Results
| Title | Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| City of Houston v. Levingston | Not Reported in S.W.3d, 2006 WL 241127 (Tex.App.-Hous. (1 Dist.)) |
A city veterinarian who worked for the Bureau of Animal Regulation and Care (BARC) brought an action against the city, arguing that he was wrongfully terminated under the Whistleblower’s Act. The vet contended that he reported several instances of abuses by BARC employees to the division manager. In upholding the trial court’s decision to award Levingston over $600,000 in damages, the appellate court ruled the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the veterinarian was terminated due to his report . Contrary to the city’s assertion, the court held that BARC was an appropriate law enforcement authority under the Act to report violations of section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code committed by BARC employees. Opinion Withdrawn and Superseded on Rehearing by City of Houston v. Levingston , 221 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. App., 2006). |
Case | |
| Chile - Sterilization - Decreto 2, 2015 | Decreto 2, 2015 | This Decreto lays out the regulations for the reproductive control of pets. Its purpose is to control the population of companion animals through the sterilization of these species. | Statute | |
| Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Weber | 979 F.Supp.2d 1118 (D.Mont.,2013) | 2013 WL 5844447 (D.Mont.,2013) |
An environmental group sued the U.S. Forest Service claiming it violated the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) when it permitted the implementation of the Flathead National Forest Precommercial Thinning Project. The court that the defendants' designation of matrix habitat was not arbitrary and that there was no showing of irreparable harm to lynx habitat to require the Service to be enjoined from implementing project. Likewise, plaintiffs’ claims regarding the grizzly bear’s critical habitat did not prevail; nor did the plaintiffs’ claims regarding the National Forest Management Act’s Inland Native Fish Strategy. The court, therefore, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion.
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Case |
| ND - Lost Property - CHAPTER 60-01. DEPOSITS - GENERAL PROVISIONS. | NDCC 60-01-34 to 43 | ND ST 60-01-34 to 43 | These statutes comprise North Dakota's lost property provisions. | Statute |
| KY - Hunting - Chapter 150. Fish and Wildlife Resources. | KRS § 150.710; 150.990 | KY ST § 150.710; 150.990 | This law comprises Kentucky's hunter harassment law. The law states that no person shall intentionally obstruct or disrupt the right of a person to lawfully take wildlife by hunting, trapping, or fishing. It also provides that the state attorney general or any person directly affected by the unlawful conduct may bring an action to restrain such conduct or to recover damages. | Statute |
| The Duck Shooting Case | (1997) 189 CLR 579 | (1997) 146 ALR 248; (1997) 71 ALJR 837; [1997] 12 Leg Rep 14; [1997] HCA 31 |
The plaintiff was charged with being in an area set aside for hunting, during hunting season, without a licence. The plaintiff argued that he was there in order to collect dead and wounded ducks and endangered species and to draw media attention to the cruelty associated with duck shooting. The Court found that although the regulation under which the plaintiff was charged restricted the implied freedom of political communication, it was appropriate to protect the safety of persons with conflicting aims likely to be in the area. |
Case |
| Spangler v. Stark County Dog Warden | 999 N.E.2d 1247 (Ohio App. 5 Dist.,2013) | 2013 -Ohio- 4774, 2013 WL 5820277 |
The appellant Robert T. Spangler appealed the decision of the Canton Municipal Court, Stark County that affirmed a dog warden's classification of his dog as "dangerous" under R.C. 955.11. While there are no cases on point that interpret this specific procedure on appeal, the court found the record did not reveal an abuse of discretion that would create a manifest miscarriage of justice. Even where there was potentially conflicting testimony whether appellant's dog actually bit the other dog's owner or whether it was caused by his own dog, the statute only requires a demonstration that the dog in question "caused injury" without provocation. Appellant's dog leaving the property lead to a "chain of events resulting in some sort of puncture injury" to the other dog owner's leg. |
Case |
| CA - Sales - § 1670.10. Sale of dogs and cats; retail installment contracts prohibited; remedies | West's Ann.Cal.Civ.Code § 1670.10 | This law, effective 2018, prohibits the transfer of ownership of dogs and cats through retail installment contracts. This is a contract where transfer ownership of a dog or cat in which ownership is contingent upon the making of payments over a period of time subsequent to the transfer of possession of the dog or cat. These contracts on or after January 1, 2018 are void as against public policy in the state | Statute | |
| Buffalo Field Campaign v. Zinke | 289 F.Supp.3d 103 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | 2018 WL 646887 (D.D.C. Jan. 31, 2018) | Plaintiffs Buffalo Field Campaign and other environmental groups petitioned the Fish and Wildlife Service ("Service") to add the Yellowstone bison population to the federal endangered species list. After the Service made a threshold “90–day” determination that Buffalo Field's petition failed to present sufficient scientific evidence that listing the bison may be warranted, Buffalo Field brought suit under the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging that the Service's determination was arbitrary and capricious. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the Service applied an improper standard when evaluating Buffalo Field's petition, granted Buffalo Field's motion for summary judgment, denied the Service's cross-motion, and remanded the case for the agency to conduct a new 90–day finding using the proper standard. In particular, the court observed that the Service "simply picked a side in an ongoing debate in the scientific community," thereby in inappropriately heightening the standard of evaluation for a 90-day petition. Because of that, the court agreed with the Service that remand is the appropriate remedy as opposed to to directing the Service to begin a 12-month review. | Case |
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