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Displaying 6591 - 6600 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Naples v. Miller | No. CIV.A.08C-01-093PLA, 2009 WL 1163504 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 30, 2009) | In this case, the plaintiff brought a lawsuit against the defendant alleging damage to property, which included past and future veterinary bills, emotional distress, mental anguish, and punitive damages caused by the attack of “Ricky”, defendant’s rescue dog to the plaintiff’s terrier “Peanut”. Peanut's veterinary treatment cost over $14,000. Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by both parties. Defendants alleged that veterinary expenses were not compensable in a property damage case. Additionally, defendants argued that there was no basis for recovery for emotional distress and mental anguish as noneconomic damages were not available for damage to personal property either. Finally, defendants contended that facts did not support an argument for punitive damages as this claim required conduct that is "outrageous" or the result of an "evil motive" or a "reckless indifference to the rights of others," Plaintiff’s moved for summary judgment as well. Plaintiff argued that defendants responsibility was based on 7 Del. C. § 1711 that makes the owner of a dog liable in damages for "any loss to person or property." However, the issue as to the measure of damages was not addressed. The court granted partial summary judgment for the defendant. In its opinion, the court stated that “under Delaware law, dogs were seen as personal property, and the damages to Peanut could not be measured as if Peanut was a human being.” As personal property, a dog is “subject to the same measure of damages as a sofa, a car, a rug, a vase, or any other inanimate item of property.” For that reason veterinary expenses in excess of market value and emotional damage could not be recovered. On the punitive damages allegations, the court did not find that the plaintiff had presented any evidence as to the defendant’s conduct that would satisfy the standard of behavior required. | Case | ||
| NV - Rabies - Chapter 441A. Infectious Diseases; Toxic Agents | NV ADC 441A.410 to 445 | NAC 441A.410 to 445 |
NAC 441A.410 Appointment of rabies control authority; ordinance providing for rabies control program; authority of county, city or town to require licenses for dogs, cats and ferrets; duty of county, city or town to provide certain information to State Health Officer or repres |
Administrative | |
| CA - Elephant Abuse - § 596.5. Elephants; abusive behavior by owner or manager; misdemeanor | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 596.5 | CA PENAL § 596.5 | This statute makes it a misdemeanor for an owner or manager of an elephant to engage in abuse and specifies certain behaviors that qualify as abuse. | Statute | |
| Brazil - Constitution (Portuguese) - Constituiclo Federal do Brazil - Protecclo dos Animais | CHAPTER VI, ART. 225 |
Constituiclo Federal do Brazil - Protecclo dos Animais |
Statute | ||
| Humane Soc. of U.S. v. Dirk Kempthorne | 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir., 2008) | 2008 WL 2245321 (C.A.D.C.) |
The Humane Society of the United States sought an injunction to prevent the lethal depredation of gray wolves. The district court granted the injunction but, while the case was on appeal, the United States Department of the Interior removed the gray wolf from the Endangered Species List. After the gray wolf was removed from the Endangered Species List, all parties agreed that the delisting of the gray wolf rendered the appeal moot. The Court of Appeals vacated the district court's ruling. |
Case | |
| VA - Research - Chapter 52. Humane Cosmetics Act | VA Code Ann. § 59.1-571 - 574 | VA ST § 59.1-571 - 574 | This Virginia law states that, beginning July 1, 2022, no manufacturer shall sell or offer for sale within the Commonwealth any cosmetic, if the cosmetics manufacturer knows or reasonably should know that the cosmetic or any component thereof was developed or manufactured using cosmetic animal testing that was conducted on or after January 1, 2022. Limited exceptions exist. Any person who violates any provision of this chapter is subject to a civil penalty of $5,000 and an additional $1,000 for each day the violation continues. Such penalty shall be collected by the Attorney General and the proceeds shall be deposited into the Literary Fund. | Statute | |
| People v. Zamora | 175 N.E.3d 700 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | 2020 IL App (1st) 172011 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | Defendant Juan Zamora was found guilty of failing to provide humane care and treatment for, and abusing, his 10 dogs in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act. On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the it generally showed that he treated his dogs well and they had not sustained physical or psychological injuries. Additionally, he argues that section 3(a)(4) of the act, which criminalizes the failure to provide “humane care and treatment,” is unconstitutionally vague. The conviction stems from defendant's conduct with his 10 pit bull type dogs. When the investigating officer executed a search warrant on defendant's residence, they found the ten dogs heavily chained in the basement standing on newspaper completely saturated with feces and urine, along with breeding harnesses and training treadmills indicative of dog fighting. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant suggests the evidence showed he was a "considerate dog owner with healthy dogs." However, the court was unconvinced, finding the slates of the metal and wooden makeshift cages were not appropriate for indoor or outdoor housing. Further, the accumulation of dog waste also supported the officer's testimony and the presence of dog fighting supplies supported a conclusion that "defendant's treatment of the dogs reflected something other than mere companionship." As to the vagueness challenge, the court found that defendant did not demonstrate that section 3(a)(4) fails to sufficiently enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct the statute criminalizes or that it fails to provide police officers and the courts explicit standards. In fact, the court found that "defendant did not demonstrate compassion, sympathy or consideration for the dogs when he failed to provide an adequate habitat or ensure that bodily waste did not accumulate" and that this conduct fell squarely in the conduct addressed by the law. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment and rejected defendant's claims on appeal. | Case | |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine | 991 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2014) | 119 A.D.3d 1202; 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05395; 2014 WL 3511059 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) | Petitioners seek, among other things, a declaration that force-fed foie gras is an adulterated food product and an order prohibiting the state respondents from allowing foie gras into the human food supply. Pre-answer motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that petitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court granted dismissal upon such ground and petitioners appealed. Petitioner Stahlie contended he had standing based upon allegations that he occasionally ate foie gras at parties and other events and that this might increase his risk of developing secondary amyloidosis. The court, however, found the risk of exposure to be minimal and the indication of harm uncertain since Stahlie had no underlying medical conditions that might be related to an increased risk of secondary amyloidosism, that his exposure to foie gras was infrequent, and that he did not cite a situation of any person ever suffering secondary amyloidosis that was linked to foie gras. The Animal Legal Defense Fund argued that since it used its resources to investigate and litigate the alleged conduct of the state respondents, it had standing. The court, however, found that a finding of standing under this situation would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction. Lastly the court found that petitioners had not alleged ‘a sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the state to allow for State Finance Law § 123-b standing.’ The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. | Case | |
| AL - Ordinances - Article 5. Powers as to Health, Sanitation, and Quarantine | Ala. Code 1975 § 11-47-130 to 132 | AL ST § 11-47-130 to 132 | This set of laws authorizes all cities and towns to regulate animals and animal related conditions that pose a threat to the public health. | Statute | |
| Christine Valpiani and Anthony Valpiani, husband and wife, plaintiffs v. Lisa K. Reising, D.V.M. a Washington State veterinarian |
This King County, Washington motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of several of plaintiff's claims as well as a limitation to the damages that are recoverable. Plaintiffs claim that the negligence of defendant-veterinarian caused the death of their dog (defendant admitted negligence so the issue here centers on damages). The court held that plaintiffs may assert claims for loss of use, but not loss of companionship. |
Pleading |