Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| VA - Liens - § 43–32 Lien of keeper of livery stable, marina, etc. | Va. Code Ann. § 43-32 | VA Code Ann. § 43-32 | Every keeper of a livery stable, hangar, tie-down, or marina, and every person pasturing or keeping any horses or other animals, boats, aircrafts, or harness, will have a lien for the amount that would be due for towing, storage, recovery, keeping, supporting, and care. The lien will be removed once the amount is paid. | Statute |
| Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes | 823 N.W.2d 627 (Minn.,2012) | 2012 WL 6601313 (Minn.,2012) |
A city ordered a dog to be destroyed after three separate biting incidents. Upon the owner’s appeal of the city’s determinations, the appeals court reversed the city’s decision to destroy the dog because the city had not allowed the owner an opportunity to challenge the “potentially dangerous” determination. The appeals court (800 N.W.2d 663 (Minn.App.,2011) held the city had therefore violated the owner’s procedural due process rights. Upon review by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, however, the court held that the owner’s procedural due process rights were not violated because the “potentially dangerous” determination did not deprive the owner of a property interest and because the city satisfied the basic requirements of procedural due process. Additionally, the court found that the dangerous dog and the destruction determinations were not arbitrary or capricious. The court therefore reversed the decision of the court of appeals, upheld the city's “dangerous dog” determination, and affirmed the city's order of destruction. |
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| UT - Breed - § 18-2-101. Regulation of dogs by a municipality | U.C.A. 1953 § 18-2-101 | UT ST § 18-2-101 | This Utah law effective in 2015 prohibits a municipality from adopting breed-specific rule, regulation, policy, or ordinance regarding dogs. Any breed-specific rule, regulation, policy, or ordinance regarding dogs is void. | Statute |
| DE - Dogs - Consolidated Dog Laws | 16 Del.C. § 3041F - 3059F; 16 Del.C. § 3071F - 3081F; 3 Del.C. § 8201 - 8213; 16 Del.C. §§ 3010F - 3021F; 6 Del.C. § 4001 - 4011; 7 Del.C. § 570; 7 Del.C. § 1701 - 1740; 22 Del.C. § 116 | These statutes comprise Delaware's dog laws. Among the provisions include licensing requirements, laws concerning hunting field trials, and the dangerous dog subchapter. | Statute | |
| Hammer v. American Kennel Club | 304 A.D.2d 74 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,2003) | 758 N.Y.S.2d 276, 2003 N.Y. Slip Op. 11491 (2003) |
Plaintiff Jon Hammer is the owner of a pure-bred Brittany Spaniel which has a natural, undocked tail approximately ten (10) inches long. He contends that tail docking is a form of animal cruelty, and that the practical effect of defendant American Kennel Club's tail standards for Brittany Spaniels is to effectively exclude his dog from meaningfully competing shows unless he complies with what he perceives as an unfair and discriminatory practice. Specifically, his amended complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that the complained-of standard (1) unlawfully discriminates against plaintiff by effectively precluding him from entering his dog in breed competitions, (2) is arbitrary and capricious, (3) violates Agriculture and Markets Law § 353, and (4) is null and void as in derogation of law; he further seeks an injunction prohibiting defendants from applying, enforcing or utilizing the standard. The court held that plaintiff lacked standing to obtain any of the civil remedies he sought for the alleged violation of Agriculture and Markets Law Section 353. The Legislature's inclusion of a complete scheme for enforcement of its provisions precludes the possibility that it intended enforcement by private individuals as well. The dissent disagreed with the majority's standing analysis, finding that plaintiff's object is not to privately enforce § 353, insofar as seeking to have the defendants' prosecuted for cruelty. Rather, plaintiff was seeking a declaration that the AKC's standard for judging the Brittany Spaniel deprives him of a benefit of membership on the basis of his unwillingness to violate a state law and, thus, he wanted to enjoin defendants from enforcing that standard against him. The dissent found that whether tail docking for purely cosmetic reasons violates § 353 is solely a question of law and entirely appropriate for a declaratory judgment. Cosmetic docking of tails was wholly unjustifiable under the law in the dissent's eyes. While plaintiff pointed out that docking may serve some purposes for hunting dogs, it is not a justification for docking the tails of non-hunting dogs, such as plaintiff's, for purposes of AKC competitions. |
