Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA - Slaughter - § 599f. Nonambulatory animals; slaughter houses, stockyards, auctions, market agencies, or dealers; transaction | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 599f | CA PENAL § 599f | As used in this section, "nonambulatory" means unable to stand and walk without assistance. This statute prohibits a slaughterhouse that is not inspected by the United States Department of Agriculture, stockyard, or auction shall buy, sell, or receive a nonambulatory animal. Effective July 2008, the law also states that no slaughterhouse shall sell meat from non-ambulatory animals for human consumption. The penalty was also increased from an unspecified misdemeanor to a penalty of up to one year in jail or a fine of up to $20,000 or both. | Statute |
| EU - Farming - 78/923/EEC: Council Decision of 19 June 1978 concerning the conclusion of the European Convention for the protect | 78/923/EEC |
This EU council decision approves the European Convention for the protection of animals kept for farming purposes on behalf of the European Economic Community. It has the aim of protecting animals kept for farming purposes, particularly in modem intensive production systems. |
Statute | |
| Robinson v. U.S. | 718 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1983) |
Richard "Dick" Robinson was charged by the Department of Agriculture with violating the Animal Welfare Act for transporting a wolf from Utah to California for exhibition on television without a license. Robinson exhibited the wolf on several television programs to promote his most recent book about his exploits as an animal trainer and producer of animal films. Respondent once held a valid exhibitor's license under the AWA, but the license was revoked in 1979 when Robinson failed to comply with the terms of a consent decision requiring him to install more adequate plywood cover for his bear cages. After a hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) for the Department of Agriculture issued a cease and desist order to prevent Robinson from further illegally transporting and exhibiting his animals and assessed a $500 civil penalty against him. The Judicial Officer of the Department of Agriculture affirmed the order of the ALJ on appeal. The 10th Circuit affirmed the ALJ's conclusion that a cease and desist order by itself was insufficient and that a $500 penalty was necessary to impress Robinson with the need to comply with the Act's requirements in the future. |
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| Kollman Ramos v. U.S. Dept. Of Agr. | 322 Fed.Appx. 814 (C.A.11) | Slip Copy, 2009 WL 922661 (C.A.11) |
Petitioner sought to have the United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, set aside a Default Decision and Order of a United States Department of Agriculture Judicial Officer concluding that Petitioner had willfully violated multiple provisions of the AWA, including knowingly operating as a dealer without a license by delivering for transportation, or transporting, two lions for exhibition without a valid license to do so, causing injury to two lions that resulted in the death of one of the lions, and lying to investigators about Petitioner’s actions. The Court affirmed the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order, finding, among other things, that the USDA did not err in concluding that Petitioner failed to admit or deny any material allegations in the complaint and was thus deemed to have admitted all allegations, the Judicial Officer did not abuse his discretion by revoking Petitioner’s AWA license on a finding of willfulness, and that that the Judicial Officer’s Decision and Order did not violate fundamental principles of fairness as embodied in the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Administrative Procedures Act, the Animal Welfare Act, and the USDA’s rules. |
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| People v. Brinkley | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2019 WL 3226728 (N.Y. App. Div. July 18, 2019) | Defendant was convicted of aggravated cruelty to animals. The Defendant appealed the judgment. Defendant and his nephew had purchased a puppy and continually used negative reinforcement, such as paddling or popping the dog on the rear end with an open hand, for unwanted behavior. On one occasion, when the dog was approximately 15 months old, the Defendant’s nephew found that the dog had defecated in the apartment. The nephew attempted to paddle the dog and the dog bit the nephew’s thumb as a result. When the Defendant had returned home, the nephew explained to him what had happened. The Defendant proceeded to remove the dog from his crate, put the dog’s face by the nephew’s injured thumb, and told him he was a bad dog. The dog then bit off a portion of the Defendant’s thumb. The Defendant attempted to herd the dog onto the back porch, but the dog became aggressive and continued to bite him. As a result, the Defendant repeatedly kicked the dog and used a metal hammer to beat the dog into submission. The dog later died due to his injuries. The Defendant argued that he had a justifiable purpose for causing the dog serious physical injury. The Defendant testified that he was in shock from the injury to his thumb and that he was trying to protect himself and his nephew. However, other evidence contradicted the Defendant's testimony. The dog was in a crate when the Defendant got home, and the Defendant could have left him there rather than take the dog out to discipline him. The Defendant was at least partially at fault for creating the situation that led him to react in such a violent manner. The Court reviewed several of the Defendant’s contentions and found them all to be without merit. The judgment was ultimately affirmed. | Case | |
| AFADA habeas corpus Cecilia | EXPTE. NRO. P-72.254/15 | “Abogados y Funcionarios de defensa Animal” (AFADA) brought a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Cecilia, a 30 year old chimpanzee that lived in the Mendoza Zoo alleging that the chimpanzee had been illegitimately and arbitrarily deprived of her right to ambulatory freedom and right to have a dignified life on the part of authorities of the Zoo of the City of Mendoza, Argentina. The court granted habeas corpus to Cecilia, ruling that Cecilia was a living being with rights and instructing defendants to immediately free her and to relocate her to the Great Ape Project Sanctuary in Brazil. Until this moment, only humans illegally detained had been granted this writ. | Case | |
| US - AWA - 1976 Public Law 94-279 | 1976 PL 94-279 | The 1976 Amendments of the AWA dealt with several new topics: (1) transportation carriers and intermediate handlers of animals were brought under the provisions of the Act, (2) a number of specific transportation problems were addressed by Congress, (3) a new provision was added which made it a crime to knowingly sponsor, participate in, transport, or use the mails to promote fights between live birds, live dogs or other mammals, (4) the penalty provisions were rewritten, allowing the broad use of civil fines. | Statute | |
| Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 329: Section 6268 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6268 (1918) | Section 6268 of Chapter 329 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers the unlawful injury to certain property of another. Specifically, the statute states the punishment for hurting, maiming, poisoning anther's cattle, ox, horse, and mule. | Statute | |
| Molinari v. Tuskegee University | 339 F. Supp. 2d. 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2004) |
A veterinary student was kicked by a cow while trying to perform a medical procedure. The student brought a personal injury lawsuit against the professor and university for negligently allowing the university-owned cow to kick her and not providing timely medical treatment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. |
Case | |
| U.S. v. Stevens | 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) | 176 L.Ed.2d 435, 78 USLW 4267, 38 Media L. Rep. 1577, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4819, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5779, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 221 |
Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note: 18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010). |
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