Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | ||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Law Review Vol 12, No. 2 Table of Contents |
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| MN - Declaw - 504B.114. Pet declawing and devocalization prohibited | M.S.A. § 504B.114 | MN ST § 504B.114 | This Maine law, effective January 1, 2024, prohibits a landlord who allows an animal from: (1) advertising the availability of a real property for occupancy in a manner designed to discourage application for occupancy of that real property because an applicant's animal has not been declawed or devocalized; (2) refusing to allow the occupancy of a real property, refusing to negotiate the occupancy of a real property, or otherwise making unavailable or deny to another person the occupancy of a real property because of that person's refusal to declaw or devocalize an animal; or (3) requiring a tenant or occupant of real property to declaw or devocalize an animal allowed on the premises. | Statute | ||||||||
| Hogan v. Hogan | 199 So. 3d 50 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 7889623 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 4, 2015) | This case is an appeal of a judgment granting an Alabama divorce. With regard to animal law, the husband argues on appeal that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the couple's two dogs. Specifically, the husband argues that one of the dogs was given to him as a gift and is therefore his separate property. He also suggests that because the dogs lived with him since his wife moved out of the marital property (from 11/2012 until 02/2015), he is the "proper owner" of the dogs. While this court noted that evidence concerning ownership was disputed at trial, the evidence is undisputed that the wife entered the marriage with one of the dogs. The second dog was given to both parties by the wife's niece. In examining Alabama law, the court observed that it has long been held that dogs are property. Thus, evidence of ownership can come from documentary title (like a dog license or registration) or possession. Here, the court was persuaded by the testimony that when the wife moved out, she moved into an apartment and was unable to take the dogs with her. No evidence was presented that the wife's circumstances changed to allow her to keep the dogs, and there was no showing that the wife sought court intervention to regain possession of the dogs. Thus, the court stated the following: "Based on the presumption stated in Placey, supra, that the ownership of a pet is presumed to be in the person who possesses it, and given the wife's failure to present evidence indicating that she was in a position to take the dogs, we conclude that the evidence does not support the trial court's decision to award the dogs to the wife. Accordingly, that portion of the judgment awarding the dogs to the wife is reversed." | Case | ||||||||
| China - Wildlife - Wildlife Law Regulations | Wildlife Law Regs. |
This is the set of regulations for the implementation of the national wildlife law, primarily for the protection of endangered species. |
Statute | |||||||||
| OK - Newcastle - Title IX: General Regulations (Chapter: 90: Animals) | Newcastle City Code §§ 90.04, 90.99 |
This Newcastle, Oklahoma ordinance declares it to be unlawful and an offense for any person to keep any animal within the corporate limits of the city except as provided by these provisions. A violation of this ordinance will result in a fine not to exceed $200. |
Local Ordinance | |||||||||
| Derecho Animal Volume 5 Núm 1 |
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Policy | ||||||||||
| Map of Private Exotic Pet Ownership Laws | The above map details states that ban, partially ban, require licensure, or provide miscellaneous regulations on private ownership of wild or exotic animals. Currently, 20 states have what can be called "comprehensive bans." These bans typically classify wild cats, large non-domesticated carnivores, reptiles, and non-human primates as "dangerous animals" or otherwise prohibit private ownership of these species. These laws may outright ban the ownership of wild or exotic animals as pets or only allow those animals to be kept under certain licenses not including pet or private possession (i.e., for educational or scientific purposes). Thirteen (13) states have partial bans on exotic pets, which means that these states ban specific, listed animals by statute, but not all non-traditional, non-domestic animals (for example, these states may allow ownership of small primates). Fourteen (14) states permit private ownership of exotic animals under a licensure or permit scheme. People seeking licenses may have to register with the state, prove satisfactory conditions for the keeping of such animals, pay a fee, and maintain liability insurance. The remaining three (3) states do not have a statutory or regulatory scheme that directly addresses or controls the private ownership of exotic pets, but may regulate some aspect of ownership. These states may require health certificates or import permits for such animals. For more discussion on exotic pet laws, see our Topical Introduction. | State map | ||||||||||
| Altieri v. Nanavati | 573 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super., 1990) | 41 Conn.Supp. 317 (1990) |
This is an action against a veterinarian for negligence, claiming that the defendant performed unwanted sterilization surgery on the plaintiff's dog, a Lhasa Apso. The court held that there is also a question of fact regarding whether performing an unwanted operation on the dog is, under the circumstances, actionable as reckless conduct. However, the court observed that, at the time of the trial it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will be able to recover, as an element of damages, any alleged emotional distress they may have experienced as a result of the surgery on their dog. |
Case | ||||||||
| Index to Journal of Animal and Natural Resource Law |
Index for Animal and Natural Resource Law ReviewVolume #1 (2005) |
Policy | ||||||||||
| State v. Borowski | 231 Or.App. 511 (2009) | 220 P.3d 100 (Or.,2009) |
Defendants were convicted of interfering with agricultural operations under the anti-picketing provision of a criminal statute. The Court of Appeals held that the anti-picketing provision was not facially over-broad under the free speech or free assembly provision of State Constitution. The provision, which imposed criminal penalties on people engaged in picketing but created an exception for those involved in a labor protest, did not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the State Constitution, but it did violate equal protection rights under the U.S. Constitution. The statutory presumption of severability did not apply in this case. |
Case |