Pet Damages: Related Cases

Case namesort descending Citation Summary
Liddle v. Clark 107 N.E.3d 478 (Ind. Ct. App.), transfer denied, 113 N.E.3d 627 (Ind. 2018) In November of 2005 DNR issued an emergency rule that authorized park managers to permit individuals to trap racoons during Indiana’s official trapping season which it reissued on an annual basis from 2007 to 2013. Harry Bloom, a security officer at Versailles State Park (VSP) began installing his own lethal traps with the authorization from the park’s manager. The park manager did not keep track of where the traps were placed nor did Bloom post any signs to warn people of the traps due to fear of theft. As a result, Melodie Liddle’s dog, Copper, died in a concealed animal trap in the park. Liddle filed suit against several state officials and asked the court to declare the state-issued emergency rules governing trapping in state parks invalid. The trial court awarded damages to Liddle for the loss of her dog. Liddle appealed the trial court’s ruling on summary judgment limiting the calculation of damages and denying her request for declaratory judgment. On appeal, Liddle claimed that the trial court erred in ruling in favor of DNR for declaratory judgment on the emergency trapping rules and in excluding sentimental value from Liddle’s calculation of damages. The Court concluded that Liddle’s claim for declaratory relief was moot because the 2012 and 2013 versions of the emergency rule were expired and no longer in effect. The Court also concluded that recovery of a pet is limited to fair market-value since animals are considered personal property under Indiana law. The Court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s ruling.
AKERS v. SELLERS 54 N.E.2d 779 (Ind.App.1944)
This Indiana case involves an action in replevin by John W. Akers against his former wife, Stella Sellers. The controversy at issue was ownership and possession of a Boston bull terrier dog. At the time of the divorce decree, the dog was not part of the property division and was instead left at the marriage domicile in custody of the former wife. Appellant-Akers claimed that legal title and the dog's best interests rested with him and unsuccessfully brought a suit in replevin in the lower court. On appeal, this Court held that there was no sufficient evidence to overturn the lower court's determination. The judgment was affirmed.
Alaimo v. Racetrack at Evangeline Downs, Inc. 893 So.2d 190 (3rd Cir., 2005)

A racehorse breeder  and owner brought suit against a racetrack for the loss of future winnings after a racehorse collided with a negligently maintained gate on the racetrack.  The trial court awarded plaintiff $38,000 without specifying what the award was for.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision holding the award was not unreasonable based on the horse's racing history.

Allen v. Camp 70 So. 290 (Ala.App. 1915)

Defendant shot and killed Plaintiff's dog, which had bitten Defendant's daughter several days earlier, for the purpose of sending the dog's head to a laboratory for examination for rabies. The Court of Appeals of Alabama found that Plaintiff's wife's injuries were too remote to be compensable, when the wife was not home at the time of the incident and became excited and hysterical upon hearing of the incident several hours later. The Appeals Court also held that although one may protect himself or his family from injury by a dog or other animal when on his own private property or on public property, the destruction of an animal is wrongful when the danger of attack and subsequent injury by that animal no longer exists, and where the animal is not trespassing.

Altieri v. Nanavati 573 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super., 1990)

This is an action against a veterinarian for negligence, claiming that the defendant performed unwanted sterilization surgery on the plaintiff's dog, a Lhasa Apso.  The court held that there is also a question of fact regarding whether performing an unwanted operation on the dog is, under the circumstances, actionable as reckless conduct.  However, the court observed that, at the time of the trial it is unlikely that the plaintiffs will be able to recover, as an element of damages, any alleged emotional distress they may have experienced as a result of the surgery on their dog.

Altman v. City of High Point 330 F.3d 194 C.A.4 (N.C. 2003)

This case arises out of several shooting incidents in the City of High Point, North Carolina.  In each incident, a High Point animal control officer shot and killed one or more dogs that were running at large in the city. Plaintiffs, the owners of the animals, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officers' actions violated their Fourth Amendment rights.  The Court of Appeals concluded that the dogs at issue in this case do qualify as property protected by the Fourth Amendment and that the officers seized that property. However, because in each instance the seizure involved was reasonable, it concluded that the officers did not violate the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights.

Ammon v. Welty 113 S.W.3d 185 (Ky.App.,2002)

In this Kentucky case, the plaintiffs brought an action against the county dog warden for shooting their dog. Before the statutorily imposed 7-day waiting limit had expired, the warden euthanized the dog by shooting him in the head. The Court of Appeals held that while a family dog can be beloved by a family, loss of the pet does not support an action for loss of consortium. Further, the dog warden was not liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress because his actions did not rise to the outrageous level where the dog was not shot in the presence of the family and there was no evidence that Brewer intended to inflict emotional harm.

