Cases

Case name Citationsort descending Summary
State v. Archer --- So.3d ----, 2018 WL 6579053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2018) This appeal concerns the lower court's granting of a motion to suppress evidence in an animal cruelty case. In April of 2017, a Ponce Inlet Police Department officer responded to defendant's residence after receiving a call about possible animal abuse. The caller described hearing sounds of a dog yelping and being beaten. Upon arrival, Officer Bines heard dog commands and the sounds of "striking flesh." He then knocked on defendant Archer's front door and began speaking with him on the front porch. Officer Bines told Archer that he was there to investigate a complaint of possible animal abuse to which Archer acknowledged that his dog bit him after he disciplined the dog for making a mess, so he "hit him a couple times." The officer then told Archer he had "probable cause" to enter the house or he could seek a warrant. Ultimately, Bines followed Archer to the backyard where Archer pointed to a dog in the corner that had its tongue out and was bloodied. Shortly thereafter, Bines determined the dog was dead. Archer was then cuffed and advised of his Miranda rights. After placing Archer in the police vehicle, Bines and other officers re-entered the home and yard to take pictures of the crime scene and to secure the canine's remains. After being charged with violating the cruelty to animals law (Section 828.12), Archer moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the warrantless entry of his home. The trial court granted and denied the motion in part, finding that while there were exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry, the exigency was over once it was determined that the dog was dead. The State of Florida appeals here. The appellate court first noted that while warrantless searches of homes are presumed illegal, an officer may enter when there are exigent circumstances including medical emergencies related to animals. Despite Archer's attempts to distinguish the instant facts from previous cases because there were no signs of blood or smells to indicate an emergency, the totality of the facts showed police received a call of animal cruelty in progress and the Officer Bines heard sounds of striking flesh. In addition, Archer advised Bines that he had struck the dog. Thus, the court found the officer "had reasonable grounds to believe that there was an urgent and immediate need to check on the safety and well-being of the dog and to connect the feared emergency to the house that they entered." As to suppression of the evidence found in plain view after entry onto the property, the appellate court also found the lower court erred in its decision. Under existing case law, once entry is allowed based on exigent circumstances, items found in plain view may be lawfully seized. The officer saw the dog in the corner before he knew the dog was dead, and thus, the exigency still existed. With respect to the photographs taken and the bodycam footage, the court held that re-entry into the home after Archer was in the patrol car did not require a warrant. Once an exigency that justified a warrantless search is over, law enforcement cannot go back and conduct further searches. However, in this case, the re-entry into Archer's house was a continuation of photographing evidence that was already found in plain view while the exigency existed (e.g., before the officers knew the dog was dead). The motion to suppress was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
State v. Avella --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 2552529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. June 21, 2019) The Defendant was charged with practicing veterinary medicine without a license and for cruelty to animals. The Defendant made a homemade device attempting to treat his dog for a problem because he did not have the money to take his dog to the vet. The home treatment ended up injuring the dog and he took the dog to a veterinarian for treatment. The veterinarian stated that the dog needed to be taken to an advanced care veterinary facility, however, the Defendant could not do so due to lack of funds. The trial court dismissed the charges brought against the Defendant and the State of Florida appealed. Florida law forbids a person from practicing veterinary medicine without a license. The Defendant was not a veterinarian. The Defendant relied upon statutory exemptions in Florida’s statue that permit a person to care for his or her own animals and claims that he was just trying to help his dog, Thor. The Defendant also argued that the purpose of the statute was to prevent unlicensed veterinary care provided to the public rather than to criminalize the care an owner provides to his or her animals. The Court held that the trial court did not err in dismissing Count I for unlicensed practice of veterinary medicine given the stated purpose of the statute and the statutory exemptions. As for Count II, animal cruelty, the State argued that the Defendant’s conduct in using a homemade tool to remove bone fragments from the dog’s rectum and then failing to take the dog to an advanced care clinic fits under the Florida animal cruelty statute. Although the Defendant argued that he had no intention of inflicting pain upon his dog and was only trying to help him, the Court agreed with the State’s argument that “the statute does not require a specific intent to cause pain but punishes an intentional act that results in the excessive infliction of unnecessary pain or suffering.” Ultimately the Court affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Count I, reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Count II and remanded for further proceedings on the animal cruelty charge.
Estis v. Mills --- So.3d ----, 2019 WL 3807048 (La. App. 2 Cir. August 14, 2019) On September 11, 2017, Plaintiffs, Catherine Estis, Samuel Estis, and Thuy Estis brought this action against the Defendants, Clifton and Kimberly Mills, seeking damages for the shooting of the Plaintiff’s ten-month-old German Shepherd puppy, Bella. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Defendants shot Bella, did not disclose to them that Bella had been shot, and dumped her body over ten miles away. Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Defendants argued that they fell within the immunity afforded by a Louisiana statute that gives immunity to anyone who kills a dog that is not on the property of the owner and is harassing, wounding, or killing livestock. The Defendants alleged that Bella, the puppy, was harassing their horses. The Plaintiffs argued that the immunity afforded by the statute needed to be affirmatively pled by the Defendants and that the Defendants waived such immunity by failing to assert the affirmative defense in their original answer or any subsequent pleading. The Plaintiffs further argued that the motion for summary judgment would not have been granted if it were not for the immunity protections. The Court ultimately held that the Defendants failed to affirmatively plead the immunity statute and, therefore, it reversed and remanded the case to the lower court.
Flathead-Lolo-Bitterroot Citizen Task Force v. Montana ---- F.Supp.3d ----, 2023 WL 8064884 (D. Mont. Nov. 21, 2023) This case was brought by several environmental organizations against the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission to challenge the approval or regulations that authorize the trapping and snaring of wolves within grizzly bear habitat in Montana. The grizzly bear is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the Montana trapping regulations allow wolf hunters to use foothold traps large enough to capture grizzly bears. Grizzly bears rely heavily on their front and back paws to hunt for food, so crippling their limbs with these traps will lead to the incidental killing of grizzly bears from starvation. Plaintiffs contend that allowing the trapping of wolves in grizzly bear territory is in violation of § 9 of the ESA, as it will lead to the incidental unlawful taking of grizzly bears. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction to enjoin the start of the wolf trapping season, raised questions on the merits, and established a reasonable threat of harm to grizzly bears if the trapping and snaring of wolves is allowed in their habitat. On the merits of the claim, although defendants could prove that no grizzly bears had been killed with such traps in Montana for several years, the court found that plaintiffs succeeded on the merits as there was evidence of grizzly bears being killed by such traps in adjacent states. Plaintiffs also showed that there was a likelihood of harm to grizzly bears, with evidence that these traps will lead to the death of grizzly bears. The court granted plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in part and denied in part, and enjoined the Montana Fish and Wildlife Commission from authorizing wolf trapping and snaring.
Strickland v. Medlen -397 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. 2013)

