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Displaying 1 - 10 of 43
Title |
Citation | Alternate Citation | Summary | Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| AKERS v. SELLERS | 54 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.App.1944) | 114 Ind.App. 660 (1944) |
This Indiana case involves an action in replevin by John W. Akers against his former wife, Stella Sellers. The controversy at issue was ownership and possession of a Boston bull terrier dog. At the time of the divorce decree, the dog was not part of the property division and was instead left at the marriage domicile in custody of the former wife. Appellant-Akers claimed that legal title and the dog's best interests rested with him and unsuccessfully brought a suit in replevin in the lower court. On appeal, this Court held that there was no sufficient evidence to overturn the lower court's determination. The judgment was affirmed.
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| Amparo Directo D.A.- 454/2021 - Mexico | DA 10417/2021 | The administrative tribunal in Mexico City recognizes companion animals as family members, protected under Article 4 of their Constitution. Citing the Supreme Court of Justice, the tribunal stated that there are different types of families that are protected constitutionally, which includes some families that consider domestic animals their members. This is the decision to an Amparo against a resolution issued by the Institute of Administrative Verification (Instituto de Verificación Administrativa) holding that the owner of a pet boarding facility providing grooming and training services lacked the land use permits to have the commercial establishment. The owner of the pet boarding argued that she would only use 20% of her home for these purposes. After citing comparative law from countries such as Spain, Colombia, and Brazil, the court stated that “currently pets are considered sentient beings that are also part of the family nucleus and require attention and care. Therefore, the service provided by the Amparo promoter has become necessary for people or families also made up of domestic animals, who are looking for a place [to] care for their pets when they are away from their home for a long time” and, as such, these types of families ought to be considered by the authorities. The court stated that domestic animals “play a role of protection, support, company, affection, and care towards humans. Even the reciprocal attachment relationship between people and domestic animals is clear in multispecies families because they are treated as part of the family. They are, in a few words, members of it. Hence the name multispecies or interspecies family.” | Case | |
| Arrington v. Arrington | 613 S.W.2d 565 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) |
A divorcing couple agreed to visitation of their dog, which the trial court incorporated into the divorce decree, appointing wife as the dog's managing conservator. Husband appealed because he had not been appointed managing conservator; the appellate court stated that dogs are personal property, and the office of managing conservator had been created for human children. While the court held that dogs are personal property under the law, it also stated that visitation of dogs should be allowed. |
Case | |
| Ballas v Ballas | 3 Cal.Rptr. 11 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) | 178 Cal.App.2d 570 |
In a divorce decree, lower court awarded dog and car to husband; the wife appealed. Appellate court found that distinction between community and separate property was unimportant and held that wife was entitled to the dog, but the husband remained entitled to the car. |
Case |
| Bennett v. Bennett | 655 So.2d 109 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.,1995) | 20 Fla. L. Weekly D225 (Fla.App. 1 Dist.,1995) |
In this Florida case, the husband, Ronald Bennett, appealed a final judgment of dissolution of marriage awarding custody of the parties' dog. Specifically, the husband challenged the trial court's awarding the former wife visitation with the dog. The appellate court held that the trial court lacked the authority to order visitation with personal property (in this case, a dog). The court recognized that the lower court was trying to reach a fair solution, but the order was reversed and remanded remanded so that the trial court could award the animal pursuant to the dictates of the equitable distribution statute. |
Case |
| Colucci v. Colucci | 234 A.3d 1226 (Me. 2020) | 2020 ME 75 , 2020 WL 2764560 | This Maine case is an appeal of a divorce proceeding where one party argues the court erred in awarding the parties' dogs to another. In 2017, Suan Colucci filed a complaint for divorce against her husband, Stephen Colucci. In 2019, the court entered a judgment granting the divorce and awarded both dogs “set aside to [Susan] as her exclusive property.” On appeal by Stephen, this court found that undisputed evidence established that "Louise" the dog was acquired five years before marriage, and thus, was nonmarital property. Because no evidence was presented to which of the parties actually acquired Louise in 2010, the judgment was vacated and remanded for further proceedings to determine ownership of Louise. | Case |