Anderson v. State Department of Natural Resources 693 N.W.2d 181 (Minn. 2005)

A paper manufacturing company sprayed pesticides on their tree grove, but accidentally over sprayed killing some of plaintiff's commercial bees.  The commercial beekeeper sued the paper manufacturing company and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the paper company.  The Supreme Court of Minnesota ultimately reversed the grants of summary judgment on the commercial beekeeper's negligence claims and affirmed dismissal of the nuisance claims. 

Animal Hospital of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco 418 N.Y.S.2d 992 (N.Y.Dist.Ct., 1979)

In this New York case, defendant presented his puppy to plaintiff-animal hospital for treatment. After discussions between about the cost of the care, defendant apparently felt that he would not be allowed to retrieve the puppy from the hospital's possession. As a consequence, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant describing the balance owed, and stating that the hospital would retain the puppy for 10 more days after which it would "take care of the dog in accordance with the legal methods available to dispose of abandoned dogs." The issue on appeal is whether this letter qualified as noticed required by the Agriculture and Markets Act, Sec. 331. The court found that it did not comply with the statutory requirements and thus, plaintiff was responsible for defendant's loss of his puppy valued at $200 at trial. Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on its complaint for the costs of care amounting to $309.

Anne Arundel County v. Reeves 252 A.3d 921 (Md., 2021) This Maryland case examines the scope of compensatory damages available forf the tortious injury or death of a pet under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (“CJP”) § 11-110, a law that allow pet owner to recover damages for the tort-based death or injury of their pet up to a capped level. The incident giving rise to this case occurred when Anne Arundel County Police Officer Rodney Price shot Micheal Reeves' dog in the front yard of Mr. Reeves' home. Officer Price was going door-to-door inquiring with residents after a recent spate of burglaries. Mr. Reeves' dog Vern burst from the front storm door and put his paw on the officer's forearm. While Officer Price stepped back and pushed the dog away, he testified that he did not vocalize any commands to the dog at that time, and, instead, decided to shoot the dog. Testimony by a veterinary pathologist at trial revealed that, if the dog were going for the officer's face as Price testified, this would have been improbable based on the dog's size as compared to the officer. Further, there was no dirt on that area of the officer's arm/chest nor any marks from the dog's paws. After a jury trial, a verdict was returned in favor of Mr. Reeves for $10,000 for the trespass to chattel claim, and $500,000 in economic damages and $750,000 in noneconomic damages for the gross negligence claim. The circuit court then reduced the gross negligence damages to $200,000 pursuant to the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). CJP § 5-301 et seq. The circuit court also reduced the trespass to chattel damages to $7,500 pursuant to the then-applicable damages cap in CJP § 11-110.1. The Court of Special Appeals held in an unreported divided decision that the statute did not bar recovery of noneconomic damages. On appeal here, this court now holds that CJP § 11-110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages. And while the court found there was legally sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Officer Price was grossly negligent, it also held that Mr. Reeves could not recover these damages due to Maryland's single recovery rule. As a matter of first impression, this court found CJP § 11-110's plain language evinces an intent to exclude those things not expressed in the statute. In other words, because the legislature defined the specific types of compensatory damages it allows, it intended to exclude other forms of damages like noneconomic damages. Further, the court found the plaintiff's reading of the statute "illogical" because economic damages would be capped, but yet noneconomic damages would not be. Thus, it would be up to the General Assembly to expressly provide for noneconomic damages in amendments to the statute. The court ultimately concluded that the statute defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet and the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals was affirmed in part and reversed in part. The dissent noted the majority decision created a "double anomaly" in Maryland law by capping damages for victims of a tortfeasor who kills their dog but allowing a fraudster who intentionally tricks a family into selling a painting of their dog unlimited damages. Further, the dissent argued the majority ignored both judicial and ethical trends regarding pets in society and disregards the legislative debate when the statute was re-enacted showing an intent to include higher damages amounts.
ANSON v. DWIGHT 18 Iowa 241 (1865)

This case involved the killing of a dog by defendant's minor son. While the issues on appeal were mostly procedural, the court did find that dogs belong to a class of personal property for which a witness can testify as to their value.

Armstrong v. Riggi 549 P.2d 753 (Nev. 1976)

Joe Riggi delivered his two unregistered Pomeranian dogs to the Armstrongs' Poodle Parlor to be bathed and groomed. The dogs died while in the care of the bailee. Riggi commenced this action to recover damages alleging that the dogs were worth more than $10,000. The issue on appeal was whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the state court rule regarding attorney fees. Since the appellate court did in fact determine error, the case was remanded.

