Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Agency Citation | Summary | Type | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine | 991 N.Y.S.2d 482 (2014) | 119 A.D.3d 1202; 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05395; 2014 WL 3511059 (N.Y.A.D. 3 Dept.) | Petitioners seek, among other things, a declaration that force-fed foie gras is an adulterated food product and an order prohibiting the state respondents from allowing foie gras into the human food supply. Pre-answer motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that petitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court granted dismissal upon such ground and petitioners appealed. Petitioner Stahlie contended he had standing based upon allegations that he occasionally ate foie gras at parties and other events and that this might increase his risk of developing secondary amyloidosis. The court, however, found the risk of exposure to be minimal and the indication of harm uncertain since Stahlie had no underlying medical conditions that might be related to an increased risk of secondary amyloidosism, that his exposure to foie gras was infrequent, and that he did not cite a situation of any person ever suffering secondary amyloidosis that was linked to foie gras. The Animal Legal Defense Fund argued that since it used its resources to investigate and litigate the alleged conduct of the state respondents, it had standing. The court, however, found that a finding of standing under this situation would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction. Lastly the court found that petitioners had not alleged ‘a sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the state to allow for State Finance Law § 123-b standing.’ The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed. | Case | ||
| Erie County Society ex rel. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Hoskins | 91 A.D.3d 1354 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2012) | 939 N.Y.S.2d 674, 2012 WL 266461 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.) |
In this action, plaintiff animal society appeals from an order to return 40 horses to defendant after they were seized pursuant to a warrant. The issue of whether the Court has the authority to order return of animals to the original owner was raised for the first time on appeal. Despite the procedural impropriety, the Court found plaintiff's contention without merit. The Court held that the return of the horses is based on principles of due process, not statutory authority. |
Case | ||
| IN - Cattle Slaughter - CHHATTISGARH AGRICULTURAL CATTLE PRESERVATION ACT, 2004 | 25 of 2006 | The Act, specific to the state of Chhattisgarh, prohibits the slaughter of agricultural cattle—cows, calves, bulls, bullocks and male and female buffaloes. The law criminalizes the possession and sale of beef, and the transport of agricultural cattle from the state for the purpose of slaughter. The state government shall make rules for the economic rehabilitation of persons affected by the Act. | Statute | |||
| City of Columbiana v. Simpson | --- N.E.3d ----, 2019 WL 4897158 (Ohio Ct. App., 2019) | 2019-Ohio-4086 (2019) | Richard G. Simpson, Appellant, lived in a residential district in Columbiana, Ohio. Simpson kept eight hens, a chicken coop, and an enclosure on his property for approximately seven years. On July of 2016, Simpson was informed that keeping chickens in the district he lived in was a zoning violation, however, Simpson found no prohibition in the Code regarding the keeping of chickens in a residential district. The city sent Simpson violation notices and instructed him to remove the chickens from the property. Simpson appealed the violation to the Planning Committee. On June 20, 2017 the City Council voted to place a resolution on the ballot for voters to decide whether chickens could be kept in residential districts. The resolution failed at the general election. A second notice was sent to Simpson and Simpson refused to remove the chickens from his property. The City instituted an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on March 13, 2018. The trial court held that the keeping of chickens was prohibited in the City’s residential districts and that the city ordinances were valid on their face and were not arbitrarily or capriciously applied. Simpson appealed. Simpson argued that keeping the chickens did not constitute an agricultural use or poultry husbandry because he kept them as a hobby and therefore does not violate any of the city ordinances. The Court did not agree and concluded that the keeping of chickens fell within the definition of agriculture and was, therefore, prohibited based on the ordinances. Simpson next argued that since he acquired the chicken and coop prior to the City applying the prohibitions, it was a legal non-conforming use and that the