Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type | |||||||
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| IN - Health - Article 17. Animal Health and Animal Products. Chapter 18. Crimes and Infractions | I.C. 15-17-18-1 - 13 | IN ST 15-17-18-1 - 13 | This set of Indiana laws covers diseased livestock and the sale of domestic animals. It also provides that a person responsible for livestock or poultry who knowingly or intentionally permits the livestock or poultry to run at large commits a Class B misdemeanor. Another provision states that a person may not import to or export from Indiana for the purpose of sale any dog under the age of eight (8) weeks unless the dog is transported with its dam. | Statute | |||||||
| CO - Domestic Violence - Animals and Domestic Violence; Definition. | C. R. S. A. § 18-6-800.3; C.R.S.A. § 13-14-101, 103 | CO ST § 18-6-800.3; CO ST § 13-14-101, 103 | This statute includes within the definition of "domestic violence" any other crime against a person, or against property, including an animal, or any municipal ordinance violation against a person, or against property, including an animal, when used as a method of coercion, control, punishment, intimidation, or revenge directed against a person with whom the actor is or has been involved in an intimate relationship. Under Article 14 on Civil Protection Orders, the phrase "protection order” means any order that prohibits the restrained person from contacting, harassing, injuring, intimidating, molesting, threatening, touching, stalking, or sexually assaulting or abusing any protected person or from entering or remaining on premises, or from coming within a specified distance of a protected person or premises, or from taking, transferring, concealing, harming, disposing of or threatening harm to an animal owned, possessed, leased, kept, or held by a protected person, or any other provision to protect the protected person from imminent danger to life or health. | Statute | |||||||
| Hendrickson v. Grider | 70 N.E.3d 604 (2016), appeal not allowed, 2017-Ohio-7843 | 2016-Ohio-8474, 2016 WL 7626329, 2016-Ohio-8474 (2016) |
A car accident occurred and Plaintiffs, Jo Ellen Hendrickson and her husband were injured when her vehicle hit two horses that were on the roadway. Defendant Randall D. Grider owned the horses and Defendant Gartner owned the lot where Grider kept the horses. Defendant Cope is Gartner's son-in-law and acted as an intermediary between Gartner and Grider. The Hendrickson’s filed a complaint against Grider, Cope, and Gartner and alleged that they were owners and/or keepers of horses under statute R.C. Chapter 951 and that they negligently allowed the horses to escape. Hendrickson sought damages for her injuries and a loss of consortium claim on her husbands’ behalf. The Common Pleas Court, granted summary judgment for the Defendants. The Hendrickson’s appealed. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District affirmed the Common Pleas Court. The Court of Appeals reasoned that: (1) neither defendant was “keeper” of horses within the meaning of the statute which governed liability for horses running at large on public roads; (2) even if the lot owner breached their duty by allowing the owner of the horses to keep the horses on her property before fencing was installed, such breach was not the proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries; and (3) the lot owner could not have reasonably foreseen that the horses would escape from a fenced-in lot and injure the motorist and, thus, she could not be held liable in negligence for the motorist's resulting injuries. |
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| New York Pet Welfare Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York | 143 F.Supp.3d 50 (E.D. New York,2015) | 2015 WL 7017388 (E.D. New York,2015) |
(Aff'd on appeal to 2nd Circuit: New York Pet Welfare Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 850 F.3d 79 (2d Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs, a non-profit group trade association of pet stores ("NYPWA"), dog and cat breeders and dealers, veterinarians, and pet owners, brought this action against New York City, the city council, and council members, alleging that defendants have adopted laws that violate the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, as well as New York law that governs veterinary medicine, the treatment of animals, and equal protection. The challenged law relate to the sale of dogs and cats in the city that require pet stores to obtain pets from Class A USDA licensees in good standing and that the pet stores spay and neuter the pets before selling them. In rejecting NYPWA's federal preemption claim, the court found that the AWA specifically contemplates local regulation in § 2143(a)(8) and previous cases have found no conflict even where the local legislation bans what is otherwise allowed under the AWA. The court also found no conflict with state law (N.Y. Gen. Bus. § 753–d) or other laws concerning veterinary licensing, pet shops, and animal cruelty. In dismissing plaintiff's Equal Protection argument, the court was not persuaded that pet stores and shelters/rescues are "similarly situated" to support the claim. Additionally, the court found a rational basis to support any differential treatment. NYPWA also alleged that the Pet Shop Laws violate the dormant Commerce Clause, arguing that the laws impermissibly regulate extraterritorially and favor local interests. The court found that even if plaintiff's factual allegations were true, the law was not economic protectionism, but an attempt to curb problems with homeless animals and euthanasia. Finally, the court found not due process violations (substantive or procedural) where there is no interference with a constitutionally protected right. NYPWA's motion to dismiss the claims is granted and the motion for preliminary injunction was denied. |
