffs lost when the district court granted the defendants motion for summary judgment on all counts.
|Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. 3-4-9- Cruelty to Animals.||Title III, Section 3-4-9||Under Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians code, cruelty to animals is a Class B offense. Any person who shall kill, torture, mistreat, mutilate, injure or abandon any animal shall be guilty of an offense under this section.||Statute|
|FL - Fish and Wildlife Conservation - Part V. Law Enforcement||West's F. S. A. § 379.33 - 379.343||FL ST § 379.33 - 379.343||This set of laws describes the scope and methods of enforcement of the state's fish and wildlife laws.||Statute|
|WI - Assistance Animals - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws||W. S. A. 106.50; 106.52; 346.26; 440.45; 951.01, 951.097, 951.18||WI ST 106.50; 106.52; 346.26; 440.45; 951.01, 951.097, 951.18||The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and service animal laws.||Statute|
|State v. Archer||--- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018)||This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part.||Case|
|American Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Dade County, Fla.||728 F.Supp. 1533 (S.D.Fla.,1989)||
Associations of dog owners sued Dade, County, Florida seeking declaratory judgment that an ordinance that regulated “pit bull” dogs was unconstitutionally vague. Plaintiffs contend that there is no such breed as a pit bull, but rather a three breeds that this ordinance has mistakenly lumped together. The District Court held that ordinance sufficiently defined “pit bull” dogs by specifically referencing three breeds recognized by kennel clubs, including a description of the characteristics of such dogs, and provided a mechanism for verification of whether a particular dog was included. The uncontradicted testimony of the various veterinarians reflected that most dog owners know the breed of their dog and that most dog owners look for and select a dog of a particular breed.
|Revock v. Cowpet Bay West Condominium Association||853 F.3d 96 (3d Cir. 2017)||55 NDLR P 14||Homeowners brought action against thier condominium association and other homeowners, claiming that the association failed to provide a reasonable accommodation for homeowners' disability in the form of emotional support animals, and that the other homeowners interfered with the fair exercise of their fair housing rights, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The Court of Appeals held that: 1) Fair Housing Act claims survive the death of a party; 2) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on claims association failed to make a reasonable accommodation under the Fair Housing Act; 3) issue of fact as to whether association reviewed homeowners' paperwork for an emotional support animal precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; 4) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's comments about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims; and 5) issue of fact as to whether neighbor's blog posts about homeowners were sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to interfere with homeowners' Fair Housing Act rights precluded summary judgment on Fair Housing Act interference claims. Reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.||Case|
|CO - Humane Slaughter - Article 33. Custom Processing of Meat Animals.||C. R. S. A. § 35-33-101 to 407||CO ST § 35-33-101 to 407||
This Colorado section includes both the meat processing laws and the humane slaughter provisions. It covers livestock, which are defined as cattle, calves, sheep, swine, horses, mules, goats, and any other animal which may be used in and for the preparation of meat or meat products. No processor shall shackle, hoist, or otherwise bring livestock into position for slaughter or shall slaughter livestock except by humane methods as defined by regulation; the use of a manually operated hammer, sledge, or poleax is not permitted. Additionally, poultry shall be slaughtered in accordance with "good commercial practices" and in a manner that will result in thorough bleeding. Any person who violates any provision is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $750 per violation for each day of violation and commits a class 2 misdemeanor.