Augillard v. Madura 257 S.W.3d 494 (Tex.App.-Austin,2008)

This appeal arises from a suit for conversion filed by Shalanda Augillard alleging that Tiffany Madura and Richard Toro wrongfully exercised dominion and control over Augillard's black cocker spaniel, Jazz, who was recovered from New Orleans in the wake of the Hurricane Katrina. The central issue at trial and the only disputed issue on appeal is whether Augillard's dog, Jazz, and the dog that Madura adopted from New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, Hope, are in fact the same dog. Augillard asserts on appeal that the trial court erred in disregarding conclusive evidence, including forensic DNA analysis, establishing that Hope and Jazz are the same dog.

Balch v. Newberry 208 Okla. 46, 253 P.2d 153, 35 A.L.R.2d 1267, 1953 OK 23

In this Oklahoma case, plaintiff purchased a pointer dog for a payment of $800 cash, whom he purchased for breeding purposes. Plaintiff alleged, that for several years prior to March 24, 1947, defendant was engaged in the business of breeding and selling thoroughbred pointer bird dogs at Tulsa, Oklahoma, and that plaintiff had for many years been engaged in the business of operating kennels. In affirming the judgment for plaintiff, the court held that the purchase of a dog with the knowledge of the seller that it is bought exclusively for breeding purposes gives rise to a warranty of fitness for such purpose where the buyer relies upon the seller's skill and judgment that the dog is fit for such purpose. Where a sale of highly bred stud dog for breeding purposes is rescinded for breach of an implied warranty, because of sterility, the purchaser can recover what he paid under the contract and expenses necessarily incident to caring for the dog but he cannot, in addition, recover damages for the breach of the implied warranty of the dog's usefulness for breeding purposes.

Banasczek v. Kowalski 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 94 (1979)

Edward Banasczek (plaintiff) instituted an action in trespass against William Kowalski (defendant) for money damages resulting from the alleged shooting of two of plaintiff's dogs. The court held the following: “[T]he claim for emotional distress arising out of the malicious destruction of a pet should not be confused with a claim for the sentimental value of a pet, the latter claim being unrecognized in most jurisdictions.   Secondly we do not think, as defendant argues, that the owner of the maliciously destroyed pet must have witnessed the death of his or her pet in order to make a claim for emotional distress.” Pennsylvania has summarily rejected a claim for loss of companionship for the death of a dog.  

BARKING HOUND VILLAGE, LLC., et al. v. MONYAK, et al. 299 Ga. 144, 787 S.E.2d 191 (Ga., 2016) In 2012, Plaintiffs Robert and Elizabeth Monyaks took their dogs Lola and Callie, for ten days to a kennel owned by Defendants Barking Hound Village, LLC (“BHV”) and managed by William Furman. Callie, had been prescribed an anti-inflammatory drug for arthritis pain. However, three days after picking up their dogs from BHV, Lola was diagnosed with acute renal failure and died in March 2013.The Monyaks sued BHV and Furman for damages alleging that while at the kennel Lola was administered toxic doses of the arthritis medication prescribed for Callie. BHV and Furman moved for summary judgment on all the Monyaks' claims asserting that the measure of damages for the death of a dog was capped at the dog's fair market value and the Monyaks failed to prove that Lola had any market value. The Court of Appeals concluded that the proper measure of damages for the loss of a pet is the actual value of the dog to its owners rather than the dog’s fair market value. The court stated that the actual value of the animal could be demonstrated by reasonable veterinary and other expenses incurred by its owners in treating injuries, as well as by other economic factors. However, evidence of non-economic factors demonstrating the dog's intrinsic value to its owners would not be admissible. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed in part and held that the damages recoverable by the owners of an animal negligently killed by another includes both the animal's fair market value at the time of the loss plus interest, and, in addition, any medical and other expenses reasonably incurred in treating the animal. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[t]he value of [a] dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown.” The Supreme Court also affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and found no error in the court's determination that Georgia precedent does not allow for the recovery of damages based on the sentimental value of personal property to its owner.
Barrios v. Safeway Ins. Co. 97 So.3d 1019 (La.App. 4 Cir.,2012)

Louisiana dog owners sued motorist for mental anguish and property damage  after their dog was hit and killed by defendant's car. The lower court awarded damages to each of the dog owners in the total amount of $10,000. The Court upheld that the damages award of $10,000 because the dog was killed as a result of motorist's negligence, the owners were nearby and immediately arrived at scene to find their beloved dog dead, the dog was extremely valuable to owners, who had a close family-like relationship with dog for approximately 12 years, and the loss caused the owners to suffer psychic trauma.

