Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| PA - Cruelty - Chapter 37. Humane Society Police Officers. | 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | PA ST 22 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701 - 3718 | These statutes enable and regulate Pennsylvania's grant of police powers to humane society agents. Topics within these statutes include the appointment, termination, powers granted to, and training of humane society police officers. | Statute |
| Peru - Wildlife - LEY 9147, 1949 | LEY 9147, 1949 | This law declares government protection over all the wild species of animals that are within the national territory. It also prohibits the hunting of vicuña, chinchilla and guanacu species. | Statute | |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| Bogart v. Chapell | 396 F.3d 548 (4th Cir., 2005) |
A woman was housing hundreds of animals in her residential home, the animals were seized and more than two hundred of them were euthanized. The woman brought a section 1983 claim against the county sheriff's department and human society. The trial court granted defendants summary judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed holding no viable due process claim existed arising from the euthanization. |
Case | |
| UT - Hunting - § 23-20-29. Interference with hunting prohibited--Action to recover damages--Exceptions | U.C.A. 1953 § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly U.C.A. 1953 § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | UT ST § 23A-5-321 - 322 (formerly UT ST § 23-20-29, 23-20-29.5) | This section reflects Utah's hunter harassment provisions. A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor who intentionally interferes with the right of a person, licensed and legally hunting, to take wildlife by driving, harassing, or intentionally disturbing any species of wildlife for the purpose of disrupting a legal hunt, trapping, or predator control. A person adversely affected, or the state, may bring a civil action for damages resulting from the violation or a seek a restraining order. This section does not apply to incidental interference with a hunt caused by lawful activities including, but not limited to, ranching, mining, and recreation. | Statute |
| Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman | 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000) |
In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA. |
Case | |
| NY - Disaster - Article 2-B. State and Local Natural and Man-Made Disaster Preparedness. Agriculture and Markets Law. | McKinney's Executive Law § 22, 23; McKinney's Agriculture and Markets Law § 410 - 411; McKinney's Public Authorities Law § 1264-a; McK.Unconsol.Laws § 6408-e | NY EXEC § 22, 23; NY AGRI & MKTS § 410 | In New York, disaster emergency plans must include utilization and coordination of programs to assist individuals with household pets and service animals. Particular emphasis must be on evacuation, shelter and transportation options following a disaster. | Statute |
| MX - Bird - Parrot Ban in Spanish (DECREE by which article 60 2 to the General Law of Wildlife) | artículo 60 Bis 2 a la Ley General de Vida Silvestre |
(Text of law in Spanish). The ban prohibits the capture, export and import of 22 Mexican parrot species. The ban on imports was needed because most species are shared with Central and South American countries and many were being imported and used as cover up for illegal trade. The ban was approved by Congress last April by consensus and it was originally drafted after a presentation of a 2007 report, "The Illegal Parrot Trade in Mexico: A Comprehensive Assessment." The report revealed for the first time the volume of the illegal trade of parrots within Mexico. An estimated 65,000 -78,500 wild parrots and macaws are captured illegally each year, with more than 75 percent of the birds dying before ever reaching a purchaser. The measure was passed in late October of 2008. |
Statute | |
| Secretary of State for The Home Office v. BUAV and the Information Commissioner | [2008] EWHC 892 (QB | Appeal concerning the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and experiments involving animals. The BUAV had made an information request in respect of five research project licenses issued under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The Home Office released limited summary information, relying on exemptions under FOIA to reason this; namely under section 24(1) which would prohibit information from being disclosed that had been given “in confidence.” The Court of Appeal upheld the decision that the Home Office was entitled to refuse BUAV’s information request. | Case | |
| Jaeger v. Cellco Partnership | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 965730 (D.Conn.,2010) |
The Connecticut Siting Council granted Cellco Partnership a Certificate allowing the company to build a cell tower in Falls Village, Connecticut. Dina Jaeger brought suit against Cellco and the Council to prevent the building of the cell tower. In her complaint, Jaeger cited the harmful effects of radio frequency emissions (RF emissions), and alleged violations of the International Migratory Bird Treaty, the Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA), the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act (BGEPA), the Telecommunications Act (TCA), and the 10 th and 14 th Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Defendants moved to dismiss Jaeger's claims on various grounds, including that the Council was preempted from considering the environmental effects of RF emissions under the TCA. The Court found in favor of the Defendants, holding that the TCA preempts local and state regulation of cell towers solely on the basis of RF emissions. |
Case |