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| Maps of States that have Laws to Protect Animals in Parked Cars |
Thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia have laws that concern companion animals left unattended in parked vehicles under dangerous conditions as of 2023. In some states, leaving an animal in an unattended vehicle under dangerous conditions is a crime. Many states also give immunity to law enforcement or other first responders who forcibly enter vehicles to rescue animals. Recently, several states (AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, MA, OH, OR, TN, VT, and WI) enacted laws giving civil immunity to any individuals who break-in to vehicles to remove pets (or vulnerable persons like children or incapacitated individuals) in imminent danger, provided they meet other conditions under these laws. To view these laws, click on the teal states. For more detailed information on these laws, please visit our comparative table on the topic. |
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| Derecho Animal Volume 2 Núm 4 |
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| GA - Cruelty - Chapter 11. Animal Protection | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-11-1 to 18 | GA ST § 4-11-1 to 4-11-18 | The Georgia Animal Protection Act was passed in 2000 and provides for jail up to one year for general cruelty convictions and up to five years for an aggravated cruelty conviction. The judge is also allowed to order psychological counseling. The law also encompasses licensing provisions for kennels and impoundment provisions. | Statute | |||||||
| CA - Sharks - § 2021. Shark fins; unlawful possession, sale, offer for sale, trading, or distribution; exceptions | West's Ann.Cal.Fish & G.Code §§ 2021, 2021.5 | CA FISH & G § 2021, 2021.5 | Under these California statutes, it is unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin. However, there are exceptions for people who have a license or permit. In addition, people and restaurants who have a shark fin as of January 1, 2012 may possess it until January 1, 2013. | Statute | |||||||
| Miller v. Dep't of Agric. | 168 Conn. App. 255, 145 A.3d 393 (2016) | 168 Conn. App. 255 (Conn. App. 2016), 2016 WL 4654364 (Conn. App. 2016) | The Plaintiff, Kim Miller, argued “a severe deprivation” of her rights when the Superior Court dismissed her appeal to prevent her dogs from being euthanized. Miller owned two Rottweiler dogs that attacked the victim Cynthia Reed, causing injuries to Reed's head, the back of her neck, and her back. An animal control officer issued two disposal orders to euthanize Miller’s dogs. The Defendant, Connecticut Department of Agriculture, then affirmed the orders and Miller appealed. The Superior Court also dismissed the appeal, and Miller appealed further to the Appellate Court of Connecticut. Here, Miller argues, among other things, that her Sixth Amendment rights to confront witnesses were violated when witnesses were not available for cross-examination. Plaintiff Miller also claims that there were procedural violations in the initial hearing because of lack of written rules that applied to dog disposal orders and claimed error when the hearing officer acted acted arbitrarily and capriciously by “interject[ing] his opinion” while questioning a witness. The Appellate Court held that: (1) the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA) did not preclude the admission of statements from the victim and an eyewitness, even though the victim and witness did not testify at the hearing. The court reasoned that in administrative proceedings under the UAPA, evidence is not inadmissible solely because it constitutes hearsay, as long as the evidence is reliable and probative. Additionally, a party to an administrative proceeding under the UAPA is not required to call any particular witness. (2) A dog owner's appeal of disposal orders for a biting animal is not a criminal prosecution that invokes Sixth Amendment protections. The court reasoned that the issuance of a disposal order does not, by itself, trigger the imposition of a fine or prison term on the owner. Rather, by obviating the threat that dangerous animals pose to the public, the provision is remedial and civil in nature. The judgment of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's appeal was affirmed. | Case | |||||||
| The Ecology Center v. Russell | 361 F.Supp.2d 1310 (D.Utah,2005) |
The instant case is a Petition for Review of Agency Action, brought by The Ecology Center and The Aquarius Escalante Foundation (Plaintiffs). Plaintiffs seek review of a Record of Decision (ROD) issued by the Acting Forest Supervisor of the Dixie National Forest (the DNF), an agency of the United States Department of Agriculture. The decision in question is the final approval by the DNF of the Griffin Springs Resource Management Project, (the Project) in which the DNF approved a plan to allow logging in the Griffin Springs area of the DNF. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to stop the implementation of the plan, claiming that the ROD violates the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Of particular concern, is the effect upon the northern goshawk. |
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