Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US - AWA - 1976 Public Law 94-279 | 1976 PL 94-279 | The 1976 Amendments of the AWA dealt with several new topics: (1) transportation carriers and intermediate handlers of animals were brought under the provisions of the Act, (2) a number of specific transportation problems were addressed by Congress, (3) a new provision was added which made it a crime to knowingly sponsor, participate in, transport, or use the mails to promote fights between live birds, live dogs or other mammals, (4) the penalty provisions were rewritten, allowing the broad use of civil fines. | Statute | |
| Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 329: Section 6268 | Conn. Gen. Stat. § 6268 (1918) | Section 6268 of Chapter 329 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers the unlawful injury to certain property of another. Specifically, the statute states the punishment for hurting, maiming, poisoning anther's cattle, ox, horse, and mule. | Statute | |
| American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign v. Vilsack | 133 F. Supp. 3d 200 (D.D.C. 2015) | 2015 WL 5726880 (D.D.C., 2015) | The American Wild Horse Preservation Campaign (Plaintiffs) brought this action against the United States Forest Service (Forest Service) to prevent the implementation of the new Devil’s Garden Wild Horse Territory Plan (WHT) that Modoc County helped develop. Plaintiffs brought six claims against defendants, all under the Administrative Procedures Act. In Counts I, II, and III, plaintiffs alleged that the boundary clarification was arbitrary and capricious because it violated the Wild Horses Act, the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and in Counts IV, V, and VI, they claimed that the adjustment to the "appropriate management level" (AML) range was arbitrary and capricious because it was contrary to the same three statutes. Because the Forest Service reasonably concluded that the disputed territory was never formally incorporated into the Devil's Garden WHT, and that any references to one contiguous territory were the result of administrative error, the Court found that it was not arbitrary and capricious or in violation of the law for the Forest Service to act to correct the boundary in the 2013 Environmental Assessment and the 2013 Management Plan. Thus, defendants were entitled to summary judgment on Counts I, II, and III. And because the Forest Service articulated a rational basis for its decision to adjust the AML range for the Devil's Garden WHT that was not counter to record evidence or otherwise contrary to the law, the Court found that defendants were also entitled to summary judgment on Counts IV, V, and VI. Thus, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was denied, defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was granted, and because they sought the same relief as defendants, the intervenor-defendants' cross-motion for summary judgment was denied as moot. | Case |
| Molinari v. Tuskegee University | 339 F. Supp. 2d. 1293 (N.D. Ala. 2004) |
A veterinary student was kicked by a cow while trying to perform a medical procedure. The student brought a personal injury lawsuit against the professor and university for negligently allowing the university-owned cow to kick her and not providing timely medical treatment. Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part. |
Case | |
| MT - Bite - Chapter 1. Availability of Remedies--Liability. | MCA 27-1-715 | MT ST 27-1-715 | This Montana statute provides that the owner of any dog which shall without provocation bite any person while such person is on or in a public place or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of such dog, located within an incorporated city or town shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by the person bitten regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owner's knowledge of such viciousness. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Stevens | 130 S.Ct. 1577 (2010) | 176 L.Ed.2d 435, 78 USLW 4267, 38 Media L. Rep. 1577, 10 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 4819, 2010 Daily Journal D.A.R. 5779, 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 221 |
Defendant was convicted of violating statute prohibiting the commercial creation, sale, or possession of depictions of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court held that the statute was unconstitutional for being substantially overbroad: it did not require the depicted conduct to be cruel, extended to depictions of conduct that were only illegal in the State in which the creation, sale, or possession occurred, and because the exceptions clause did not substantially narrow the statute's reach. (2011 note: 18 U.S.C. § 48 was amended following this ruling in late 2010). |
Case |
| NO - Aquaculture - Regulations concerning abattoirs and processing plants for aquaculture animals | Chap. 1 - 5, Regulations concerning abattoirs and processing plants for aquaculture animals |
The purpose of these regulations is to promote good health in aquaculture animals and ensure good fish welfare. |
Statute | |
| Deardorff v. Farnsworth | 343 P.3d 687, review denied, 358 Or. 145 (2015) | 268 Or.App. 844 (2015) |
In this case, the Oregon Court of Appeals was reviewing whether or not the trial court erred in holding that an insurance company was estopped from relying on an exclusion in an insurance policy. The plaintiffs in this case were transporting horses in California that were owned by other when the trailer carrying the horses caught fire. The insurers for the horse owners compensated the horse owners and then filed an action against plaintiffs. As a result, plaintiffs charged the defense of the action to their insurer, OMI. OMI refused to provide a defense for the plaintiffs, arguing that it was not covered in the insurance policy. Plaintiffs filed an action against OMI to recover the costs arguing that they were verbally told that this would be covered in the policy. The trial court ordered summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that OMI was estopped from denying liability because it had breached its contract with plaintiff. Ultimately, the court of appeals reviewed the issue and determined that the trial court had erred in its decision. The court of appeals found that based on applicable case law, estoppel cannot be used to negate an express exclusion in an insurance policy. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case. |
Case |
| Colleen Harrington v. David Hovanec, and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive | This California complaint for damages raises five causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) trespass to chattel; (3) conversion; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 3340 (related to damage to animals as property). The lawsuit arose from the negligent and/or intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant in May of 2004. According to the complaint, plaintiff's dog was shot at least thirteen times by defendant's two different guns. | Pleading | ||
| Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal Volume 18 |
SUMÁRIOEDITORIAL Heron Gordilho............... Direito Animal Comparado/Comparative Animal Law |
Policy |