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Displaying 71 - 80 of 6639
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Toney v. Glickman | 101 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir., 1996) | Plaintiffs were in the business of selling animals to research facilities. The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that they had committed hundreds of violations of the Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131 et seq. The ALH then imposed what was, to that point, the harshest sanction, $200,000, in the history of the Act. The Judicial Officer affirmed the ALJ's findings and denied the Plaintiffs' request to reopen the hearing for consideration of new evidence. While the 8th Circuit affirmed most of these findings, it held that the evidence did not support all of them. Accordingly, the court remanded the matter to the Department for redetermination of the sanction. The court also affirmed the Judicial Officer's refusal to reopen the hearing and denied the Plaintiffs' Request for Leave to Adduce Additional Evidence. The Plaintiffs were free, however, to seek leave to offer this additional evidence on remand to the extent it was relevant to the sanction. | Case | |
| Argentina - Cruelty - Ley 14346, 1954 | LEY DJA: S-0410 | This law seeks to protect animals against mIstreatment and cruel acts. Mistreatment are cruel acts and considered criminal offenses, which can be punished from 15 days to 1 year in prison. Article 2 of this law establishes the acts considered mistreatment, which includes not feeding domestic and captive animals with food in enough quantity and quality. Also included are the acts of forcing animals to work excessive hours without providing adequate rest according to the weather and stimulating them with drugs without pursuing therapeutic purposes, among others. Article 3 defines acts that are considered cruel. These acts include practicing vivisection for purposes that are not scientifically demonstrable, or in places or by people who are not authorized to operate on animals without anesthesia and without the title of doctor or veterinarian, except in cases of emergency. In addition, cruelty includes: mutilating any part of the body of an animal unless the action has purposes of improvement; marking of the respective animal species unless performed for reasons of mercy; performing public or private acts of animal fights, bullfights and parodies where animals are killed, injured or harassed; and other listed acts. | Statute | |
| Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society | 106 S. Ct. 2860 (1986) | 478 U.S. 221 (1986) |
Congress had granted the Secretary the authority to determine whether a foreign nation's whaling in excess of quotas diminished the effectiveness of the IWC, and the Court found no reason to impose a mandatory obligation upon the Secretary to certify that every quota violation necessarily failed that standard. |
Case |
| Hairston v. Burger King Corp. | 764 So.2d 176 (La.App. 2 Cir.,2000) |
Louisiana appeals court affirmed trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to adequately link her stomach ailment with a burger purchased from Burger King and thus could not sustain an action that sought recovery of alleged damages suffering due to food poisoning. |
Case | |
| Swilley v. State | 465 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. App. 2015) | 2015 WL 3637850 (Tex. App. 2015) | In the indictment, the State alleged Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting a dog with a crossbow, a state jail felony. The dog in question was a stray, which fell within the statutory definition of an “animal.” After a jury found Appellant guilty, the trial court assessed his punishment at two years' confinement in a state jail. On appeal, Appellant contended that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the jury heard evidence of an extraneous offense also involving cruelty to animals. Since the video that mentioned the extraneous offense was admitted without objection, the court held the Appellant waived the error and the trial court did not err by denying Appellant's motion for mistrial or by giving the instruction to disregard and overrule Appellant's first issue. Appellant further asserted the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. The court, however, held the evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly tortured or in a cruel manner killed or caused serious bodily injury to an animal by shooting it with a crossbow. The trial court's judgment was therefore affirmed. | Case |
| RU - Cruelty - Responsible Treatment of Animals | Responsible Treatment of Animals | Responsible Treatment of Animals | The Law on Responsible Treatment of Animals, signed by Vladimir Putin in 2018, prohibits the killing of animals “under any pretext.” The law also outlaws shooting or poisoning stray dogs and cats, which has occurred in Russian cities in recent years according to news sources. Under the law, owners must keep their pets in proper conditions and homeless animals must be taken-up, vaccinated, sterilized, and then released by local agencies. One of the primary purposes of the laws is to ban petting zoos at malls and the practice of bars and restaurants hosting animals. The conducting of animal fights is also banned under the new law. | Statute |