Case |
| Velzen v. Grand Valley State University | 902 F.Supp.2d 1038(W.D. Mich. 2012) | On March 30, 2012, Plaintiff and the Fair Housing Center of West Michigan (“FHCWM”) brought suit against Defendants, a university, alleging unlawful discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), Federal Rehabilitation Act, and Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), for denying Plaintiff’s request to keep an emotional support animal in on-campus housing. All claims brought against the individual defendants were brought against them in their official capacities as university administrators. Plaintiffs sought both injunctive and compensatory relief. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 12(b)(6), failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The District Court decided the following would be dismissed: (1) all claims under the PWDCRA against all defendants; (2) all claims for compensatory damages under the FHA brought against all defendants; (3) all claims for injunctive relief under the FHA brought against the institutional defendants; (4) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by the FHCWM; and (5) all claims for relief under the Rehabilitation Act by Plaintiff that depended on disparate treatment. The following claims remained: (1) Plaintiff and the FHCWM's claims under the FHA seeking injunctive relief from the individual defendants; and (2) Plaintiff's claims against all defendants for compensatory damages and injunctive relief under the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to the failure to accommodate theory. | Case | |
| Parker v. Obert's Legacy Dairy, LCC | 988 N.E.2d 319 (In. Ct. App., 2013) | 2013 WL 1820364 |
A neighboring landowner brought a nuisance claim against a dairy farm when the dairy farm decided to expand its operations; the dairy farm, however, used Indiana’s Right to Farm Act as an affirmative defense. Agreeing with the dairy farm, the trial court granted the dairy farm’s motion for summary judgment. Upon appeal, the appeals court affirmed the lower court’s decision. |
Case |
| Johnson v. District of Columbia | 2014 WL 5316644 (D.D.C. Oct. 17, 2014) (Only the Westlaw citation is currently available) | Although he has never been prosecuted or threatened with prosecution under the District of Columbia's Animal Control Act, plaintiff, an animal rights activist, challenges a provision that reads: “No person shall knowingly and falsely deny ownership of any animal.” D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff asserts that he desires to give speeches in the District of Columbia about why he opposes treating animals as property, and in such speeches he would like to deny ownership of his dog. However, he alleges that he does not do so because he is deterred by D.C.Code § 8–1808(b). Plaintiff therefore sued the District of Columbia to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing the statute violated his First Amendment right to free speech. The District Court, however, found that plaintiff lacked standing because he presented no concrete evidence to substantiate his fears of prosecution, but rather rests his claims on mere conjecture about possible governmental actions. Such hypothetical fears cannot form the basis for standing under Article III of the US Constitution. The defendant's motion to dismiss was therefore granted and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed. | Case | |
| CA - Horse slaughter - § 597o. Humane transportation of equine to slaughter; vehicle requirements; | West's Ann. Cal. Penal Code § 597o | CA PENAL § 597o | This statute outlines the requirements for transporting equine to slaughter, including, but limited to, proper ventilation, sufficient space for equine to stand, and the use of ramps and floors with nonskid surfaces. | Statute |
| Ladnier v. Hester | 98 So.3d 1025 (Miss., 2012) |
Plaintiff motorist sued horse owner for negligence after he collided with the horse that was loose on the highway. Plaintiff sought damages for personal injury. The Court of Appeals sustained summary judgment for horse owner because the motorist produced no evidence that owner 1) had failed to act with reasonable care in enclosing his horses, and 2) that horse had a propensity to escape or cause injury that gave rise to a heightened duty on owner's part. After being granted a writ of certiorari by the Mississippi Supreme Court, the court held that the Plaintiffs had offered sufficient evidence to withstand the horse owner's motion for summary judgment.The case was then reversed and remanded.
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