Beaumont v Cahir [2004] ACTSC 97

The appellant landed a hot air balloon in a paddock occupied by a dressage horse belonging to the respondent. The horse was spooked and impaled itself on fencing. The appellant was liable for the cost of reinstating the horse to health and was not permitted to euthanise the horse and find a replacement.

Bedford v. Jorden 698 P.2d 854 (Mont. 1985)

This action was brought by Dale C. Bedford, appellant, on an amended complaint on two counts seeking special damages in the amount of $750, unspecified general damages, and $50,000 in punitive damages against E.E. Jorden, a Billings, Montana veterinarian and his partnership. The first count of complaint alleges that the defendant, Dr. Jorden, willfully or by gross negligence broke, or allowed to be broken a wing of a parrot belonging to the appellant, Bedford. The second count alleges that Dr. Jorden and his business willfully, wantonly or maliciously failed to provide adequate care for the parrot. The court found that the interrogatories and depositions of all witnesses, including the appellant, indicate that there was no evidence produced that would establish a prima facie case of negligence, let alone intentional cruelty or inhumanity to animals.

Berry v. Frazier 307 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778 (2023), as modified on denial of reh'g (May 15, 2023), review denied (Aug. 9, 2023) Ryan Berry sued veterinarian Jeffery R. Frazier for damages related to the euthanasia of her cat. Berry alleged that Frazier performed the euthanasia without her informed consent, using an unnecessary and unjustified intracardiac injection that caused a painful death for her cat and emotional distress for her. In 2019, plaintiff hired "Vetted," a service that provides home euthanasia for pets, to put down their dying cat. Vetted sent Dr. Frazier, who failed to sedate the cat with a catheter and suggested using an intracardiac injection (injecting fluid directly into the heart), claiming it was a quick and painless method. The owners agreed, but later learned that this method is generally considered inhumane and illegal in some circumstances. Plaintiff's first amended complaint (FAC) raised the following: (1) fraud/deceit/intentional misrepresentation (third cause of action); (2) breach of fiduciary duty (fourth cause of action); (3) conversion/trespass to chattels (fifth cause of action); (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (sixth cause of action); and (5) violation of section 3340 (eighth cause of action). The prayer for relief for each cause of action sought nominal damages of $1, restitution of $600 (cost of euthanasia), and punitive damages. The trial court granted Frazier's demurrer and dismissed the causes of action for fraud, conversion, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of Civil Code section 3340. Berry voluntarily dismissed the remaining cause of action, resulting in a final judgment. On the instant appeal, the appellate court looked at the fraud claim finding that the defendant intentionally misled the plaintiff about the method of euthanasia and manipulated her into giving consent for the intracardiac injection, which turned out to be an inhumane and painful procedure. The plaintiff provided specific allegations of the defendant's representations, including statements about the procedure being quick and painless. The court found that the plaintiff's allegations were sufficient to support a claim of fraud, and the defendant's argument that the plaintiff failed to allege legally cognizable damages was rejected. With respect to the conversion/trespass to chattels claim, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, a veterinarian, obtained her consent for euthanizing her cat through fraudulent means. The plaintiff claims that the defendant intentionally misled her about the procedure, resulting in the cat experiencing extreme pain. As to plaintiffs' claims of conversion/trespass to chattels and IIED, the court found that the allegations support these claims, as the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's property rights and caused severe emotional distress. The court disagreed with the trial court's dismissal of these claims and concludes that the demurrer should have been overruled. Finally, on the violation of Section 3340 (the exemplary damages statute), the court agreed with the trial court's ruling that no separate cause of action can be alleged for a violation of Section 3340. The court notes that while the statute provides for exemplary damages, it does not define "wrongful injuries" or indicate an intent to create a separate cause of action. While there is no independent cause of action under Section 3340, it can serve as a basis for seeking exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action so the plaintiff should have pleaded the request for Section 3340, providing sufficient facts to support the allegation of willful and inhumane conduct. The court remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to file a second amended complaint to include the request for Section 3340 exemplary damages in connection with other causes of action. Notably, the court rejected the defendant's argument that Section 3340 does not apply to veterinarians or that the plaintiff's claim only involves professional negligence. Section 3340 is broadly worded and can apply to any defendant, including veterinarians, for willful or grossly negligent conduct causing wrongful injuries to animals. The court found no basis to exclude veterinarians from the statute's coverage and notes that the defendant's argument is unsupported by relevant case law. The court has dismissed the appeals from the October 7, 2021 demurrer order, the October 7, 2021 motion to strike order, and the October 26, 2021 order dismissing the fourth cause of action without prejudice. The court has also reversed the judgment of dismissal and sent the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court was directed to vacate the dismissal of the first amended complaint and modify the demurrer order. The plaintiff is allowed to file a second amended complaint, and the defendant is allowed to file a demurrer and motion to strike to any new amended pleading.
BREEDLOVE v. HARDY 110 S.E. 358 (Va. 1922)

