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Displaying 41 - 50 of 6638
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sentencia C-045/19 | This Constitutional Court's decision declares sport hunting illegal in the entire territory. In its reasoning, the court stated that sport hunting is not an exception to the duty to protect animals against cruelty, as it does not satisfy any objective or purpose compatible with the Constitution. "It is not an expression of religious freedom, nor intended for food or medical or scientific experimentation. It is not done to control the species population and is not a deeply rooted cultural manifestation." The court further stated, "The sacrifice of an animal by humans is an extreme form of mistreatment as it eliminates its very existence and is an act of annihilation. When it is unjustified, an animal's death is cruel because it means understanding that the animal is exclusively a resource available to humans. Sport hunting, in short, is a harmful act insofar as it is aimed at capturing wild animals, either by killing, mutilating or catching them alive." "What happens here is an example of how the content and scope of constitutional norms adapt to a changing society. It is about the concept of a Living constitution, in which its scope and content take shape with the political community's economic, social, political, and cultural changes." Other forms of hunting, such as subsistence hunting, hunting for scientific and research purposes, and controlled hunting, continue to be allowed under the circumstances delineated by laws and regulations and with prior authorization of the natural resources managing authority. | Case | |||
| US - Air travel, service animals - Subpart H. Services on Aircraft. | 14 C.F.R. § 382.117, § 382.51, and § 382.117 | Note: two of these sections were removed and reserved in 2020, effectively removing provisions related to service animals. Prior to it being removed, it previously stated that carriers must permit service animals to accompany passengers with disabilities. A carrier must permit the service animal to accompany the passenger with a disability at any seat in which the passenger sits, unless the animal obstructs an aisle or other area. The Department of Transportation used to allow identification of a service animal by the presence of harnesses, tags, or "the credible verbal assurances of a qualified individual with a disability using the animal." A carrier is was never required to accommodate certain unusual service animals (e.g., snakes, other reptiles, ferrets, rodents, and spiders). | Administrative | ||
| State v. Davidson | Slip Copy, 2006 WL 763082 (Ohio App. 11 Dist.), 2006-Ohio-1458 |
In this Ohio case, defendant was convicted of 10 counts of cruelty to animals resulting from her neglect of several dogs and horses in her barn. On appeal, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient where the prosecution witness did not state the dogs were "malnourished" and said that a couple were reasonably healthy. The appellate court disagreed, finding that defendant mischaracterized the veterinarian's testimony and that there was no requirement to prove malnourishment. Further, the dog warden testified that she did not find any food or water in the barn and that the animals' bowls were covered with mud and feces. |
Case | ||
| Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack | 2015 WL 514389 (D.D.C., 2015) | The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed a lawsuit by plaintiffs against U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack that challenged the United States Department of Agriculture’s New Poultry Inspection System (NPIS) promulgated under the US Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA). The court held that plaintiff’s failed to state an injury-in-fact that was traceable to the actions of the defendants for which relief could be granted. Under NPIS, far fewer federal inspectors would be stationed along slaughter lines, and the employees themselves could conduct a preliminary screening of the carcasses before presenting the poultry to a federal inspector for a visual-only inspection. Plaintiffs contended that the revised processing procedures were inconsistent with the PPIA and would ultimately result in the production of unsafe poultry products. They sought a preliminary and permanent injunction by the court to prevent the USDA and the USDA′s Food Safety and Inspection Service from implementing NPIS. | Case | ||
| DC - Domestic Violence - Chapter 10. Proceedings Regarding Intrafamily Offenses. | DC CODE § 16-1005 | DC ST § 16-1005 | This D.C. law provides that if, after a hearing, the judicial officer finds that there is good cause to believe the respondent has committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner or against petitioner's animal or an animal in petitioner's household, the judicial officer may issue a protection order that directs the care, custody, or control of a domestic animal that belongs to petitioner or respondent or lives in his or her household. | Statute | |
| Colombia - Law enforcement animals - Law 2318, 2023 | Ley 2318, 2023 | The purpose of this law is to modify the provisions of the National Code of Police and Coexistence (Law 1801 of 2016) to prohibit the use of animals for deterring demonstrations, riots, and unrest while adhering to existing regulations and obligations regarding animal protection and welfare. Article 4, PAR1 states: "Under no circumstances should the involvement of animals be construed as a component of the application of force outlined in this article. Animals, such as canines and equines that have been trained by law enforcement, are only allowed to engage in surveillance, preventive measures, and control tasks during events like mass gatherings, rescue operations, searches, explosive detection, illegal crop eradication, or law enforcement deployment. The use of animals to disperse public demonstrations, incite riots, or quell public unrest by law enforcement is explicitly prohibited." | Statute | ||
| Arrington v. Arrington | 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) |
A divorcing couple agreed to visitation of their dog, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree, appointing wife as the dog's managing conservator. Husband appealed because he had not been appointed managing conservator; the appellate court stated that dogs are personal property, and the office of managing conservator had been created for human children. While the court held that dogs are personal property under the law, it also stated that visitation of dogs should be allowed. |
Case | ||
| Hayes v. Akam Associates, Inc. | No. 156457/2013, 2019 WL 4695713 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sep. 25, 2019) | In this case, plaintiffs sought recovery for property damage and for emotional distress and loss of companionship of their dog Toto, who died as a result of a fire in the building where plaintiffs resided. Plaintiffs were not home at the time of the fire. Upon their return, they learned their dog had died as a result of smoke inhalation. Plaintiffs found Toto’s body lying on the road, covered with a sheet. Plaintiffs alleged that their dog, who they considered a member of their family, had died as a consequence of the defendants’ negligence in inspecting, maintaining, supervising, operating, and controlling the building. In its opinion, the court stated that there was a well-settled common law precedent that pets are personal property and for that reason, damages for emotional injury were not allowed when a companion animal dies. The court declined to follow the cases that considered loss of companionship in determining the value of a pet and dismissed the causes of action seeking damages for the emotional injuries the plaintiffs alleged were caused by the loss of their dog. Defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint was granted. | Case | ||
| Gerofsky v. Passaic County Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals | 870 A.2d 704 (N.J. 2005) | 376 N.J.Super. 405 |
The President of the New Jersey SPCA brought an action to have several county SPCA certificates of authority revoked. The county SPCAs brought a counterclaim alleging the revocation was beyond the state SPCA's statutory authority. The trial court revoked one county's certificate of authority, but the Court of Appeals held the revocation was an abuse of discretion. |
Case | |
| OK - Health - Subchapter 3. Rabies Control | OK ADC 310:599-3-1 to 12 | Okla. Admin. Code 310:599-3-1 to 12 | These regulations contain Oklahoma's rabies provisions. | Administrative |