Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Breheny | 197 N.E.3d 921, reargument denied, 39 N.Y.3d 967, 200 N.E.3d 121 (2022) | No. 52, 176 N.Y.S.3d 533, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 03859, 2022 WL 2122141 (N.Y., June 14, 2022) | This New York case centers on a petition of habeas corpus for an elephant named "Happy" who is housed at the Bronx Zoo. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project is a not-for-profit corporation with a mission of seeking to establish that “at least some nonhuman animals” are “legal persons” entitled to fundamental rights, including “bodily integrity and bodily liberty.” In 2018, petitioner commenced this habeas proceeding in Supreme Court against respondents James J. Breheny, Director of the Bronx Zoo, and the Wildlife Conservation Society, the organization that operates the Zoo. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of Happy,” an Asian elephant that petitioner claimed was unlawfully confined at the Zoo in violation of her right to bodily liberty. Happy has resided at the Bronx Zoo for the last 45 years and has been held in captivity since she was approximately one year old. Petitioners request that she be transferred to an “appropriate sanctuary" where she could potentially be integrated with other elephants. To support its request, petitioner proffered affidavits from several experts specializing in elephant study and care attesting to the general characteristics of elephants. The Zoo respondents opposed petitioner's application and requested dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action. Specifically, respondents argued that there was no legal basis for habeas relief and that Happy's living conditions comply with all relevant laws and accepted standards of care. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground “that animals are not ‘persons’ entitled to rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus” and that habeas relief is not available for an animal. On petitioner's appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, reasoning that “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to human beings.” While the court acknowledged that the law recognizes that animals are not mere "things," and existing animal protection laws underscore this conclusion, the scope of habeas corpus does not include animals. The court lastly noted that " this case has garnered extraordinary interest from amici curiae and the public . . . Though beyond the purview of the courts, we appreciate that the desire and ability of our community to engage in a continuing dialogue regarding the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals is an essential characteristic of our humanity. Such dialogue, however, should be directed to the legislature." As such, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed | Case | ||||||
| People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture | 60 F.Supp.3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014) | On December 16, 2013, this Court issued an Opinion that dismissed a lawsuit brought by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals alleging that the United States Department of Agriculture had unlawfully failed to implement the Animal Welfare Act with respect to birds. The Court found that the actions PETA sought to compel USDA to take—promulgating bird-specific regulations and enforcing the AWA against bird abusers—were committed to the agency's discretion by law. On January 13, 2014, PETA moved for reconsideration of the second part of that decision. PETA also asked, in the alternative, for leave to amend its Complaint. The government opposed both requests. Because the Court stands by its initial conclusions, and because leave to amend was not allowed at this juncture, it denied PETA's Motion. This case was appealed, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 797 F.3d 1087 (D.C. Cir., 2015). For a prior District Court case, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2013) | Case | |||||||
| CA - Cruelty - Part 11. Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | West's Ann. Cal. Corp. Code § 14500 - 14505 | CA CORP § 14500 - 14505 | This section of California laws concerns the formation and powers of societies for the prevention of cruelty to animals. | Statute | ||||||
| EU - Transport - Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport | Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 |
The text sets out to regulate transport of live vertebrate animals within the European Union (EU) where such transport is carried out as part of an economic activity. The aim is to prevent injury or undue suffering to animals and to ensure that they have appropriate conditions that meet their needs. |
Statute | |||||||
| Fallini v. Hodel | 783 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 1986) |
The Wild and Free-Roaming Horse Act does not require that wild horses be prevented from straying onto private land, only that they be removed if they do stray onto private land. |
Case | |||||||
| Barber v. Pennsylvania Dept. Agriculture | Slip Copy, 2010 WL 1816760 (W.D.Pa.) |
The plaintiffs in this Pennsylvania case are owners and operators of a non-profit animal rescue and kennel that houses housing about 500 dogs doing business in and throughout Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The current dispute stems from a series of inspections of the kennels that occurred throughout the 2007 calendar year. Plaintiffs allege that defendants conspired in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and that the PSPCA and the Bureau of Dog Law Enforcement (the inspection branch of the Dept. of Agriculture) failed to take reasonable steps to protect them from the conspiratorial activity in violation of 42 U.S .C. § 1986. Plaintiffs also state that the PSPCA and the Bureau violated various of their constitutional rights in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiffs also seek to hold the Defendants liable for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S .C. § 1983. Finally, other counts allege that Defendant Delenick sexually harassed Plaintiff Rachel Lappe-Biler in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983; that plaintiff Pauline Gladys Bryner-Lappe was assaulted and battered in contravention of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth Amendment; and that the defendants intentionally inflicted emotional distress. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims. |
Case | |||||||
| CÓDIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL - Ciudad de Mexico | Criminal Code - Mexico City | Animal cruelty against any animal is considered a crime Under the Criminal Code of Mexico City since 2014. Chapter IV contains the provisions regarding the crimes committed by acts of cruelty or mistreatment against non-human animals. Article 350 BIS establishes that whoever intentionally mistreats or cruelly acts against any specimen of any animal species causing injury, damage, or alteration in their health will be punished with one to up to three years of imprisonment and three hundred to five hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. In addition, intentional acts of cruelty or mistreatment that cause the death of an animal will be punished with imprisonment from two years to up to six years and six hundred to twelve hundred times the Units of Measure and Update. | Statute | |||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 8 Núm 2 |
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Policy | ||||||||
| Gruber v. YMCA of Greater Indianapolis | 34 N.E.3d 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 3534886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) | An eleven-year-old boy was at a YMCA camp when a pig—which had never injured anyone or exhibited any dangerous propensities—stuck its head between the bars of its pen and grabbed the boy's hand, causing injuries. The boy and his mother sued the camp, and the camp filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the camp. On appeal, the boy and his mother asked the court to change the standard for liability of owners of domestic animals to that of strict liability when the animal was not a cat or dog. Since the Indiana Supreme Court precedent was clear that this general rule applied to all domestic animals—and not just cats and dogs—the court declined their invitation to alter the standard. The trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the camp was therefore affirmed. | Case | ||||||
| AZ - Ordinances - Lawful presence on private property defined (dogs) | A. R. S. § 11-1026 | AZ ST § 11-1026 | This Arizona statute provides that a person is lawfully on a dog owner's property when he or she is there as an invitee or guest, or when in the performance of a duty imposed upon him by law of the state or United States, or by ordinances of a municipality in which such property is located. | Statute |