|"No Animals Were Harmed . . .": Protecting Chimpanzees From Cruelty Behind The Curtain||Lorraine L. Fischer||27 Hastings Comm. & Ent L.J. 405||
In this law review, Lorraine L. Fischer hopes to effect change in the way chimpanzees and other exotic animals are perceived in filmed media. Fischer argues that the exploitation of these animals is unacceptable because they (and other great apes) are not only sentient beings, but beings capable of suffering, forming relationships, expressing emotion, mourning death, communicating thoughts, and expressing love. Additionally, Fischer argues that since chimpanzees are a severely endangered species, using them as actors contradicts and offends the strong public policy of conservation and preservation that should be afforded to this precious species. To illustrate how laws fail to protect chimpanzees used in entertainment, this law review examines the Endangered Species Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and various state anti-cruelty laws.
|"Man's Best Friend:" Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification of Companion Animals and its Impact||William C. Root||47 Vill. L. Rev. 423 (2002)||
This article examines the historical treatment of companion animals (pets) under the law as property or chattel, despite the degree of importance most Americans place upon their relationship with their pets. In cases of willful or negligent injury or death to these animals, courts have typically awarded market value damages, which, in most cases are nominal. The author proposes that the characterization of animals as mere property should change to reflect societal views, and punitive damages should be assessed by court where injury to the animal is willful, wanton or reckless.
|"Live Animals": Towards Protection for Pets and Livestock in Contracts for Carriage||Erin Sheley||3 J. Animal L. 59 (2007)||
This article maps the current legal and logistical circumstances of animals in transportation, with a focus on commercial airlines and meat industry trucking practices, and proposes novel ways of utilizing the existing common law of contract adjudication to win stronger protections for such animals, even absent the fulfilled dream of statutory reform. In particular, it argues that courts should utilize two well-established doctrines of contractual interpretation--unconscionability and unenforceability as against public policy--to arrive at more humane results for animals.
|"It's the Right Thing to Do": Why the Animal Agriculture Industry Should Not Oppose Science-Based Regulations Protecting the Welfare Of Animals Raised for Food||Angela J. Geiman||106 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 128 (2008)||The purpose of this commentary is to respond to the question, “Should laws criminalizing animal abuse apply to animals raised for food?” The simple answer to the question is “yes,” but the reality is not simple. It requires analyzing both the science of raising livestock and the current legal framework, which we must understand before discussing what to require and how to implement those requirements. Continued improvements in the livestock and meatpacking industries and the rising expectations of consumers add to the complexity of the issue.||Article|
|"DO DOGS APE?" OR "DO APES DOG?" AND DOES IT MATTER? BROADENING AND DEEPENING COGNITIVE ETHOLOGY||Marc Bekoff||3 Animal L. 13 (1997)||This article is a brief discussion of some aspects of Marc Bekoff's research that bear on animal sentience and animal protection. First he considers how the comparative study of animal minds informs discussions of animal exploitation, then he discusses how humans interfere, often unknowingly, in the lives of wild animals. It doesn't matter whether "dogs ape" or "apes dog" when taking into account the worlds of different animals.||Article|
|"Cruelty to Police Dogs" Laws Update||Craig Scheiner||7 Animal L. 141 (2001)||
Mr. Scheiner updates his article, Statutes with Four Legs to Stand On?: An Examination of "Cruelty to Police Dog" Laws, published in Volume 5 of Animal Law.
|". . . und die tiere" Constitutional Protection for Germany's Animals||Kate M. Nattrass||10 Animal L. 283 (2004)||In the summer of 2002, Germany welcomed animals into the folds of constitutional protection. With the addition of the words “and the animals,” Germany became the first country in the European Union (“E.U.”), and the second on the European continent, to guarantee the highest level of federal legal protection to its nonhuman animals. Though a welcomed development in the eyes of most Germans, this groundbreaking event received very little attention on the world stage. Common misconceptions about the ramifications of the constitutional amendment resulted in limited to no accurate representation in worldwide media. Likewise, international policymakers and animal protectionists have shown little awareness of this development and its potential implications. In addition to possible legal effects, the social implications of such an occurrence in a major western country are vast. International leaders will certainly take note as the effects of this change begin to take place in Germany’s laws and, increasingly, in its international policies. More importantly, the global animal protection community should take note of what is possible, and what can be learned from the achievements of Germany’s animal protection community. This study traces the legal and social developments leading to Germany’s constitutional amendment which provides protection to animals, showing how this legal highpoint was achieved. Multiple sources are used, including congressional, judicial, and party doc uments, press releases, international media reports, personal communication with leaders in four major German animal protection organizations, interviews with a key Ministry official, and published materials. This study will also critically assess the claims of the animal protection and opposition communities in order to predict where German animal law is going and what effects this change will have on the treatment of animals both within Germany and internationally. Concluding thoughts will address how the international animal protection community can understand this legal victory in a constructive context.||Article|
|Voiceless Animal Law Toolkit - Second Edition||Voiceless Australia||Voiceless Animal Law Toolkit - Second Edition||In 2009, Voiceless prepared the first edition of The Animal Law Toolkit to introduce students, academics, practitioners, law firms and animal advocates to key issues in animal law. As its name suggests, that Toolkit was intended to provide the tools needed to better protect the billions of animals left with inadequate protections under our current legal framework. This second edition of The Animal Law Toolkit provides an overview of the evolving animal law landscape over the last six years, including a snapshot of emerging animal law issues, summaries of new animal law cases (both in Australia and abroad), as well as new resources and materials for students, teachers and practitioners.||Article|
|THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT FORTY: THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY||Daniel J. Rohlf||20 Animal L. 251 (2014)||
This article provides the introduction for Volume 20, Part 2 of the Animal Law Review.
|Liddle v. Clark||107 N.E.3d 478 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 113 N.E.3d 627 (Ind. 2018)||In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.||Case|