Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TX - Endangered Species - Chapter 68. Endangered Species | V. T. C. A., Parks & Wildlife Code § 68.001 - 021 | TX PARKS & WILD § 68.001 - 021 | Texas defines endangered species as those listed on the federal ESA List as well as those designated in the state. No person may capture, trap, take, or kill, or attempt to capture, trap, take, or kill, endangered fish or wildlife nor may he or she possess, sell, distribute, or offer or advertise for sale those species (unless allowed as described in the subchapter). Notably, this chapter excepts from its provisions coyotes, cougars, bobcats, prairie dogs, and red foxes (with no mention as to what occurs in the event they become endangered). Violation of the provisions results in a Class C Parks and Wildlife Code misdemeanor for the first offense, a Class B misdemeanor for the second offense, and a Class A misdemeanor for subsequent offenses. | Statute |
| NV - Veterinary - Chapter 638. Veterinarians. General Provisions. | N. R. S. 638.001 - 638.200 | NV ST 638.001 - 638.200 | These are the state's veterinary practice laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning the state veterinary board, veterinary records laws, and the laws governing disciplinary actions for impaired or incompetent practitioners. | Statute |
| Womack v. Von Rardon | 135 P.3d 542 (Wash. 2006) |
In this Washington case, a cat owner sued a minor and his parents after the minor set her cat on fire. While this Court found that the trial court correctly granted summary judgment with respect to Ms. Womack's private nuisance, tort outrage, and statutory waste claims, it held that the lower court incorrectly calculated the measure of damages. Noting that the Division 2 Appellate Court left open the question of emotional distress damages where a pet has been maliciously injured in Pickford v. Masion , 124 Wash.App. 257, 262-63, 98 P.3d 1232 (2004), this Court held that the general allegations include sufficient facts to find both malicious conduct toward Ms. Womack's pet and her resulting emotional distress. Thus, "[f]or the first time in Washington, we hold malicious injury to a pet can support a claim for, and be considered a factor in measuring a person's emotional distress damages." |
Case | |
| Hastings v. Sauve | 94 A.D.3d 1171 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012) | 2012 WL 1129275 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept., 2012); 941 N.Y.S.2d 774 (2012) | Plaintiff motorist was injured after hitting a cow that had wandered onto the highway, and sued owner for negligently failing to confine cow. The Supreme Court held that injury claims could only proceed under strict liability theory based on owner's knowledge of animal's vicious propensities. There was no evidence that cow had a vicious propensity, or that owner knew of propensity, thus, owner was not liable. This order was Reversed by Hastings v. Sauve , 2013 WL 1829834 (N.Y., 2013). | Case |
| R (on the application of Countryside Alliance and others) v Attorney General and another | [2007] UKHL 52 | An appeal was brought against a decision that the Hunting Act 2004 was not inconsistent with the EC Treaty, or incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. In particular, the appellants argued that the Act was incompatible with the right to a private and family life; and the right of freedom of assembly and association (Articles 8 and 11 of the Human Rights Act); along with Articles 1 and 14 of the Act (the right to peaceful enjoyment of property rights, and prohibition on discrimination). The appeal was rejected by the House of Lords. Findings included that Articles 8 and 11 were not engaged, and that even if they were, the hunting ban was proportionate to the end it sought to achieve and necessary in a democratic society. | Case | |
| RI - Livestock, damage done by - Chapter 14. Damage by Animals | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-14-1 to 20 | RI ST § 4-14-1 to 20 | This chapter deals with responsibilities and liability for livestock at large. No horse, bull, boar, ram, or goat shall be permitted to run at large and if the owner or keeper of these, for any reason suffers any animals to do so he or she shall upon conviction be fined not in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) and be liable in addition for all damages done by the animal while so at large. The chapter also specifies procedures for impounding animals found at large. | Statute |
| NC - Hunting - Chapter 113. Conservation and Development. | N.C.G.S.A. § 113-295 | NC ST § 113-295 | This law reflects North Carolina's hunter harassment provision. Under the law, it is unlawful for a person to interfere intentionally with the lawful taking of wildlife resources or to drive, harass, or intentionally disturb any wildlife resources for the purpose of disrupting the lawful taking of wildlife resources. Incidental interference is excluded from the statute. Violation of this subsection is a Class 2 misdemeanor for a first conviction and a Class 1 misdemeanor for a second or subsequent conviction. | Statute |
| Snead v. Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals of Pennsylvania | 929 A.2d 1169 (Pa.Super., 2007) | 2007 PA Super 204, 2007 WL 1990510 (Pa.Super.) |
This Pennsylvania case involves cross-appeals following a jury trial in which defendant SPCA, was found liable for euthanizing the dogs belonging to plaintiff Snead, who was awarded damages in the amount of $154,926.37, including $100,000 in punitive damages. The facts stemmed from a seizure several dogs at a seemingly abandoned property owned by Snead where Snead was arrested on dog fighting charges, which were then dropped the next day. However, Snead was not aware that the charges were dropped and that the dogs were therefore available to be reclaimed. The dogs were ultimately euthanized after Snead went to reclaim them. On appeal, this court first held that the SPCA does not operate as a branch of the Commonwealth and therefore, does not enjoy the protection of sovereign immunity or protection under the Pennsylvania Tort Claims Act. The court held that there was sufficient evidence presented for Snead's Sec. 1983 to go to the jury that found the SPCA has inadequate procedures/policies in place to safeguard Snead's property interest in the dogs. As to damages, the court found the there was no evidence to impute to the SPCA evil motive or reckless indifference to the rights of Snead sufficient for an award of punitive damages. |
Case |
| State ex rel. Humane Society of Missouri v. Beetem | 317 S.W.3d 669 (Mo.App. W.D.,2010) | 2010 WL 3167457 (Mo.App. W.D.) |
The "Missourians for Protection of Dogs" ("MPD") advocated a statewide ballot measure to enact a new statutory provision to be known as the "Puppy Mill Cruelty Prevention Act." The certified ballot title included a summary statement reading: "Shall Missouri law be amended to: . . . create a misdemeanor crime of ‘puppy mill cruelty’ for any violations?" One taxpaying Missouri citizen, Karen Strange, subsequently filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief against the Secretary of State, challenging the summary statement as being "insufficient and unfair." In this action, the Humane Society of Missouri sought protection from an order of the circuit court requiring it to disclose and turn over Document 10 - a series of focus group findings and related documentation developed by the Humane Society of Missouri and its partners to formulate political strategy. Writing on behalf of the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, Judge Victor C. Howard, with all concurring, granted the HSMO’s writ of prohibition. HSMO’s preliminary writ of prohibition was made absolute, rendering Document 10 non-discoverable. |
Case |
| Australia - Anti Cruelty - New South Wales Regulations |
The Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (General) Regulation 2006 are authorative in the state of New South Wales. |
Administrative |