zoning code contained no language that would have put him on notice that such property was not permitted on his real property. The Court concluded that there was no error by the trial court in holding that Simpson’s use of his land was not a legally conforming use. Finally, Simpson argued that the one of the city ordinances was arbitrary and unreasonable because there was no evidence of the chickens, coup, or enclosure constituting a nuisance. The Court concluded that a city is not required to show that a property owner’s proposed use constitutes a nuisance in order to establish the constitutionality of the ordinance. The Court found that the ordinance was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable and bears a substantial relation to the public health. The ordinance was a valid exercise of the City’s police power. The Court ultimately held that the City ordinance prohibited the keeping of chickens in residential districts. The prohibition was inferred from reading the ordinance in concert with other Code sections. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. | Case | ||
| Hoffa v. Bimes | 954 A.2d 1241 (Pa.Super.,2008) | 2008 PA Super 181; 2008 WL 3126320 |
This case arises from the treatment of plaintiff's horse by the defendant-veterinarian. This appeal arises from plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred in granting a compulsory non-suit in favor of defendant finding that the Veterinary Immunity Act bars claims against veterinarians except those based upon gross negligence. This court agreed with the lower court that defendant was confronted with an emergency medical condition such as to fall under the protections of the Act. Further, this court held that the trial court committed no error in concluding that plaintiff's consent was not required before the veterinarian performed the abdominal tap because that procedure was rendered under an 'emergency situation.' |
Case | ||
| In the Matter of the Application of Richard M. COPLAND, as an Executor of the estate of Lenore Lewis Abels, Deceased | 988 N.Y.S.2d 458 | 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 24172 | Co-executor of an estate petitioned the Westchester County Surrogate's Court for a decree in accordance with EPTL 7–8.1[d] reducing the amount of money to be transferred from the estate to the trustees of a testamentary pet trust established under the decedent's will. Since the decedent gave very specific instructions as to how she wanted her cats to be cared for and the petition was in opposition to the decedent’s wishes, the court denied the reduction. | Case | ||
| Miles ex rel. Miles v. Rich | 347 S.W.3d 477 (Mo.App. E.D., 2011) | 2011 WL 1564030 (Mo.App. E.D.) |
In this Missouri case, the plaintiff filed an action against defendant dog owner for damages after defendant's dog bit the plaintiff's child. Defendant dog owner then filed a third-party petition against the Humane Society of Missouri from which defendant had adopted the dog, seeking contribution under a theory of common law negligence. Defendant appeals the lower court's dismissal, specifically contending that the Humane Society breached 1) its duty to prevent the adoption of the dog by doing tests it knew would have identified the dog's dangerous propensity to bite ; and 2) its duty to fully inform defendant of the risks of keeping a dog who has bitten in the past. The appellate court found that the Humane Society did not own, possess, harbor or control the dog when it bit Ms. Miles; thus, it had no duty under common law negligence principles to prevent the harm. |
Case | ||
| Canada - New Brunswick Provincial Dog Regulations - N.B. Reg. 84-85 | Agency Citation |
In this province the main legislation governing dog husbandry and the penalties for dog misbehaviour or running at large are in the form of regulations pursuant to the provincial Municipalities Act. |
Administrative | |||
| Derecho Animal Volume 12 num 1 |
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Policy | ||||
| SC - Restaurant, animal - 9-3 OUTDOOR PET DINING | SC ADC 61-25 | S.C. CODE REGS. 61-25 | This South Carolina regulation concerns outdoor dining with pets. The regulation first defines pets as domesticated cats, dogs, and ferrets. A retail food service establishment may allow customers to be accompanied by pets in an outdoor dining area provided the retail food service establishment complies with the requirements of this section and all other applicable sections of this regulation. Among other requirements include availability of cleaning supplies and sanitizers in the outdoor pet dining area, signage indicating that the area is "pet dining friendly," a separate outdoor entrance to the dining area, a requirement that owners keep pets restrained at all times, and a prohibition on pets on the table, countertop, or other food contact surface. | Administrative |