|Viva! v. Adidas||63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50 (Cal., 2007)||2007 WL 2080000 (Cal. 2007), 41 Cal.4th 929||Viva, an animal protective organization, filed action against Adidas shoe retailer alleging that it was violating a state statute banning the import of products made from Australian kangaroo hide into California. On cross motions for summary judgment, the original court sided with Adidas, on the ground that state statute was preempted by federal Endangered Species Act of 1973. The appeals court affirmed, however the California Superior Court reversed, holding that the state statute was not preempted by federal law.||Case|
|Voiceless Animal Law Toolkit||Voiceless Australia||www.voiceless.org.au||
Overview of the state of Animal Law in Australia.
|Volosen v. State||192 S.W.3d 597(Tex.App.-Fort Worth, 2006)||2006 WL 349713 (Tx. 2006)||
In this Texas case, the trial court found Appellant Mircea Volosen guilty of animal cruelty for killing a neighbor's dog. The sole issue on appeal is whether the State met its burden of presenting legally sufficient evidence that Volosen was "without legal authority" to kill the dog. By statute, a dog that "is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked ... fowls may be killed by ... any person witnessing the attack." The court found that no rational trier of fact could have determined beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was not attacking or had not recently attacked chickens in a pen in Volosen's yard; thus, the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that Volosen killed the dog "without legal authority" as required to sustain a conviction for animal cruelty. Judgment Reversed by Volosen v. State , 227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex.Crim.App., 2007).
|Volosen v. State||227 S.W.3d 77 (Tex. Crim. App., 2007)||2007 WL 1752803 (Tex. Crim. App.)||
Appellant killed neighbor's miniature dachshund with a maul when he found it among his chickens in his backyard, and he defends that Health & Safety Code 822 gave him legal authority to do so. At the bench trial, the judge found him guilty of animal cruelty, but on appeal the court reversed the conviction because it found that the statute gave him legal authority to kill the attacking dog. However, this court held that appellant did not meet his burden of production to show that the statute was adopted in Colleyville, TX and found as a matter of fact that the dog was not "attacking."
|Volosen v. State||227 S.W.3d 77 (Tx.Crim.App. 2007)||
The appellant/defendant mauled a miniature dachshund to death after the dog entered a yard where the appellant kept his chickens. The State of Texas prosecuted the appellant/defendant for cruelty to animals on the ground that the appellant/defendant killed the dog without legal authority. The appellant/defendant, however, argued that section 822.033 of the Texas Health and Safety Code, an entirely different statute, provided that authority. After the appeals court reversed the district court’s decision to convict the defendant/appellant, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that the appellant/defendant had failed to meet his burden of production to show the applicability of his claimed defense and thus reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and remand the case back to that court.
|VOLPE VITO, INC. v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE||58 Agric. Dec. 85 (1999)||1999 WL 33314002 (U.S.D.A.)||Judicial officer is not required to accept ALJ's findings of fact, even when those findings are based on credibility determinations, and judicial officer is authorized to substitute his or her judgment for that of ALJ.||Case|
|Vosburgh v. Kimball||285 A.2d 766 (Vt. 1971)||130 Vt. 27 (1971)||
This case involves an action by a dog owner against farmer for wrongfully impounding dogs and against town constable for wrongfully killing the dogs. The Vermont Supreme Court held that farmer had acted in a reasonable and prudent manner by contacting the constable, where he never intended to "impound" the dogs when he secured them overnight in his barn after finding them in pursuit of his injured cows. However, the issue of whether the dogs were wearing a collar as required by state law precluded the granting of a directed verdict for the constable. (Under state law, a constable was authorized to kill dogs not registered or wearing a prescribed collar.) The court held that it was necessary for the jury to make this determination.
|VT - Assistance animal - Assistance Animal/Guide Dog Laws||13 V.S.A. § 355; 9 V.S.A. § 4502 - 4507; 23 V.S.A. § 1057||VT ST T 13 § 355; VT ST T 9 V§ 4502 - 4507; VT ST T 23 § 1057||The following statutes comprise the state's relevant assistance animal and guide dog laws.||Statute|
|VT - Brattleboro - Chapter 3: Animals and Fowl (Article 2: Dogs, Wolf-Hybrids)||Brattleboro, Vermont Code of Ordinances, Article 2: Dogs, Wolf-Hybrids, §§ 3-27 to 3-34||
In Brattleboro, Vermont, owners or keepers of assistance dogs are exempt from the license surcharge fee, but are still required to pay a basic license fee plus a fee for the statewide rabies program. When obtaining a license, owners or keepers of assistance dogs must provide documentation of their assistance dog’s training. The following ordinances also indicate which dogs are eligible as assistance dogs.
|VT - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes||13 V.S.A. § 351 - 400; 20 V.S.A. § 2365b; 24 V.S.A. § 1943||VT ST T. 13 § 351 - 400; VT ST T. 20 § 2365b; VT ST T. 24 § 1943||This Vermont statutory section contains the amended anti-cruelty and animal fighting laws. Animal cruelty, as defined by § 352, occurs when a person overworks, overloads, tortures, torments, abandons, administers poison to, cruelly beats or mutilates an animal, or deprives an animal which a person owns or possesses of adequate food, water, shelter, rest, sanitation, or necessary medical attention. It is also animal cruelty if one owns, possesses, keeps or trains an animal engaged in an exhibition of fighting. The section excludes scientific research activities, hunting, farming, and veterinary activities among others.||Statute|