The Supreme Court of Texas considers petitioner's appeal from the court of appeals' decision holding that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The facts underlying the action involved the improper euthanization of respondents' dog, Avery. They sued for Avery's “sentimental or intrinsic value” because the dog had little or no market value and was irreplaceable. The trial court found that Texas law barred such damages, and dismissed the suit with prejudice. The Court of Appeals of Texas became the first court to hold that a dog owner may recover intangible loss-of-companionship damages in the form of intrinsic or sentimental-value property damages. The Supreme Court reverses that decision here, ruling that dogs are ordinary property, with damages limited to market value, and noneconomic damages based in relational attachment are not permitted.

Judgment 00017-2010-PI/TC, 2011 - Peru 00017-2010-PI/TC The Bar Association of North Lima brought this suit against the Congress of the Republic of Peru regarding several pieces of legislation promoting the development of non-sporting public shows, such as bullfights and cockfights. The Bar Association claimed that the legislation was unconstitutional as it contradicted the right to equality as well as several fiscal principles by taxing non-sporting events but not sporting events. It further claimed that through these practices, the State neglected its duty to guarantee participation in Peru’s national cultural heritage. Congress argued that the claim should be unfounded as no one had been discriminated against based on demographic factors. The court held that the claim was unfounded, as bullfighting is a regulated cultural manifestation and the Peruvian Constitution allows the legislators to use their discretion to impose taxes.
Sentencia 00017-2010-PI/TC, 2011 - Peru 00017-2010-PI/TC El Colegio de Abogados de Lima Norte interpuso esta demanda contra el Congreso de la República de Perú en relación con varias leyes que promovían el desarrollo de espectáculos públicos no deportivos, como las corridas de toros y las peleas de gallos. El Colegio de Abogados alegó que la legislación era inconstitucional, ya que contradecía el derecho a la igualdad así como varios principios fiscales al gravar los espectáculos no deportivos pero no los deportivos. Además, alegó que, mediante estas prácticas, el Estado desatendía su deber de garantizar la participación en el patrimonio cultural nacional de Perú. El Congreso argumentó que la reclamación carecía de fundamento, ya que no se había discriminado a nadie por factores demográficos. El tribunal sostuvo que la reclamación era infundada, ya que, en última instancia, las corridas de toros son una manifestación cultural regulada y la Constitución peruana permite a los legisladores hacer uso de su discrecionalidad para imponer tributos.
Decision Report 00022-2018-AI, 2020 - Peru 00022-2018-AI This report discussed issues of constitutionality against Law 30407, which allows for cockfighting and bullfighting in the name of cultural character.
Relatoría 00022-2018-AI, 2020 - Peru 00022-2018-AI Esta relatoria discutió cuestiones de constitucionalidad contra la Ley 30407, que permite las peleas de gallos y las corridas de toros en nombre del carácter cultural.
Resolucion No. 07, 2023 - Caso Kira - Peru 00045-2023-1-0905-JR-PE-02 La demandante presentó esta demanda en nombre de uno de sus perros, Kira. La demandante asistió a una reunión social con sus hijos y dejó a sus dos perros, Kira y Logan, jugando fuera. La demandante regresó a su casa y descubrió que su vecino, el demandado, había cometido un acto de zoofilia contra Kira. El tribunal examinó varias cuestiones constitucionales y teorías de la pena. Sopesó los factores de lo que el demandado había hecho a Kira con su falta de antecedentes y su escasa probabilidad de reincidencia. El tribunal decidió que el demandado debía cumplir 17 meses de encarcelamiento y pagar multas civiles por el sufrimiento tanto de la demandante como de Kira. También se basó en la cuestión del bienestar de los animales su decisión de prohibir al demandado la "tenencia" de animales para reducir aún más el riesgo de reincidencia. En definitiva, el tribunal basó sus decisiones en motivos de bienestar animal y condena de la crueldad hacia los animales.
Judgment 00048-2004-AI, 2005 - Peru 00048-2004-AI This case challenged the constitutionality of Law 28258: Mine Royalty Law. Most pertinently, articles 1-5 of the law establish guidelines and regulations regarding the use and royalty of mineral materials. The court discussed aspects of natural preservation, social equality, and liberty regarding the use and taxation of such materials. Ultimately, the court held that the claim was unfounded, and required transparency in how the funds were allocated to allow civil society to be aware of their uses.