| Conte v. Fossett | Not Reported in A.3d, 2013 WL 1143329 (Del.Super.,2013) | No. 12A-03-007 JRJ | Plaintiff and defendant were a non-married couple that shared ownership of a miniature dauschund. Defendant asked for the dog, but plaintiff repeatedly declined. Eventually, Plaintiff gave in and purchased the dog for defendant. The parties shared ownership, expenses, and labor involved in caring for the dog. Eventually, the parties broke up, and began a shared-custody arrangement for the dog. However, the relationship between the parties further soured, and defendant kept the dog in her possession. Plaintiff filed suit for sole possession of the dog. The trial court found that the dog was a gift from plaintiff to defendant in contemplation of the relationship, and awarded possession to plaintiff. On appeal, the court found that there was no basis to assume that the dog was a gift given in anticipation of marriage. Therefore, defendant had no basis to pursue recovery of the dog. | Case |
| Desanctis v. Pritchard | 803 A.2d 230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) | The trial court dismissed a couple's complaint asking the court to enforce a settlement agreement which provided for shared custody of the couple's dog. The appellate court upheld that decision, holding that the settlement agreement was void to the extent that it attempted to award visitation or shared custody with personal property. | Case | |
| Finn v. Anderson | 64 Misc. 3d 273, 101 N.Y.S.3d 825 (N.Y. City Ct. 2019) | 2019 WL 1984091 (N.Y. City Ct. Apr. 30, 2019) | This replevin action concerns ownership of an "indoor/outdoor" cat named "Sylvester" or "Marshmallow," depending on perspective. In September 2018, plaintiffs found an unidentified, thin, white cat hanging around their house looking for food. After several months of feeding the cat, in January 2019, plaintiffs decided to bring the cat inside and take it to a vet, where he was de-wormed, vaccinated, treated for fleas, microchipped, and dubbed "Sylvester." A few weeks later, Sylvester accidentally got out of plaintiff's house where plaintiff found out from a neighbor that the cat was taken back by the Defendant, who claimed that Sylvester is actually "Marshmallow" and had been plaintiff's indoor/outdoor cat since 2009. Plaintiff then filed a replevin action against defendant to recover legal possession of Sylvester, aka Marshmallow. The City Court, New York, Jamestown, Chautauqua County first noted that, regardless of how people feel about their dogs and cats, New York law treats them as personal property and even "chattel." While the court observed that the trend has been the "de-chattelization" of household pets in New York, it has not gone so far as to adopt a "best interests" standard to replace the superior possessory rights standard. The court noted that there is inherent difficulty in applying a best interests standard with pets because there is no practical way of gauging a pet's feelings and assessing its interests. The court further stated that New York Courts have developed a “quasi-interests based standard” for pets that considers highly subjective factors. Significantly, the court declared the following: "[w]hile it appears the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has not addressed the issue, this Court concludes that it is time to declare that a pet should no longer be considered “personal property” like a table or car." Thus, using a "best for all concerned" articulated in Raymond v. Lachmann in 1999, this court weighed the factors whether to place Sylvester/Marshmallow with plaintiff or defendant based on the care provided by both parties. The court found, in a very close decision, that the “best interests of all concerned” test leaves the custody of the cat, Sylvester/Marshmallow, with the defendant. While the court was convinced that plaintiffs were genuinely concerned for Sylvester's/Marshmallow's welfare and spent time and money on his care, it appears that Sylvester/Marshmallow may have “voted with his feet” to return to his home of ten years with the defendant and her children. The Court found in favor of the defendant, and plaintiff's claim was dismissed. | Case |
| Fitch v. Eiseman | 2000 WL 34545801 (Alaska 2000) (unpublished opinion) | The trial court approved a divorcing couple’s agreement for dogs to be with their children (and so travel to the husband's and wife’s houses as part of a shared custody agreement of their children). The wife did not abide by the agreement, so the Supreme Court remanded back to the trial court to determine sole ownership of the dog. | Case |