|TX - Breeder - Chapter 802. Dog or Cat Breeders.||V. T. C. A., Occupations Code § 802.001 - 251||
Under the Texas Dog or Cat Breeders Act, a person may not act as a dog or cat breeder without a license. Facilities must be inspected at least once every 18-months, and inspectors must notify the law enforcement if they discover evidence of animal cruelty or neglect. This Act also establishes a dog or cat breeder training and enforcement account that can be used for promoting consumer awareness of this chapter, and supporting education, training, and enforcement efforts.
|IN - Fowler - Breed - Sec. 4-7. - Certain vicious breeds prohibited.||FOWLER, IN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 4.7||
No person shall own, keep or harbor a Pit Bull Terrier, Rottweiler, or Chow dog or any other breed of animal that meets the definition of a vicious or ferocious animal as described in section 4-1 in Fowler, Indiana.
|State v. Peterson||174 Wash. App. 828, 301 P.3d 1060 review denied, 178 Wash. 2d 1021, 312 P.3d 650 (2013)||2013 WL 2156837 (Wa. Ct. App.)||
In this case, defendant appeals six counts of first degree animal cruelty charges. On appeal, the defendant argued that (1) the statute she was convicted under, RCW 16.52.205(6), was unconstitutionally vague; that (2) starvation and dehydration were alternative means of committing first degree animal cruelty and that (3) there was no substantial evidence supporting the horses suffered from dehydration. The defendant also argued that the Snohomish Superior court had no authority to order her to reimburse the county for caring for her horses. The appeals court, however, held that RCW 16.52.205(6) was not unconstitutionally vague; that starvation and dehydration were alternative means to commit first degree animal cruelty, but there was substantial evidence to support the horses suffered from dehydration; and that the superior court had authority to order the defendant to pay restitution to the county.
|U.S. v. Lopez (Abridged for Purposes of Eagle Topic Area)||115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995)||
Laws governing intrastate activities will be upheld if they substantially affect interstate commerce. Under the Eagle Act, the power to regulate eagles has been summarily upheld as a valid exercise of commerce power, as it protects the eagle as a species by preventing the creation of a legal commercial market for the animal. For further discussion of the Eagle Act, see Detailed Discussion.
|People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. United States Dep't of Agric. & Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv.||918 F.3d 151 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019)||2019 WL 1212181 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 15, 2019)||The plaintiffs, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, sought documents from the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”), the entity within the United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) that administers the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”). The USDA took a large amount of documents off of its website relating to AWA compliance. The USDA claimed that the removal was for the purpose of removing certain personal information and although they did not say that the removal was temporary, the agency described the removal as provisional which suggests that it is temporary in nature. The plaintiffs filed suit asking for declaratory and injunctive relief and invoking a provision known as FOIA’s reading room provision (5 U.S.C. section 552(a)(2)). The provision requires that agencies make available for public inspection in an electronic format five categories of documents. The plaintiffs allege that the agency removed (1) research facility annual reports; (2) inspection reports; (3) lists of entities licensed under the AWA; and (4) regulatory correspondence and enforcement records that had not yet received final adjudication. Category 4 and the portion of category 2 consisting of animal inventories were dismissed and not discussed in this case. Categories 1-3 appeared to be reposted by the agency which is why the district court dismissed them as moot. The appeal centers on the reposted records and the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims by the district court. Ultimately the Court held that for the reposted records featuring new redactions, the complaint was most plausibly read as requesting that USDA repost all information that those records contained before their takedown. The Court stated that the district court should proceed to the merits on remand. As to “voluntary cessation,” the Court affirmed the mootness dismissal as to the research reports but remanded for further explanation as to the inspection reports and the entity lists. If the agency unambiguously commits to continued posting of those documents, plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed as moot, without discovery, even if USDA continues to regard its postings as voluntary.||Case|
|MD - Spay/neuter - § 2-1602. Spay/Neuter Fund||MD Code, Agriculture, § 2-1602||This Maryland law establishes a spay/neuter fund to finance local governments and animal welfare organizations for programs to facilitate the spay and neutering of dogs and cats in the state. In addition, as of 2014, each county and organization that receives funding shall quarterly report: (1) the number of cats and dogs taken in; (2) the number of cats and dogs disposed of, broken down by method of disposal, including euthanasia; and (3) any other relevant data the Department requires.||Statute|
|WI - Cruelty - Consolidated Cruelty Statutes||W. S. A. 951.01 - 18; W.S.A. 944.18||WI ST. 951.01 - 18; WI ST 944.18||This section comprises the Wisconsin anti-cruelty section. Under the section, "animal" includes every living warm-blooded creature (except a human being), reptile, or amphibian. The section prohibits "mistreating animals," which is defined as treating any animal, whether belonging to the person or another, in a cruel manner. This section does not prohibit bona fide experiments carried on for scientific research or normal and accepted veterinary practices. This section also prohibits the instigation of dogfights, and has a unique provisions that prohibits the shooting of caged or staked animals.||Statute|
|RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-1. Regulatory ordinances--Enforcement and penalties||Gen. Laws, 1956, § 4-13-1||RI ST § 4-13-1||This Rhode Island statute first provides that city or town councils may make any ordinances concerning dogs in their cities or towns as they deem expedient, to be enforced by the destruction or disposition of the animal, or by pecuniary penalties. It then outlines that specific ordinances that several cities are authorized to enact and what terms must be included.||Statute|
|Chalmers v. Diwell||74 LGR 173||
Defendant was an exporter of pet birds. He kept birds at a premises in the course of his business. Usually the birds remained on the premises for less than 48 hours before continuing their journey to their purchasers but on occasion birds had remained on the premises for up to 12 days. A magistrates' court acquitted him of keeping a pet shop without a licence (contrary to Pet Animals Act 1951, s.1). Prosecutor appealed. Result: appeal allowed. Held: even though the premises was being used as no more than a holding center, the defendant was carrying on from that premises a business of selling pets and the premises therefore required a pet shop license.
|Commonwealth v. Craven||572 Pa. 431 (Pa. S.C. 2003)||572 Pa. 431 (Pa. S.C. 2003)||
Defendants who were charged with cruelty to animals and criminal conspiracy for their attendance at a dogfight as spectators challenged the constitutionality of the dogfighting statute. The trial court found that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that since the statute only creates criminal liability for a person's conscious decision to attend a dogfight, it is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.