Sentencia 00048-2004-AI, 2005 - Peru 00048-2004-AI Este caso impugnó la constitucionalidad de la Ley 28258: Ley de Regalías Mineras. Lo más pertinente es que los artículos 1-5 de la ley establecen lineamientos y regulaciones con respecto al uso y regalías de los materiales minerales. El tribunal discutió aspectos de preservación natural, igualdad social y libertad en relación con el uso y la tributación de dichos materiales. En última instancia, el tribunal consideró que la demanda carecía de fundamento y exigió transparencia en la asignación de los fondos para que la sociedad civil pudiera conocer su uso.
Sentencia 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01, 2019, La policia y el uso de caballos - Peru 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01 Este caso se refiere al uso de caballos como medio de transporte y control por parte de la policía. La demanda fue interpuesta por el Instituto Peruano de Asesoría Legal en Medio Ambiente y Biodiversidad contra el Ministerio del Interior para impugnar una ley relativa a la policía y el uso de caballos. El Instituto cita la Ley 30407, que prescribe la protección del bienestar animal, ya que los caballos corren peligro cuando se utilizan en asuntos policiales. El tribunal discutió en su dictamen cuestiones de bienestar animal, constitucionalidad y varios casos precedentes, incluida la interpretación de la palabra "montada" en el artículo 229 Reglamento de la Ley de la Policía, que especifica las funciones de la policía especial de Lima. Estas cuestiones de bienestar animal llevaron al tribunal a concluir que la demanda era parcialmente nula, eliminando la palabra “montada” del numeral 6 del artículo 229 de la mencionada ley. Sin embargo, la sentencia no prohibió el uso de caballos para controlar multitudes.
Judgment 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01, use of horses by law enforcement - Peru 00316-2018-0-1801-SP-CI-01 This case concerns the use of horses as transportation and control by police. The suit was brought by the Peruvian Institute of Legal Counsel for the Environment and Biodiversity against the Ministry of the Interior to challenge a law relating to the police force and the use of horses. The Institute cites Law 30407, which prescribes the protection of animal welfare, as the horses are put in peril when used in policing matters. In its ruling, the court discussed issues of animal welfare, constitutionality, and judicial precedent, including the interpretation of the word "mounted" in Article 229(6) of the Police Law Regulations, which specifies the functions of the special police and when the use of "mounted police" is justified. Animal welfare concerns led the court to partially invalidate the lower court decision, removing the word "mounted" from numeral 6 of Article 229 of the Police Law Regulations. However, the ruling did not prohibit the use of horses for crowd control.
Juan Enrique Martín Pendavis Pflucker v. Cañete, Exp No. 00949-2022-PA/TC - Peru 00949-2022-PA/TC Este caso trata de la tenencia de mascotas y de los derechos constitucionales de las personas en los espacios de alquiler vacacional. La opinión mayoritaria razonó que el espacio de alquiler estaba autorizado a prohibir los animales de compañía, ya que lo hacía como expresión de la voluntad compartida de los cohabitantes, y por tanto, no violaba los derechos del demandante, ya que éste entró voluntariamente en la propiedad. El tribunal señaló que los animales de servicio son animales de trabajo, y no simples "mascotas", cuya presencia es necesaria para que sus propietarios disfruten de la plena accesibilidad del inmueble en cuestión, y no pueden ser prohibidos. Las opiniones discrepantes trataron los temas de los animales como propiedad, las libertades constitucionales y el bienestar de los animales, y argumentaron que la demanda del demandante debía ser fundada.
Resolución Nro. 03, Exp 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Caso "Dachi" - Peru 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 Este es el caso de un hombre apuñaló repetidamente a "Dachi," elperro de su novia. Los hechos se dieron después de que ella le confesara que tenía una aventura con su amigo. El hombre había estado bebiendo y consumiendo drogas y en su ira, actuó violentamente contra Dachi como venganza contra su novia. Dachi sobrevivió, pero los veterinarios no estaban seguros de cuánto tiempo viviría ni de su calidad de vida. Más tarde se descubrió que el hombre tenía inestabilidades psicológicas y había cometido varios delitos más. Fue declarado culpable de delitos contra la propiedad y crueldad con los animales y se le impuso una pena de encarcelamiento y una multa civil.
