Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WA - Dangerous Dog - 16.08.090. Dangerous dogs--Requirements for restraint | West's RCWA 16.08.090 | WA ST 16.08.090 | This Washington statute outlines the state and local provisions related to dangerous or potentially dangerous dogs. It first provides that it is unlawful for an owner of a dangerous dog to permit the dog to be outside the proper enclosure unless the dog is muzzled and restrained by a substantial chain or leash and under physical restraint of a responsible person. Potentially dangerous dogs shall be regulated only by local, municipal, and county ordinances and nothing in this section limits restrictions local jurisdictions may place on owners of potentially dangerous dogs. | Statute |
| WA - Enumclaw - Breed - Chapter 7.08
 PIT BULL DOGS | ENUMCLAW, WA., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 7.08.010 - 7.08.030 (1990) |
In Enumclaw, Washington, it is unlawful to keep, harbor, own or possess a pit bull dog, with exceptions for dogs licensed before the effective date of the ordinance. Such dogs are subject to certain requirements, such as proper confinement, the use of a leash and muzzle, posting “Beware of Dog” signs, the use of special orange collars, photographs and tattoos for identification purposes, keeping $100,000 liability insurance, and vaccinating the dog against rabies. Failure to comply may result in the humane destruction of the dog. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Brayshaw v Liosatos | [2001] ACTSC 2 |
The appellant had informations laid against him alleging that he, as a person in charge of animals, neglected cattle 'without reasonable excuse' by failing to provide them with food. The appellant had been informed by a veterinarian that his treatment of the cattle was potentially a breach of the Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) and that they were in poor condition. The evidence admitted did not rule out the possibility that the appellant's feeding of the cattle accorded with 'maintenance rations' and the convictions were overturned. |
Case | |
| IPPL v. Institute for Behavioral Research, Inc. | 799 F.2d 934 (1986) |
Private individuals and organizations brought action seeking to be named guardians of medical research animals seized from organization whose chief was convicted of state animal cruelty statute violations. The United States District Court for the District of Maryland, John R. Hargrove, J., dismissed action, and individuals and organizations appealed. The Court of Appeals, Wilkinson, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) individuals and organizations lacked standing to bring action, and (2) Animal Welfare Act did not confer private cause of action. Case discussed in topic: US Animal Welfare Act. |
Case | |
| State ex rel. William Montgomery v. Brain | 422 P.3d 1065 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | 2018 WL 2348473 (Ariz. Ct. App., 2018) | The special action considers whether a person who uses a dangerous instrument in committing an animal cruelty offense may be sentenced as a dangerous offender. The facts in the underlying case are as follows. A witness in an apartment complex heard a dog crying and observed Shundog Hu using a rod to hit a dog that was inside a pet enclosure. Hu was charged with both intentionally or knowingly subjecting an animal to cruel mistreatment, a felony, and under the "dangerous offense" laws because the animal cruelty "involved the discharge, use, or threatening exhibition of a pole and/or rod, a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument, in violation of A.R.S. §§ 13-105 and 13-704." Hu moved to dismiss the dangerous offense allegation stating that, as a matter of law, "a dangerous offense cannot be committed against an animal." Hu contended that the legislature's inclusion of the phrase "on another person" in the statutory definition for "dangerous offense" evinces this intent. The State, on the other hand, argued that sentencing enhancement is based on the use of the dangerous instrument rather than the target of the instrument. The superior court granted Hu's motion and the State petitioned for this special action. This court accepted jurisdiction because " the State has no adequate remedy on appeal and the petition presents a legal issue of statewide importance." This court first examined the statutory definition for a "dangerous" felony offense: "an offense involving the discharge, use or threatening exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or the intentional or knowing infliction of serious physical injury on another person.” The State's contention is that the "or" in the definition is disjunctive and, thus, the phrase "on another person" only applies to the second independent clause. Hu counters that such an interpretation would cover harm to anything and lead to absurd results. This court first noted that the statutory definitions are silent as to whether they only apply to humans. Applying principles of secondary interpretation and sensible construction, the court held that legislature's purpose in drafting the dangerous offense definition and the related statutes was to enhance crimes to “dangerous offenses” to protect human life. The State cannot charge a crime as a dangerous offense unless the target is against another person. In reaching this conclusion, the court contemplated extreme examples involving felony damage to vegetation as well as comparison to a recent decision in Texas where a deadly weapon finding was limited to human victims only. | Case |
| TX - Dangerous - Subchapter D: Dangerous Dogs | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 822.041 - 047 | TX HEALTH & S § 822.041 - 047 | Chapter 822, Subchapter D addresses dangerous dogs and their treatment, including dog attacks, registration, defenses, violations of the statute. | Statute |
| U.S. v. Street | 257 F.3d 869 (8th Cir.2001) |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act. |
Case | |
| Pitts v. State | 918 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Right of appeal is only available for orders that the animal be sold at public auction. The statutory language does not extend this right to seizure orders. |
Case | |
| AL - Racing - § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47. Horse Racing and Greyhound Racing in Class 1 Municipalities | Ala.Code 1975 § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47 | AL ST § 11-65-1 to § 11-65-47 | This set of statutes allows for municipalities in Alabama to vote on whether or not they wish to authorize horse and greyhound racing and pari-mutuel wagering. Each municipality that authorizes it must create a commission which must be incorporated in order for a municipality to conduct horse and greyhound racing. The commissions each regulate horse and greyhound racing only in their respective municipalities. A license must be obtained by the commission of the respective municipality in which one desires to operate or construct a racing facility. | Statute |
| Sentencia T-608, 2011 | Sentencia T-608/11 | The Plaintiff brought an action of ‘tutela’ (Constitutional mechanism that is preferential and summary created for the purpose of protection of fundamental rights) acting as the legal guardian of her husband, who had spastic quadriplegia and mixed aphasia as a result of a severe cranioencephalic trauma, against Corporación Autónoma Regional de Caldas ‘CORPOCALDAS’. The Plaintiff argued that Corpocaldas had violated the rights to health and dignified life of her husband when the Defendant confiscated a parrot that was part of the Plaintiff’s rehabilitation treatment. The Plaintiff sought immediate restitution of the parrot by the Defendant. The court affirmed the decision of the lower court to deny the Plaintiff’s petition. The court determined that the confiscation of the parrot by Corpocaldas was reasonable and according to the law, therefore there was not a violation of the rights of the Plaintiff. The court stated that as wild animals belong to the nation and they can only be reduced to property when the are obtained through legal hunting or from legal breeders. In this particular case, the Plaintiff obtained the parrot as a present from her cousin, and she did not present evidence of title. The court concluded that the bird belonged to the nation, and therefore the environmental authority had acted in accordance to its duties. The court stated that even though there was a narrow relationship between the rights to health and life with the right to environment, the protection of the environment did not only aim to the protection of humans. The court indicated that the environment should be protected whether or not it offered a benefit to the human species. The rest of the beings that are part of the environment are dignified beings that are not at the absolute and unlimited disposition of the human beings. Humans are just another element of nature, and not a superior entity that has the environment at their disposition. Therefore, the use of natural resources should not cause damage or deterioration that could threaten diversity and environmental integrity, the court stated in its reasoning. | Case |