Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| IL - Cruelty - CRUELTY TO ANIMALS REGULATIONS (ANIMAL PROTECTION) (GEESE FORCEFEEDING) | CRUELTY TO ANIMALS REGULATIONS (ANIMAL PROTECTION) (GEESE FORCEFEEDING), |
The purpose of these Regulations is to prevent the suffering of geese while being force-fed and fattened in order to produce goose liver (fois gras), and to halt the further expansion of the goose liver production's sector in Israel. |
Statute | |
| Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink | 620 F.3d 1187 (C.A.9 (Idaho). 2010) | 2010 WL 3420012 (C.A.9 (Idaho)) |
Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands, arguing that the revisions violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals held that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed changes, and violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. Opinion Amended and Superseded on Denial of Rehearing en banc by: Western Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink, 632 F.3d 472 (9th Cir., 2010). |
Case |
| U.S. v. Gregory (Unpublished Opinion) | 933 F.2d 1016 (1991) |
Defendant challenged the search of his residence in a drug raid in which his dog was shot. The court held that the shooting of Gregory's dog was done excusably by an officer who reacted quickly in a potentially dangerous situation to a perceived attack by an animal reasonably believed to be an attack dog. The shooting of the dog did not render the search unreasonable. |
Case | |
| Sentencia STC1926-2023 | Sentencia STC1926-2023 | Romeo and Salvador, two beloved family dogs that found themselves in the center of a heartbreaking divorce. The divorce resulted in the family judge ordering the foreclosure of the dogs in the divorce proceeding. The plaintiff filed a writ of protection or "Recurso de Tutela" before the Chamber of Civil Cassation of the Supreme Court of Justice to protect her rights to family unity, free personality development, and health. Furthermore, she argued that the lower court decision had violated not just her rights but her children's rights, who had developed a filial bond with the dogs, as they are sentient beings and not just mere property. The Court denied the "tutela." It affirmed the lower court decision allowing foreclosure upon companion animals, holding that the "tutela" was not the appropriate legal mechanism to protect procedural guarantees. In his dissenting opinion, Magistrate Aroldo Wilson Quiróz stated that the court had missed a valuable opportunity to address the issue of the multispecies families in Colombia. This novel legal concept is supported under Art. 42 of the Constitution, and that it was the responsibility of the court, as the body of last instance, to delve into this subject, pointing out the fact that even though animals are considered property, they are also sentient beings in the eyes of the law with rights that limit the right to own them. Like in other family cases, the magistrate suggested that courts should address issues such as custody, visitation rights, and alimony payments when companion animals are involved. | Case | |
| MS - Initiatives - HCR 30, Establish the Right to Hunt, Fish and Harvest Wildlife as a Constitutional Right | HCR 30 (2014) | This 2014 proposed legislative referendum would establish the right to hunt and fish in the state. "Section 12A. The people have the right to hunt, fish and harvest wildlife, including by the use of traditional methods, subject only to laws and regulations that promote wildlife conservation and management and that preserve the future of hunting and fishing, as the Legislature may prescribe by general law. Public hunting and fishing shall be a preferred means of managing and controlling wildlife. This section may not be construed to modify any provision of law relating to trespass, property rights, the regulation of commercial activities or the maintenance of levees pursuant to Article 11." | Statute | |
| AZ - Ordinances - Article 2. Board of Trustees Government After Disincorporation. | A. R. S. § 9-219 (repealed 2017) | AZ ST § 9-219 | §§ 9-211 to 9-226. Repealed by Laws 2016, Ch. 62, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 2017 (related to powers of the board of trustees) | Statute |
| New Jersey Revision of Statutes 1709-1877: Chapter XII Supplement: An act for the prevention of cruelty to animals. | N.J. Rev. Stat. 64-82 (1873) | A supplement to the New Jersey Revision of Statutes for 1877. The supplement covered standing for officer's of New Jersey Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In addition, the supplement addresses the question of jurisdiction for the enforcement the anti-cruelty laws. | Statute | |
| Moore v. Garner | 2005 WL 1022088 (E.D.Tex.) |
Complaints were made against a plaintiff-couple about the poor conditions for over 100 dogs and other animals that were living in on the couple’s farm. The couple who owned the farm failed to do anything about it and the animals were seized. Plaintiffs brought claims against sixty defendants (mainly Van Zandt County, Texas officials) for conspiracy and violations of the Hobbs Act, Animal Welfare Act, Animal Enterprise Protection Act, RICO, the Texas Constitution and other federal statutes. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and the District Court affirmed. |
Case | |
| AR - Racing - Ley 27330, Dog Racing law | Ley 27330 | This law prohibits dog racing of any breed in the entire territory. Organization, promotion, and facilitation of a dog race are punishable by imprisonment of not less than 3 months and not more than 4 years. Together with fines that can go from 4,000 Argentinian pesos to $80,000. | Statute | |
| Douglas Furbee, et al. v. Gregory L. Wilson, et. al. | 144 N.E.3d 801 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) | Shelly Linder lived in an apartment complex with a no-pet policy. Linder asked if she could have an emotional-support animal and provided a letter from a licensed family and marriage therapist, which stated that Linder had a disability and required an emotional-support animal to help alleviate her symptoms. The letter did not identify a specific disability and the landlord subsequently requested more information from Linder. Linder did not provide any additional information and instead brought her cat into her apartment as her emotional-support animal. The landlord charged Linder a fine after discovering the cat on the premises and gave her seven days in which to remove the cat. Linder failed to comply which led to Linder’s eviction. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission filed a complaint against the landlord on behalf of Linder in Delaware Circuit Court alleging that the landlord failed to accommodate her request for an emotional-support animal in turn violating the Indiana Fair Housing Act. The trial court denied summary judgment for the landlord and this appeal followed. The landlord conceded that Linder was disabled and requested a reasonable accommodation, however, the landlord argued that it was not given enough information from which to “meaningfully” review Linder’s request. The Delaware Court of Appeals agreed that the Landlord did not have sufficient information to meaningfully review Linder’s request and because Linder did not inform the Landlord about her disability and her need for the cat, she was acting in bad faith. The Court ultimately reversed and remanded the case to the trial court. | Case |