Resolution No. 3, Exp Resolución Nro. 03, 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03, Dachi, the dog - Peru 01128-2023-0-1814-JR-PE-03 In this matter, a man repeatedly stabbed his girlfriend’s dog, “Dachi,” after she confessed to having an affair with his friend. The man had been drinking and taking drugs, and in his anger, took violent action against Dachi as revenge against his girlfriend. Dachi survived, but veterinarians were unsure of how long Dachi would live or her quality of life. The man was later found to have psychological instabilities and had committed several other crimes. He was convicted of crimes against property and cruelty to animals and was given an incarceration sentence and a civil fine.
Judgement 01413-2017-PA/TC, 2016, animals and horizontal property - Peru 01413-2017-PA/TC The plaintiff brought this Amparo suit against the building owners where he rented his apartment for a new regulation prohibiting pets in the building and not allowing them to take the elevator. The plaintiff claims that this recent ban on pets violates his property rights, as well as his rights to the free development of personality, freedom of movement, and the principle of non-discrimination. He also raised issues of health and safety for pets with regard to not being allowed to take the elevator. The court found in favor of the plaintiff and discussed various regulations that would serve as a compromise between the parties. Additionally, the Owner's Association was instructed to revoke any warnings or sanctions imposed on the plaintiff under the application of the regulation and to apply the ruling to guide dogs. Finally, the court determined that this ruling would constitute binding legal precedent.
Sentencia 01413-2017-PA/TC, 2016, animales en propiedad horizontal - Peru 01413-2017-PA/TC El demandante interpuso esta demanda de amparo contra los propietarios del edificio en el que alquilaba su apartamento por haber prohibido la entrada de animales de compañía en el edificio y no permitirles utilizar el ascensor. El demandante alega que, con la reciente prohibición de animales de compañía, se han vulnerado su derecho de propiedad, así como sus derechos al libre desarrollo de la personalidad, la libertad de tránsito y el principio de no discriminación. También planteó cuestiones de salud y seguridad para las mascotas en relación con el hecho de que no se les permitiera coger el ascensor. El tribunal declaró fundada la demanda y discutió varias normas que sirvieran de compromiso entre las partes. El tribunal ordenó a la Junta de Propietarios dejar sin efecto cualquier advertencia o sanción del demandante en aplicación del reglamento; que se aplique la sentencia a perros guia y que se adopte la sentencia como doctrina jurisprudencial.
Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru 01936-2017-PHC/TC El demandante interpuso una demanda de habeas corpus en su nombre y en el de sus dos hijas pequeñas contra el demandado por violación de sus derechos a la libertad individual y a la tranquilidad familiar. El demandante alegó que los perros del demandado ladraban con tanta frecuencia y tan fuerte que la familia no podía descansar por la noche ni desplazarse por los pasillos por miedo a ser atacada. El tribunal debatió la constitucionalidad de la materia abstracta, la finalidad de una demanda de habeas corpus y el derecho a la integridad personal en relación con la reclamación del demandante. En última instancia, sostuvo que la demanda debía admitirse a trámite en la presente sede constitucional con carácter excepcional.
Chang v. Alzamora, 01936-2017-PHC/TC - Peru 01936-2017-PHC/TC The plaintiff brought a habeas corpus lawsuit on behalf of himself and his two young daughters against the defendant for violating their rights to individual liberty and family tranquility. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant’s dogs barked so frequently and loudly that the family could not rest at night and travel through the halls out of fear of being attacked. The court discussed the abstract subject matter’s constitutionality, the purpose of a habeas corpus lawsuit, and the right to personal integrity regarding the plaintiff’s claim. It ultimately held that the claim must be admitted for processing in the present constitutional venue on an exceptional basis.
Unified Sportsmen of Pennsylvania ex rel. their members v. Pennsylvania Game Com'n 03 A.2d 117 (Pa.Cmwlth., 2006)

