Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Peru - Wildlife - LEY 9147, 1949 | LEY 9147, 1949 | This law declares government protection over all the wild species of animals that are within the national territory. It also prohibits the hunting of vicuña, chinchilla and guanacu species. | Statute | |
| The International Fund for Animal Welfare (Australia) Pty Ltd and Minister for Environment and Heritage | (2005) 93 ALD 594 | (2005) 41 AAR 508; [2005] AATA 1210 |
Zoos in New South Wales and Victoria sought to import asian elephants for conservation and exhibition. The Tribunal considered whether the elephants were being imported "for the purposes of conservation breeding or propagation", the zoos were "suitably equipped to manage, confine and care for the animals, including meeting the behavioural and biological needs of the animals", the importation of the elephants would "be detrimental to, or contribute to trade which is detrimental to ... the survival .... or ... recovery in nature of" Asian elephants and whether the elephants were "obtained in contravention of, [or] their importation would ... involve the contravention of, any law". The importation was allowed. |
Case |
| Hill v. Coggins | 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1003 (2018) | 2017 WL 3471259 (4th Cir. Aug. 14, 2017) | In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. | Case |
| TX - Ordinances - § 826.034. Restraint; Criminal Penalty. | V. T. C. A., Health & Safety Code § 826.034 | TX HEALTH & S § 826.034 | This Texas statute provides that a person commits an offense (Class C misdemeanor) if the person fails or refuses to restrain a dog or cat owned by the person and the animal is required to be restrained under the ordinances or rules adopted under this chapter. | Statute |
| NV - Endangered Species - Protection and Propagation of Native Fauna (Chapter 503) | N. R. S. 503.584 - 503.589 | NV ST 503.584 - 503.589 | These statutes provide that the Legislature of Nevada has an interest in protecting native species from extinction and sets forth the authority to establish programs to protect designated species. However, if a native species is found to be destructive under the statute, the statute provides for removal if appropriate. Under statute, the ultimate responsibility for management rests with the governor for reviewing state programs and entering into interstate and federal agreements. | Statute |
| AZ - Tucson - Chapter 4: Animals and Fowl (Article 1: In General § 4-3) | Tucson Code § 4-3 |
This Tucson ordinance makes it a misdemeanor to commit a crime of cruelty or neglect on an animal. Anyone found guilty of committing a crime of neglect of cruelty faces fines between $100 to $2,500, up to 6 months in jail or 3 years on probation, restitution for the victim, and may not be able to own or control an animal for up to 3 years. |
Local Ordinance | |
| Secretary of State for The Home Office v. BUAV and the Information Commissioner | [2008] EWHC 892 (QB | Appeal concerning the Freedom of Information Act 2000 and experiments involving animals. The BUAV had made an information request in respect of five research project licenses issued under the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986. The Home Office released limited summary information, relying on exemptions under FOIA to reason this; namely under section 24(1) which would prohibit information from being disclosed that had been given “in confidence.” The Court of Appeal upheld the decision that the Home Office was entitled to refuse BUAV’s information request. | Case | |
| Settle v. Commonwealth | 55 Va.App. 212, 685 S.E.2d 182 (Va.,2009) | 2009 WL 4030930 (Va.App.) |
The defendant-appellant, Charles E. Settle, Jr., was convicted of two counts of inadequate care by owner of companion animals and one count of dog at large under a county ordinance, after Fauquier County Sherriff's officers were dispatched to his home on multiple occasions over the course of one calendar year in response to animal noise and health and safety complaints from his neighbors. Consequently, all of the affected dogs were seized from Settle and relocated to local animal shelters. The trial court also declared three of the animals to be dangerous dogs pursuant to another county ordinance. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that: (1) because the forfeiture of dogs was a civil matter the Court of Appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction and was not the proper forum to decide the case; (2) that Settle failed to join the County as an indispensible party in the notice of appeal from conviction for the county ordinance violation; and (3) that the evidence was sufficient to identify Settle as the owner of the neglected companion animals. |
Case |
| RI - Hunting - § 20-13-16. Harassment of hunters, trappers, and fishers prohibited | Gen. Laws, 1956, § 20-13-16 | RI ST § 20-13-16 | This law reflects Rhode Island's hunter harassment law. The law provides that no person shall obstruct or interfere with the lawful taking of wildlife by another person at the location where the activity is taking place with intent to prevent the lawful taking. The language states that the listed actions must be done intentionally or knowingly. Violation results in a "civil violation" with a forfeiture of not less than $100 nor more $500. | Statute |
| MT - Horse Slaughter - Chapter 9. Slaughter. | MCA 81-9-240, 241 | MT ST 81-9-240, 241 | This Montana statute limits the ability of a court to issue an injunction aimed at delaying or stopping the construction of an equine slaughter or processing facility. Additionally, the law provides that if a person files an action against the operation of an equine slaughter or processing facility and does not prevail, the person is liable for all financial losses the facility suffers if the court issues an injunction that halts operations while the action is pending. | Statute |