| Presidential Village, LLC v. Phillips | 325 Conn. 394, 397, 158 A.3d 772 (2017) | 158 A.3d 772 | In this case, a landlord brought a summary process action against a tenant who lived in the federally subsidized apartment, based on tenant's keeping of “emotional support dog” in violation of a pet restriction clause in the tenant's lease. The trial court entered judgment in favor of tenant, based on equity, and the landlord appealed. The appeal was transferred to the Supreme Court of Connecticut. The Court held that: 1) appeal was not rendered moot by landlord's commencement of second summary process action against tenant, which was dismissed; 2) trial court could not rely on “spirit” of Department of Housing and Urban Development in exercising equitable discretion to enter judgment in favor of tenant; 3) trial court abused its discretion in applying doctrine of equitable nonforfeiture; and 4) summary process action was “civil action” to which medical treatment report exception to hearsay rule could be applied to allow for admission of letter from physician and social worker of tenant's niece concerning dog's benefit to niece. Reversed and remanded. | Case |
| MS - Trust - § 91-8-408. Trust for care of animal | Miss. Code Ann. § 91-8-408 | MS ST § 91-8-408 | This Mississippi statute allows a trust to be created to provide for the care of an animal alive during the settlor's lifetime. The trust terminates upon the death of the animal or, if the trust was created to provide for the care of more than one (1) animal alive during the settlor's lifetime, upon the death of the last surviving animal. | Statute |
| Davison v. Berg | 243 So.3d 489 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018) | 44 Fla. L. Weekly D641 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 22, 2018); 2018 WL 1415485 | Deborah Davison volunteered at her local Humane Society to help take care of a dog park. Three years later, Rebecca Berg’s dog who was chasing other dogs collided with Davison. Davison suffered a broken leg that required extensive medical care. Davison then filed an action against Berg under a Florida statute that “imposes liability on dog owners for damage their dogs cause to other persons and animals.” The trial court granted final summary judgment in favor of Berg for two reasons. The first reason was that the signs outside of the park sufficiently warned Davison of the risks of injury inside. The second reason was that Davison essentially consented to the risk of potential injuries by being a volunteer for the dog park. On appeal, this court stated that the Florida statute was a strict liability statute that makes an owner the insurer of their dog’s conduct. The only defense to the statute is for an owner to display in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign that includes the words “Bad Dog.” Berg presented evidence that the park had two signs prominently displayed at the entrance to the park with the title “Dog Park Rules.” The two signs listed rules for entrance to the dog park. One of these rules stated that park use is at the dog owner’s risk. Another rule stated that rough play and chasing were not allowed if any dogs or owners were uncomfortable with that behavior. The last rule stated that visitors enter at their own risk. Even though Davison entered the park at her own risk, the purpose of the sign requirement in the statute was to give notice that a bad dog is on the premises. The Court found that the trial court erred in finding that the signs at the dog park were sufficiently equivalent to “Bad Dog” signs to preclude liability under the Florida statute. The trial court also found that by virtue of Davison volunteering at the dog park, she was aware that she could be injured during the course of her work and that she signed a volunteer application form that acknowledged that she could be exposed to “bites, scratches, and other injuries.” Davison had also witnessed a prior collision between a dog and an individual that resulted in a broken leg. After witnessing that, Davison began to warn others at the Humane Society about the dangers of being inside the dog park with dogs chasing each other. The Court held that even though there may be evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that Davison consented to the risk of injury, “an actual consent or assumption of the risk defense cannot bar liability.” The Court reversed the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment in favor of Berg. | Case |
| R v. Shand | R. v. Shand, 2007 ONCJ 317 | In R v Shand 2007 ONCJ 317 (CanLII), the court examined the necessary elements required to established the “willful” mens rea component present in Canadian Federal Criminal Statute s. 429. The accused was charged with three counts of animal cruelty contrary to s.446 of the Criminal Code in relation to a dog in her care. The court found that on two of the counts that the accused was had acted "wilfully" because she was either "reckless or indifferent as to her dog's condition." | Case |