A Pennsylvania association consisting of hunters and outdoorsmen and members of the association filed a complaint/request for writ of mandamus against the Pennsylvania Game Commission, Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR), and various state officials, seeking an order directing Commission and DCNR to provide the data and information on which the Commission relied in setting "harvest" figures for Pennsylvania's deer population. Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of the Pennsylvania Game Commission , the Pennsylvania Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and certain Commonwealth officers (collectively, Respondents). The court first found that the Sportsmen indeed have standing, conferred both by statute and under the under the traditional substantial-direct-immediate test. However, Respondent Game Commission's demurrer was sustained, primarily because the court agreed that due to the ambiguous nature of Sportsmen's pleading, it is not possible to discern a legal theory to support the relief requested. Further, the court sustained Respondent's claim that the DCNR, its Secretary, and the state's Governor were not proper parties to association's suit. Despite these procedural defects, the court did not dismiss the Sportsmen's action, and instead allowed them to amend their complaint within 30 days of this order.

Judgment 07392-2013-PHC/TC, Horse Brown SAC v. El Servicio de Parques de Lima- Peru 07392-2013-PHC/TC This judgment resolves the dissents of the judges as written in the Serrano v. Horse Brown SAC case. It discusses ideas of the protection of nonhuman animals and the prevalence of positive and negative duties to nature, as well as Peruvian constitutional rights concerning property and overall personal liberty. The judgment resolves that the lawsuit was unfounded and must be understood within the framework of Amparo law.
Sentencia 07392-2013-PHC/TC - Peru 07392-2013-PHC/TC The plaintiff in this case filed a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of the company Horse Brown against the Lima Park Service to obtain possession of the numerous farm animals that the park owned on its property. The plaintiff alleged a violation of the right to property and that their seizure constituted a violation of the respect for life, dignity, and treatment of animals, as the legal system protects their welfare. The court, in its ruling, analyzed the concepts of habeas corpus, the writ of protection or 'Amparo', and the dignity of animals. The court held that the defendant did not violate the plaintiff's property rights, given that the animals were not in danger of death, and that the plaintiff had abandoned the animals. The court dismissed this issue, which, it stated, should be understood as an application of the right to protection.
Sentencia 07392-2013-PHC/TC, Horse Brown SAC v. El Servicio de Parques de Lima - Peru 07392-2013-PU Esta sentencia resuelve los disensos de los jueces en el caso Serrano vs. Horse Brown SAC. Se discuten las ideas de protección de los animales no humanos y la prevalencia de los deberes positivos y negativos para con la naturaleza, así como los derechos constitucionales peruanos relativos a la propiedad y a la libertad personal en general. La sentencia resuelve que la demanda era infundada y debe entenderse en el marco de la ley de Amparo.
People v. Berry 1 Cal. App. 4th 778 (1991)

In a prosecution arising out of the killing of a two-year-old child by a pit bulldog owned by a neighbor of the victim, the owner was convicted of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, §   192, subd. (b)), keeping a mischievous animal (Pen. Code, §   399), and keeping a fighting dog (Pen. Code, §   597.5, subd. (a)(1)). The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that an instruction that a minor under the age of five years is not required to take precautions, was proper. The court further held that the trial court erred in defining "mischievous" in the jury instruction, however, the erroneous definition was not prejudicial error under any standard of review. The court also held that the scope of defendant's duty owed toward the victim was not defined by Civ. Code, §   3342, the dog-bite statute; nothing in the statute suggests it creates a defense in a criminal action based on the victim's status as a trespasser and on the defendant's negligence.

