Results
Displaying 5821 - 5830 of 6637
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Sales - § 1670.10. Sale of dogs and cats; retail installment contracts prohibited; remedies | West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1670.10 | This law, effective 2018, prohibits the transfer of ownership of dogs and cats through retail installment contracts. This is a contract where transfer ownership of a dog or cat in which ownership is contingent upon the making of payments over a period of time subsequent to the transfer of possession of the dog or cat. These contracts on or after January 1, 2018 are void as against public policy in the state | Statute | ||
| Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke | 289 F.Supp.3d 103 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | 2018 WL 646887 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | Plaintiffs Buffalo Field Campaign and other environmental groups petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to add the Yellowstone bison population to the federal endangered species list. After the Service made a threshold “90–day” determination that Buffalo Field's petition failed to present sufficient scientific evidence that listing the bison may be warranted, Buffalo Field brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Service's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Service applied an improper standard when evaluating Buffalo Field's petition, granted Buffalo Field's motion for summary judgment, denied the Service's cross-motion, and remanded the case for the agency to conduct a new 90–day finding using the proper standard. In particular, the court observed that the Service "simply picked a side in an ongoing debate in the scientific community," thereby in inappropriately heightening the standard of evaluation for a 90-day petition. Because of that, the court agreed with the Service that remand is the appropriate remedy as opposed to to directing the Service to begin a 12-month review. | Case | |
| RI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Laws (Chapter 1. Cruelty to Animals) | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-1-1 - 43; Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-1.2-1 - 5; Gen.Laws 1956, § 11-10-1 | RI ST § 4-1-1 - 43; RI ST § 4-1.2-1 - 5; RI ST § 11-10-1 | These Rhode Island statutes comprise the state's anti-cruelty and animal fighting provisions. The cruelty law provides that whoever overdrives, overloads, overworks, tortures, torments, deprives of necessary sustenance, or cruelly beats, mutilates or kills any animal is subject to imprisonment up to 11 months, or a fine of $50.00 - $500, or both. The intentional cruelty provision expands the penalty to 2 years possible imprisonment or a fine of $1,000, or both. | Statute | |
| MT - Bear - Chapter 5. Wildlife Protection. Part 3. Grizzly Bear | MCA 87-5-301 to 87-5-303 | MT ST 87-5-301 to 87-5-303 | These Montana statutes state that state policy is to manage grizzly bears to avoid conflicts with humans and livestock, and control distribution by trapping and lethal measures. The commission may regulate the hunting of grizzlies and establish requirements for their transportation, exportation, and importation. | Statute | |
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 | 2004 BCSC 578 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
Case | |
| Students for Ethical Treatment of Animals (SETA) v. Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee of University of Oregon (IACUC) | 833 P.2d 337 (1992) | 113 Or.App. 523 (1992) |
Appeal of a circuit court decision finding a summary judgment that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring suit where a state university student organization and other parties brought suit against the university committee that supervised animal research, including a research proposal for cranial surgery on Macaque monkeys. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that plaintiffs had an interest in the governmental decisions of the committee, had established a denial of access related to that interest, thus had standing to bring the suit. |
Case | |
| VT- Pet Sales - Rule 308 Part III Sale of Cat and Dogs | VT ADC 20 022 017 | Vt. Admin. Code 2-4-308:III-1 to 3 | These regulations detail the disclosures a pet dealer must make to a consumer at the time of sale of a cat or a dog pursuant to 20 V.S.A § 4302. According to the regulations, the consumer, at the time of sale, must be provided a copy of the Consumer Right-To-Know form, the Cat or Dog Request for Restitution form, the Consumer's Rights under 20 V.S.A. § 4302(a),(e) and § 4303, and the applicable state laws regarding rabies and licensing. | Administrative | |
| Animal Rights and Advocacy Issues | Policy | ||||
| Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke | 868 F.3d 1054 (9th Cir. 2017) | 17 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8478 (9th Cir. 2017) | In this case, the Center for Biological Diversity and Maricopa Audubon Society (collectively “CBD”) challenged the determination of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) that the Sonoran Desert Area bald eagle (“desert eagle”) is not a distinct population segment (“DPS”) eligible for listing under the Endangered Species Act. There are two requirements for DPS status: (1) the discreteness of the population segment in relation to the remainder of the species to which it belongs, and (2) the significance of the population segment to the species to which it belongs. Here, the parties agreed that the desert eagle population is discrete, but they disputed whether the population is significant. CBD argued that if FWS found that a population segment satisfies any of the four listed significance factors, it is required to conclude that the population segment is significant. The court held that FWS did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that the desert eagle did not satisfy significance requirement for being a DPS, even though it found that the desert eagle satisfied the persistence requirement and one significance factors. The district court's grant of summary judgment to FWS was affirmed. | Case | |
| NY - Wildlife, Exotics - Title 1. Short Title; Definitions; General Provisions | McKinney's E. C. L. § 11-0101 to 11-0113 | NY ENVIR CONSER § 11-0101 to 11-0113 | This set of statutes represents the definitional portion of New York's Fish and Wildlife Law. Among the provisions include definitions for game and non-game, a definition for "wild animal," which includes big cats, non-domesticated dogs, bears, and venomous reptiles, and the state's hunter harassment law. The section also provides that the State of New York owns all fish, game, wildlife, shellfish, crustacea and protected insects in the state, except those legally acquired and held in private ownership. | Statute |