Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| MD - Endangered Species - Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act | MD Code, Natural Resources, § 10-2A-01 - 09 | MD NAT RES § 10-2A-01 - 09 | These Maryland statutes comprise the Nongame and Endangered Species Conservation Act. Under the Act, any species designated under the federal Endangered Species Act is deemed an endangered species as are other species designated by the state secretary based on habitat and population factors. Violators of the Act shall be fined not more than $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than 1 year, or both and equipment used in the taking of designated species may be seized. | Statute |
| Rogers v. State | 760 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. App. 1988). |
Dog fighting case. Where the dog fighting area was in an open section of woods near the defendant's home, police officers were not required to obtain a search warrant before entering the defendant's property because of the "open fields" doctrine. |
Case | |
| Armstrong v. Riggi | 549 P.2d 753 (Nev. 1976) | 92 Nev. 280 (1976) |
Joe Riggi delivered his two unregistered Pomeranian dogs to the Armstrongs' Poodle Parlor to be bathed and groomed. The dogs died while in the care of the bailee. Riggi commenced this action to recover damages alleging that the dogs were worth more than $10,000. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the state court rule regarding attorney fees. Since the appellate court did in fact determine error, the case was remanded. |
Case |
| PA - Euthanasia - The Animal Destruction Method Authorization Law | 3 P.S. § 328.101 - 3 P.S. § 328.1102 | This Pennsylvania statute provides the prohibited and authorized methods to kill or "destroy" animals within the state. The statute provides a different method for small domestic animals and also specifies which state operations and entities are excluded from following the methods as described under the statute. The statute also specifies the fines and civil penalties for violation of the statute. | Statute | |
| MA - Hunting, Internet - § 65A. Online Shooting or Spearing | M.G.L.A. 131 § 65A | Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 131, § 65A (West) | This statute prohibits hunting via the Internet and the operation of online hunting businesses within the state of Massachusetts. Violation is punished by imprisonment in the house of correction for not more than 2 1/2 years or by a fine of not more than $2,500, or by both a fine and imprisonment. | Statute |
| MS - Dog Licenses - Chapter 53. Dogs and Rabies Control. | Miss. Code Ann. § 41-53-11 | MS ST 41-53-11 | This Mississippi statute provides that it is the lawful duty for any sheriff, conservation officer or peace officer of a county or municipality to kill any dog above the age of three (3) months found running at large on whose neck there is no such collar and tag or who are not inoculated according to state law. No action shall be maintained by the owner for such killing. However, the statute then goes on to say that it is the duty of such officer to first impound the dogs for five days and give a description of the dog to the sheriff. | Statute |
| ID - Predator - Chapter 58. Protection of Natural Resources (wolf declaration) | I.C. § 67-5801 - 5807 | ID ST § 67-5801 - 5807 | The purpose of Chapter 58 is to provide an orderly, comprehensive plan for the protection of the natural resources of the state and for the suppression of dangers or threats. Section 5806 the Idaho legislature finds and declares that the state's citizens, businesses, hunting, tourism and agricultural industries, private property and wildlife, are immediately and continuously threatened and harmed by the sustained presence and growing population of Canadian gray wolves in the state of Idaho. The legislature states that "a disaster emergency is in existence as a result of the introduction of Canadian gray wolves, which have caused and continue to threaten vast devastation of Idaho's social culture, economy and natural resources." | Statute |
| Siegert v. Crook County | 266 P.3d 170 (Or.App., 2011) | 2011 WL 5402078 (Or.App.); 246 Or.App. 500 (2011) |
An individual appealed County Court’s decision to approve the location of a dog breeding kennel in a zone where such kennels were not permitted. The county interpreted the code that was in effect at the time the kennel began operating to allow dog breeding as animal husbandry, and thus permissible farm use. The Court of Appeals found the county's interpretation to be plausible. |
Case |
| People v. Cumper | 268 N.W.2d 696 (Mich. 1978) | 83 Mich. App. 490 (Mich. 1978) |
Defendant was convicted under MCL 750.49 for being a spectator at a dog fight. He argued on appeal that the statute was impermissibly vague and unconstitutionally overbroad, for punishing an individual for mere presence at a dog fight. The court disagreed, finding that the statute was neither vague nor overbroad because it did not punish the mere witnessing of a dog fight, but attendance as a spectator to a legally prohibited dog fight. For more, see Detailed Discussion . |
Case |
| Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture | 2016 WL 7235624 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2016) |
Foie gras is a food product made from the liver of a duck or goose. To create it, the duck or goose is force-fed a special mix of food which causes a large buildup of fat in the bird's liver. This gives the product its signature taste. Plaintiffs, Animal Legal Defense Fund, comprised of four animal rights organizations and three individuals. The Defendant, United States Department of Agriculture, comprised of the Food Safety and Inspection Services (FSIS), and two individuals. Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund asked Defendant (FSIS) to initiate rulemaking under the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA) “to exclude Foie gras from the food supply as an adulterated and diseased product.” They argued that the force-feeding process could cause infections and illnesses for the animals and the consumption of the birds could trigger the onset of illness and disease in humans. FSIS denied the petition to ban the food product. The Plaintiff Animal Legal Defense Fund then filed this action for judicial review. Defendant FSIS argued that the Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing, that the PPIA does not protect the interests asserted by the animal rights organizations, and that in any event, FSIS acted within its discretion in denying the petition. The United States District Court, C.D. California concluded that the Plaintiff, Animal Legal Defense Fund had standing to bring this action and that their interests fell within the “zone” of interests protected by the PPIA. However, the Court also held that Defendants, United States Department of Agriculture, did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or contrary to law in denying the petition. Accordingly, the Court Granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. |
Case |