Kanoa Inc., v. Clinton 1 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (1998)

Plaintiff cruise company filed a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt scientific research of the defendant government, alleging standing under the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), the Marine Mammal Protection Act ("MMPA"), and the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").

Collier v. Zambito 1 N.Y.3d 444 (N.Y. 2004)

Infant child attacked and bit by dog when he was a guest in the owner's home.  After defenses motion for summary judgment was denied, the Appellate Court reversed, and this court affirms.

State v. Murphy 10 A.3d 697 (Me.,2010)

Defendant appeals her convictions for assault of an officer, refusing to submit to arrest, criminal use of an electronic weapon, and two counts of cruelty to animals. In October 2009, a state police trooper was dispatched to defendant's home to investigate complaints that she was keeping animals despite a lifetime ban imposed after her 2004 animal cruelty conviction. The appellate found each of her five claims frivolous, and instead directed its inquiry as to whether the trial court correctly refused recusal at defendant's request. This court found that the trial court acted with "commendable restraint and responsible concern for Murphy's fundamental rights," especially in light of defendant's outbursts and provocations.

People v. Tinsdale 10 Abbott's Prac. Rept. (New) 374 (N.Y. 1868)

This case represents one of the first prosecutions by Mr. Bergh of the ASPCA under the new New York anti-cruelty law. That this case dealt with the issue of overloading a horse car is appropriate as it was one of the most visible examples of animal abuse of the time. This case establishes the legal proposition that the conductor and driver of a horse car will be liable for violations of the law regardless of company policy or orders.Discussed in Favre, History of Cruelty

Yuzon v. Collins 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 18 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.,2004)

In this California case, a dog bite victim sued a landlord, alleging premises liability in landlord's failure to guard or warn against tenants' dangerous dog.  On appeal from an order of summary judgment in favor of the landlords, the Court of Appeal held that the landlord owed no duty of care, as he had no actual knowledge of dog's dangerous propensities and an expert witness's declaration that the landlord should have known of the dog's vicious propensities was insufficient to warrant reconsideration of summary judgment ruling.  The landlord's knowledge that tenants may have a dog because it is allowed through a provision in the lease is insufficient to impute liability where the landlord has no knowledge of any previous attacks or incidents.

Hohenstein v. Dodds 10 N.W.2d 236 (Minn. 1943) This is an action against a licensed veterinarian to recover damages for his alleged negligence in the diagnosis and treatment of plaintiff's pigs.  Plaintiff alleged defendant-veterinarian negligently vaccinated his purebred pigs for cholera.  The court held that a n expert witness's opinion based on conflicting evidence which he is called upon to weigh is inadmissible.  Further, a n expert witness may not include the opinion of another expert witness as basis for his own opinion.  
Banasczek v. Kowalski 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 94 (1979)

Edward Banasczek (plaintiff) instituted an action in trespass against William Kowalski (defendant) for money damages resulting from the alleged shooting of two of plaintiff's dogs. The court held the following: “[T]he claim for emotional distress arising out of the malicious destruction of a pet should not be confused with a claim for the sentimental value of a pet, the latter claim being unrecognized in most jurisdictions.   Secondly we do not think, as defendant argues, that the owner of the maliciously destroyed pet must have witnessed the death of his or her pet in order to make a claim for emotional distress.” Pennsylvania has summarily rejected a claim for loss of companionship for the death of a dog.  

Free v. Jordan 10 S.W.2d 19 (Ark. 1928)

In a replevin action to recover possession of a lost dog from its finder, the court reversed and remanded the case so a jury could determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled due to the defendant's alleged fraudulent concealment of his possession of the dog.

Westfall v. State 10 S.W.3d 85 (Tex. App. 1999)

Defendant convicted of cruelty for intentionally or knowingly torturing his cattle by failing to provide necessary food or care, causing them to die. Defendant lacked standing to challenge warrantless search of property because he had no expectation of privacy under open fields doctrine.

Schindler v. Mejias 100 A.D.3d 1315 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012)

This appeal is an appeal of the denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in a defamation action. Plaintiff, an attorney, brought an action against Hector L. Mejias Jr., an employee of defendant Ulster County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, claiming that Mejias falsely accused him of misrepresenting himself as the Ulster County District Attorney during a sworn deposition. The statement occurred during an incident at the SPCA where Plaintiff-Schindler was trying to pick up a dog owned by his client. The particular issue on appeal is whether the supreme court erred in determining that Mejias's supporting deposition constitutes libel per se. The court found that the alleged act was sufficiently egregious because such a claim would suggest professional misconduct on an attorney's part and invites both disciplinary action and damage to an attorney's professional reputation. Further, defendants failed to meet their burden of showing an absence of malice. The order was affirmed.

