Cases

Case namesort ascending Citation Summary
Accion Penal 20331-2017- 00179, The case of the Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999 Accion Penal 20331-2017- 00179 In this case, the environmental authorities of the Galápagos National Park (the Galápagos Islands is an archipelago known for its unique species and marine ecosystems) tracked through the satellite monitoring system the Chinese reefer vessel—Fu Yuan Yu Leng 999—in national waters while it was cruising through the Galápagos marine reserve without the required permit. The park issued an alert to the National Guard, which approached the vessel by water and air. Upon searching the vessel, the authorities found approximately 532 tons of fish that included 7.639 sharks (7207 juveniles or adults, 432 unborn). All shark specimens found on board lacked fins, and nine of the 12 species were protected endangered species. In this case, the National Court of Justice set an exemplary precedent by affirming the lower court decision and ordering the confiscation of the vessel and imposing a 5.9 million dollar fine to be used for the restoration of the damage caused to the Galápagos ecosystem. In addition, the crew members were sentenced to 1–3 years in jail.
Acción de Inconstitucionalidad 7/2021 - Ciudad de México ACCIÓN DE INCONSTITUCIONALIDAD 7/2021 Brought by the National Human Rights Commission, this action of unconstitutionality seeks the annulment of Article 10Bis, Section II, Subsection i) of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City. This provision was added through Decree Number 495, published in the city's Official Gazette on December 16, 2020. The provision at issue allowed the Animal Squad (Brigada Animal) to enter enclosed areas where there was a presumption of animal cruelty without a warrant. The Supreme Court of Justice (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN)) invalidated section i), section II, of article 10 Bis of the Animal Protection Law of Mexico City.
Access Now, Inc. v. Town of Jasper, Tennessee 268 F.Supp.2d 973, 26 NDLR P 107 (E.D.Tenn.,2003) Plaintiffs Access Now, Inc. and Pamela Kitchens, acting as parent and legal guardian on behalf of her minor daughter Tiffany brought this action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against defendant Town of Jasper, Tennessee under the ADA after the town denied her request to keep a keep miniature horse as service animal at her residence. The town's ordinance at issue provided that no person shall keep an enumerated animal within 1000 feet of any residence without a permit from the health officer. The Jasper Municipal Court held a hearing and determined that the keeping of the horse was in violation of the code and ordered it removed from the property. On appeal, this Court found that while the plaintiffs contended that the horse helped Tiffany in standing, walking, and maintaining her balance, Tiffany does not have a disability as defined by the ADA and does not have a genuine need to use the horse as a service animal. Further, the Court found that the horse was not a service animal within the meaning of 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 because the animal was not used in the capacity of a service animal and instead was a companion or pet to Tiffany. The plaintiffs' complaint was dismissed with prejudice.
Abundant Animal Care, LLC v. Gray 316 Ga.App. 193 (Ga.App. 2012)

While either shadowing her aunt or during her first day working at the veterinary clinic, the plaintiff was bitten three times by a dog she had taken outside to exercise. Plaintiff subsequently filed numerous claims against the veterinary clinic, including: negligence; negligence per se; nuisance; and violation of a premise liability and a dangerous dog statute. After the lower court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, the defendant appealed to the Georgia appellate court. The appeals court stated that in a dog bite case, the plaintiff needed to produce evidence that the dog had a vicious propensity. Since the plaintiff failed to produce such evidence, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment on its premise liability, nuisance, dangerous dog statute, and negligence per se claims. As for the negligence claim, the court held the defendant should have been granted a motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff was not aware of internal procedures to protect invitees and because the injuries were not proximately caused by negligent supervision. The lower court's judgment was therefore reversed.

907 Whitehead Street, Inc. v. Secretary of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture 701 F.3d 1345 (C.A.11 (Fla.))

The appellant in this case, the Ernest Hemingway Home and Museum in Key West, Florida ("Museum"), appeals the lower court's determination that it is an animal exhibitor for purposes of the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"). Appellant contends that while admission is charged for the Museum, it does not exhibit the Hemingway cats to the public for compensation; thus, the cats are not distributed through interstate commerce. The court, however, found that since the AWA itself is ambiguous on the question of whether "distribution" includes the fixed-site commercial display of animals, the USDA's broader interpretation of "distribution" and "exhibitor" are entitled to legal deference. While the court sympathized with the museum's frustrations, it affirmed the district court's findings of law and held that Museum is an AWA animal exhibitor subject to USDA regulation

