Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Matter of S. A. B. | 531 P.3d 718, review denied sub nom. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. T. B., 371 Or. 476, 537 P.3d 939 (2023) | 326 Or.App. 192 (Or.App., 2023) | In this Ohio juvenile dependency case, a father appeals a juvenile court judgment ordering him to transfer the his dog to his child, claiming that the court lacked the authority to transfer possession of the dog. He also claims the dog is his personal property and not the child's. The child, who does not live with the father, suffers from panic attacks and has difficulty sleeping at night. The child's therapist testified that the child's mental health symptoms are exacerbated by "missing and worrying about the dog." The therapist testified that, because of the bond that child shares with the dog, the child's emotional support dog should be this particular dog. In contrast, the father claims the dog is legally his and provides a household benefit for him by keeping raccoons away from his chickens and deterring thieves from entering the property. The lower court found that the child shares a bond with the dog and having the dog as an emotional support animal would benefit the child. On appeal, the father argues that an emotional support animal does not fall within the statutory definition for "counseling" and, thus, the court's order was tantamount to giving away his property. In looking at the statute, the court noted that "counseling" is undefined and so looking at the plain and ordinary meaning is appropriate. As a result, the court found that the dictionary definition read with the policy goals of the chapter on jurisdiction of the juvenile court allowed the court to conclude that the term "counseling" includes the use of emotional support animals. The evidence in this case also shows that this particular dog is necessary as ". . . this particular dog is not just a pet, but rather is an emotional support animal for child, as evidenced by child's strong emotional bond with this particular dog and various testimony demonstrating that this particular dog will contribute to child's well-being by providing child with emotional stability and security." As to the property issue raised by the father, the court observed that courts routinely order parents to provide support for their children and this transfer of property did not abuse the court's discretion. Affirmed. | Case |
| OR - Initiatives - Measure 100, Save Endangered Animals (2016) | Measure 100 (2016) | Official Summary: Existing Oregon law does not prohibit sale of wildlife parts/products for non native species, except shark fins. Existing federal law does not prohibit intrastate sales of wildlife parts, with exceptions. Measure amends ORS 498.022 to prohibit purchase, sale, or possession with intent to sell of parts/products from elephant, rhinoceros, whale, tiger, lion, leopard, cheetah, jaguar, pangolin, sea turtle, shark, ray. Imposes civil penalties. Creates exceptions: law enforcement activities; activities authorized by federal law; fish managed under federal plan; certain antiques (over l00 years old) and musical instruments with less than 200 grams of parts; noncommercial transfers through estates, trusts, gifts; possession by tribal members. Other exceptions. Fish and Wildlife Commission may adopt rules, including prohibiting purchase/sale of parts "closely" resembling listed species parts. A "Yes" vote prohibits purchase/sale of parts/products from certain wildlife species; exceptions for specified activities, gift/inheritances, and certain antiques/musical instruments; civil penalties. A "No" vote maintains current Oregon law which does not prohibit purchase or sale of parts or products from species not native to Oregon, except for shark fins. | Statute | |
| Maps of States that have Laws to Protect Animals in Parked Cars |
Thirty-one (31) states and the District of Columbia have laws that concern companion animals left unattended in parked vehicles under dangerous conditions as of 2023. In some states, leaving an animal in an unattended vehicle under dangerous conditions is a crime. Many states also give immunity to law enforcement or other first responders who forcibly enter vehicles to rescue animals. Recently, several states (AZ, CA, CO, CT, DE, FL, IN, KS, LA, MA, OH, OR, TN, VT, and WI) enacted laws giving civil immunity to any individuals who break-in to vehicles to remove pets (or vulnerable persons like children or incapacitated individuals) in imminent danger, provided they meet other conditions under these laws. To view these laws, click on the teal states. For more detailed information on these laws, please visit our comparative table on the topic. |
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| GA - Cruelty - Chapter 11. Animal Protection | Ga. Code Ann., § 4-11-1 to 18 | GA ST § 4-11-1 to 4-11-18 | The Georgia Animal Protection Act was passed in 2000 and provides for jail up to one year for general cruelty convictions and up to five years for an aggravated cruelty conviction. The judge is also allowed to order psychological counseling. The law also encompasses licensing provisions for kennels and impoundment provisions. | Statute |
| CA - Sharks - § 2021. Shark fins; unlawful possession, sale, offer for sale, trading, or distribution; exceptions | West's Ann.Cal.Fish & G.Code §§ 2021, 2021.5 | CA FISH & G § 2021, 2021.5 | Under these California statutes, it is unlawful to possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute a shark fin. However, there are exceptions for people who have a license or permit. In addition, people and restaurants who have a shark fin as of January 1, 2012 may possess it until January 1, 2013. | Statute |
| Webb v. Amtower | 2008 WL 713728 (KS,2008 (not reported)) | 178 P.3d 80 (KS,2008 (table only)) |
The court applied the forum's traditional lex loci conflict-of-laws rule to determine what jurisdiction's law governed for both damages and recovery of possession. The "place of injury" for the tort/damages issue was Kansas since that's where the contract was signed. The court remanded the case to determine the law of the place where the dog was found to determine the right-to-possession since that was a personal property issue. |
Case |
| Earth Island Institute v. Hogarth | 484 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2007) | 2007 WL 1227559 (9th Cir. 2007) |
This case concerns the practice of catching yellowfin tuna by encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets. The dispute centers over whether tuna sellers may label tuna as dolphin-safe if caught with such nets. An environmental group brought suit against the Secretary of Commerce after he concluded that there was insufficient evidence to show that tuna purse seine fishing harmed depleted dolphin stocks in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean (ETP). The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision that the action by the Secretary was arbitrary and capricious where the agency's decision-making process was influenced to some degree by foreign policy considerations rather than science alone. Further, the finding of no significant impact (FONSI) was not rationally connected to the best available scientific evidence. |
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| Case Sea Cucumbers in Galapagos - Ecuador- Do not publish yet | Proceso No. 20331-2015-00232 | Case | ||
| ROL:293-15 “La arrastrada de Freirina” | RIT No. 323-2014 | This is the case of a pregnant dog dragged by a truck. The defendants also assaulted and threatened two people that witnessed the event and attempted to stop it. The court found the three defendants guilty of animal cruelty and sentenced them to 61 days in jail and a fine of 2 UTM for these charges. Additional jail time and penalties were given on the charges of assault, threatening, and damage to property. | Case | |
| Britton v. Bruin | Not Reported in P.3d, 2016 WL 1019213 (N.M. Ct. App., 2016) | 2016 WL 1019213 (N.M. Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2016) | In this case, plaintiff appealed a decision by the district court denying her petition for a writ of mandamus. Plaintiff petitioned the court for a writ of mandamus to stop the City of Albuquerque's effort to control a large population of feral cats in its metropolitan area by “trapping, neutering them, and then returning them” to the location at which they were found. The district court denied the petition for a writ of mandamus because the court held that there was “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” Also, the court held that because the city’s program did not result in any unconstitutional action, the writ of mandamus was not appropriate. The court affirmed the district court’s ruling, looking only at whether or not there was “a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.” The court did not address the issue of whether or not the city’s population control effort was appropriate and should continue. The district court's order denying Petitioner's application for a writ of mandamus is affirmed. | Case |