Nantucket Residents Against Turbines v. U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Mgmt. 100 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2024) In this case, the U.S. Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (“BOEM”) approved the construction of Vineyard Wind, a wind power project off the coast of Massachusetts after consulting with the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”). A group of Nantucket residents, organized as "Nantucket Residents Against Turbines" (“Residents”), allege that the federal agencies violated the Endangered Species Act by concluding that the project's construction likely would not jeopardize the critically endangered North Atlantic right whale. The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment for BOEM and NMFS. On appeal of summary judgment, the Residents further allege that BOEM violated the National Environmental Policy Act by relying on NMFS's flawed analysis. The court rejected the Residents' argument, finding that NMFS's biological opinion properly analyzed the current status and environmental baseline of the right whale. Further, the biological opinion properly analyzed the effects of the project (e.g., noise) on the right whale, along with mitigation measures, and did not ignore the project's additive effects on the right whale's long-term recovery prospects. Finally, BOEM's reliance on the biological opinion did not violate NEPA. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Faraci v. Urban 101 A.D.3d 1753 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.)

In this New York case, the plaintiff sought damages for injuries his son sustained after the child was bitten by a dog in a house owned by defendant Urban, but occupied by Defendant Buil (the dog's owner). Defendant Urban appeals an order denying her motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Defendant Urban failed to demonstrate as a matter of law that the dog did not have vicious tendencies because defendant's own submissions showed that the dog had previously growled at people coming to the door. However, summary judgment was appropriate here because the evidence failed to show that defendant knew or should have known of the dog's alleged vicious propensities.

People v. Baniqued 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 835 (Cal.App.3 Dist.,2000).

Defendant appealed from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, California, ordering their conviction for cockfighting in violations of animal cruelty statutes.  The court held that roosters and other birds fall within the statutory definition of "every dumb creature" and thus qualify as an "animal" for purposes of the animal cruelty statutes.

Toney v. Glickman 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir., 1996) Plaintiffs were in the business of selling animals to research facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they had committed hundreds of violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. The ALH then imposed what was, to that point, the harshest sanction, $200,000, in the history of the Act. The Judicial Officer affirmed the ALJ's findings and denied the Plaintiffs' request to reopen the hearing for consideration of new evidence. While the 8th Circuit affirmed most of these findings, it held that the evidence did not support all of them. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Department for redetermination of the sanction. The court also affirmed the Judicial Officer's refusal to reopen the hearing and denied the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence. The Plaintiffs were free, however, to seek leave to offer this additional evidence on remand to the extent it was relevant to the sanction.
Alternatives Research & Development Foundation v. Glickman 101 F.Supp.2d 7 (D.D.C.,2000)

In this case, the plaintiffs, a non-profit organization, a private firm and an individual, alleged that the defendants, the USDA and APHIS violated the mandate of the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) by promulgating regulations that exclude birds, mice and rats from the definition of “animal” under the Act. Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that all three plaintiffs lack standing to bring suit. Defendants also moved to dismiss on the grounds that the exclusion of the three species is within the agency's Congressionally delegated discretion, not subject to judicial review. The court denied defendant's motion, holding that based on Lujan , defendants challenge to standing failed. Further, the AWA does not grant the USDA "unreviewable discretion" to determine what animals are covered under the AWA.

Town of Bethlehem v. Acker 102 A.3d 107 (Conn. App. 2014) Plaintiffs seized approximately 65 dogs from the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Connecticut pursuant to a search and seizure warrant that had been issued on facts showing that the dogs, which were being kept in an uninsulated barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit, were neglected, in violation of General Statutes § 22–329a. The trial court found that the smaller breed dogs were neglected, but found that larger breed dogs were not. On an appeal by plaintiffs and a cross appeal by defendants, the appeals court found: (1) the trial court applied the correct legal standards and properly determined that the smaller breed dogs were neglected and that the larger breed dogs were not neglected, even though all dogs were kept in a barn with an average temperature of 30 degrees Fahrenheit; (2) § 22–329a was not unconstitutionally vague because a person of ordinary intelligence would know that keeping smaller breed dogs in an uninsulated space with an interior temperature of approximately 30 degrees Fahrenheit would constitute neglect; (3) the trial court did not err in declining to admit the rebuttal testimony offered by the defendants; and (4) the trial court did not err in granting the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and properly transferred ownership of the smaller breed dogs to the town. The appellate court, however, reversed the judgment of the trial court only with respect to its dispositional order, which directed the parties to determine among themselves which dogs were smaller breed dogs and which dogs were larger breed dogs, and remanded the case for further proceedings, consistent with this opinion.
Kovar v. City of Cleveland 102 N.E.2d 472 (Ohio App. 1951)