789-22-JH, Habeas Corpus - Cuqui Brown, the sloth 789-22-JH This is the case of Cuqui Brown, a sloth kept as a pet by a family in Ecuador. Cuqui Brown was seized by the authorities and transferred to a zoo. Plaintiff filed a Habeas Corpus against the Ministry of the Environment, alleging that Cuqui Brown was a family member, and requested that the court order the authorities to return Cuqui Brown to the plaintiff. In addition, plaintiff alleged that her rights and the rights of Cuqui were violated based on Estrellita's case that granted animals the status of subjects of rights. The court denied the Habeas Corpus, stating that the decision in Estrellita's case does not enable individuals to keep a wild animal or to request that a wild animal be returned to their possession. Instead, the Estrellita case recognizes the rights of wild animals based on aspects like their life, integrity, and their relationship with nature, not on the well-being or attachment of the person who removes them from their habitat to keep them as pets.
32 Pit Bulldogs and Other Property v. County of Prentiss 808 So.2d 971 (Miss. S.C. 2002) While a criminal trial regarding alleged dog-fighting was pending, the Circuit Court, Prentiss County, ordered the humane euthanization of 18 of 34 seized pit bulldogs. The alleged dog owner appealed. The Supreme Court held that allegations the dogs had been trained to fight, could not be rehabilitated as pets, and posed serious threat to other animals and people, related to the "physical condition" of the dogs, as statutory basis for humane euthanization. Affirmed.
253-20-JH/22 The case of Estrellita 253-20-JH/22 This is the unprecedented case of Estrellita, a woolly monkey, and the first animal with the status of subject of rights in Ecuador. Estrellita was illegally taken from her habitat as a baby and sold to a family that kept her as a pet for 18 years. The authorities became aware of Estrellita after an anonymous report stating that the Plaintiff was keeping a wild animal in their home. Estrellita was seized and relocated to a nearby zoo. The owner of Estrellita filed a habeas corpus requesting that Estrellita be returned to her, as she was a family member. Sadly, Estrellita died while under the care of the authorities. Despite the family's heartfelt plea, the court denied the habeas corpus, deciding that the best course of action was to keep Estrellita in the zoo - a decision that ultimately cost her life. The Constitutional Court decided to hear the case because it considered it had questions that needed to be answered. In a 7-2 court ruling, Ecuador's Constitutional Court held that animals are subjects of rights protected by the rights of nature. (In Ecuador, nature has been granted rights under the 2008 Constitution). The court found that both the Plaintiff and the authorities had violated Estrellita's rights to life and integrity by taking her from the wild and, in the government's case, by ignoring her needs when relocating her to the zoo. The court further held that the writ of habeas corpus could be appropriate in animal cases, depending on the circumstances. Another significant outcome of this decision is that the court instructed the Ministry of Environment and the Ombudsman to draft new legislation that materializes the parameters and criteria outlined in its decision. This legislation is essential in creating a legal framework to protect animals and ensure their rights are respected.
Liddle v. Clark 107 N.E.3d 478 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 113 N.E.3d 627 (Ind. 2018) In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
Animal Legal Defense Fund v. United States Department of Agriculture 2017 WL 2352009 (N.D. Cal. May 31, 2017) (unpublished) The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) regularly posted documents about the enforcement activities of the Defendant, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, (“APHIS”). The documents were posted on two online databases. However, APHIS grew concerned that its Privacy Act system was insufficient. Therefore, the USDA blocked public access to the two databases so that it could review and ensure that the documents did not contain private information. However, the Plaintiffs, animal welfare non-profit organizations, asserted that by blocking access to the databases, the USDA breached its obligations under the Freedom of Information Act's (“FOIA”)'s reading-room provision. The Plaintiff’s also asserted that the USDA's decision to block access was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”). Plaintiff's motioned for a mandatory preliminary injunction. The United States District Court, N.D. California denied the Plaintiffs motion and held that the Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their FOIA claim because (1) there is no public remedy for violations of the reading room provision and they have not exhausted administrative remedies. (2) The Plaintiffs are not likely to succeed on their claim under the APA because FOIA provides the Plaintiffs an adequate alternative remedy. The Plaintiffs cannot establish that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction or that the balance of harms weighs in their favor in light of the on-going review and privacy interests asserted by the USDA.
American Bird Conservancy v. Harvey 232 F. Supp. 3d 292 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)

Plaintiff, American Bird Conservancy, is a non-profit organization that was dedicated to the conservation of the Piping Plover (a threatened species) in this case. The individual Plaintiffs, David A. Krauss and Susan Scioli were also members of the organization, who observed Piping Plovers at Jones Beach, in New York State for many years. The Plaintiffs brought an action against Defendant Rose Harvey, the Commissioner of the New York State “Parks Office”. The Plaintiffs asserted that the Commissioner failed to act while members of the public routinely fed, built shelters, and cared for the feral cats on Jones Beach. As the cat colonies flourished, the Piping Plover population decreased due to attacks by the cats. The Plaintiffs contended that by failing to take measures to decrease the feral cat population, the Commissioner was allowing the cats to prey on the Piping Plover, in violation of the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Commissioner moved to dismiss the complaint. The District Court, held that: (1) the affidavit and documentary evidence provided by the Alley Cat Allies (ACA) organization was outside the scope of permissible supporting materials for the motion to dismiss. (2)The Plaintiffs had standing to bring action alleging violation of the Endangered Species Act. The Commissioners motion to dismiss was denied.

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