This case involved a petition by LaVeda Kovar, et al against the City of Cleveland to obtain an order to restrain the City from disposing of dogs impounded by the City Dog Warden by giving or selling them to hospitals or laboratories for experimental and research purposes.  The Court of Appeals held that the City of Cleveland, both by its constitutional right of home rule and by powers conferred on municipal corporations by statute, had the police power right to provide that no dog should be permitted to run at large unless muzzled, and any dog found at large and unmuzzled would be impounded.  Further, by carrying out the mandate of the city ordinance by disposing of these impounded dogs was simply the performance of a ministerial or administrative duty properly delegated to Director of Public Safety.

United States Association of Reptile Keepers, Inc. v. Jewell 103 F. Supp. 3d 133 (D.D.C. 2015) On a motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin implementation of the 2015 Rule (80 Fed.Reg. 12702 ), the US District Court for the District of Columbia addressed whether the U.S. Department of Interior acted within its authority when it issued Lacey Act regulations prohibiting the interstate transportation of certain large constricting snakes. The United States Association of Reptile Keepers argued that since the Lacey Act “[did] not encompass transportation of listed species between two states within the continental United States,” the Department of Interior exceeded its authority. Relying on the history of zebra mussels and bighead carp, the Department argued that it did not. The Court, however, found the Department had failed to establish that that history was sufficient to confer an authority on the Department that Congress did not confer when it enacted the controlling statutory text. The Court ruled the preliminary injunction would issue and ordered the parties to appear for a status conference on May 18, 2015 to address the scope of the injunction.
United States v. Bramble 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996)

During a search related to a controlled substances violation, undercover agents seized eagle feathers from defendant.  The court held that Congress exercised valid Commerce Clause power in enacting the BGEPA, as the incentive of interstate commerce in eagle parts would threaten eagles to extinction, thus depleting the future commercial potential of activities such as eagle-based tourism and educational research.  For discussion on the Eagle Act and the Commerce Clause, see Detailed Discussion .

White v. Vermont Mutual Insurance Company 106 A.3d 1159 (N.H., 2014) This is an appeal brought by Susan and Peter White to a declaratory judgment that her son, Charles Matthews, was not covered under Susan's homeowner's insurance policy with the respondent.The incident that led to this case involved Matthews' dog causing injury to Susan while at the home covered by the policy. The policy covered the insurer and residents of their home who are relatives, so Susan attempted to collect from Vermont Mutual for the damage done by the dog. However, her claim was denied because Matthews was deemed to not be a resident of the home. This court affirms.
Missouri Pet Breeders Association v. County of Cook 106 F. Supp. 3d 908 (N.D. Ill. 2015) Cook County passed an ordinance that required a “pet shop operator” to only sell animals obtained from a breeder that (among other requirements) held a USDA class “A” license and owned or possessed no more than 5 female dogs, cats, or rabbits capable of reproduction in any 12-month period. Plaintiffs, a professional pet organization and three Cook County pet shops and their owners, sued Cook County government officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. After concluding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their claims, with the exception of the Foreign Commerce Claim, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, but gave Plaintiffs a chance to cure their complaint's defects by amendment.
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986)

Congress had granted the Secretary the authority to determine whether a foreign nation's whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the IWC, and the Court found no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon the Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that standard.

Maine v. Taylor 106 S.Ct. 2440 (1986)

Appellee bait dealer (appellee) arranged to have live baitfish imported into Maine, despite a Maine statute prohibiting such importation. He was indicted under a federal statute making it a federal crime to transport fish in interstate commerce in violation of state law. He moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the Maine statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce.  The Court held that the ban did not violate the commerce clause in that it served legitimate local purpose, i.e., protecting native fisheries from parasitic infection and adulteration by non-native species, that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.

Frank v. Animal Haven, Inc. 107 A.D.3d 574 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2013.)

Plaintiff was bitten by the dog that she adopted from Animal Haven, Inc. and sued that entity for personal injuries stemming from the bite. In affirming the decision to dismiss the complaint, this court noted that the adopting parties signed a contract a the time of adoption where they undertook a "lifetime commitment" for the responsible care of the dog. While the contract stipulated that Animal Haven had the right to have the dog returned if the plaintiff breached the contract, this did not reserve a right of ownership of the dog. Further, the contract also explicitly relieved Animal Haven of liability once the dog was in the possession of the adoptive parties.

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