This Virginia case concerned the shooting of plaintiff's companion animal where defendant alleged that the dog was worrying his livestock. The court reversed judgment for defendant, finding that defendant’s act of killing dog while not engaged in the act of “worrying the livestock,” was not authorized within the statute.

Brent v. Kimball 60 Ill. 211 (1871)

This was an action of trespass, brought by appellant against appellee, for the alleged wrongful killing, by the latter, of appellant's dog. Plaintiff sought recovery for his dog that was shot and killed when it entered into defendant/neighbor’s backyard. The Court held that the plaintiff could recover at least nominal damages, regardless of the fact that the animal had no actual market value.

Brinton v. Codoni Not Reported in P.3d, 2009 WL 297006 (Wash.App. Div. 1,2009)

This unpublished Washington case stems from an attack on plaintiff's dog by a neighbor's dog. Plaintiff sued for damages, alleging negligence and nuisance. The trial court ruled on partial summary judgment that the plaintiff's damages were limited, as a matter of law, to the dog's fair market value. The plaintiff argued that she was entitled to damages based on the dog's intrinsic value (i.e., utility and service and not sentimental attachment) and her emotional distress. On appeal, this court held that since the plaintiff failed to carry her burden of showing that her dog had no fair market value, the trial court properly limited damages to that value. Further, because the plaintiff's nuisance claims were grounded in negligence, she was not entitled to damages beyond those awarded for her negligence claim.

Brisson v. These Guys New York Deli Corp. Not Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2023 WL 370990 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 20, 2023) The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted.
Brousseau v. Rosenthal 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 1980)

This small claims action presents the question of how to make plaintiff whole in dollars for the defendant bailee's (a boarding kennel) negligence in causing the death of plaintiff's dog.  While the dog was a gift and a mixed breed and thus had no ascertainable market value, the court contravened common law principles and assessed the dog's actual value to the owner in order to make the owner whole.  While resisting the temptation to romanticize the virtues of a "human's best friend," the court stated it would be wrong not to acknowledge the companionship and protection that Ms. Brousseau lost with the death of her canine companion of eight years.

Brown v. Crocker 139 So.2d 779 (La. 1962)

This action in tort was instituted by plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of his minor son, against the defendant to recover the value of a quarter-horse mare and a stillborn colt, and for damages occasioned by shock and mental anguish suffered by the son, as well as for services of a veterinarian and medicines used in treatment of the mare following her wounding by a shotgun blast intentionally inflicted by the defendant. The Court of Appeal in upheld an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish experienced by the child who could not stop crying about the loss of his horse and the colt that never was. As the court stated, "Under the facts and circumstances, an award of $250 for shock and mental anguish suffered by the minor would, in our opinion, do justice between the parties."

Brown v. Faircloth 66 So.2d 232 (Fla. 1953)

In this Florida case, the defendant appealed from an adverse judgment involving the sale of a bird dog. The complaint alleged that the defendant was a professional bird dog trainer and field trial handler and as such knew the qualifications necessary for a dog to have in order to compete successfully on the major field trial circuit. Plaintiff claimed that, in order to induce the plaintiff to purchase a bird dog then owned by the defendant, defendant falsely represented and warranted that the dog was of such quality and was, as is generally known in field trial parlance, a 'three-hour dog.' After plaintiff had the dog for a short time, the plaintiff found that the warranty as to soundness was not true but that the dog was infected with heart worms at the time of sale and was not a 'three-hour dog.' Thereupon the plaintiff sought to rescind the contract by returning the dog and demanding back the purchase price of which defendant refused. On appeal, defendant contended that the jury instructions failed to inform the jurors that where the sale of an animal for a particular purpose is involved, there can be no recovery for the breach of an implied warranty unless it is shown by the buyer that he or she made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the animal was being purchased and relied on the seller's skill and judgment. The Supreme Court noted that this case was not bottomed upon that theory, but upon the theory that the defendant expressly warranted the dog to be a 'three-hour dog.' This express warranty carried with it the implied warranties that the animal was sound physically, was finished in his training, and was capable of running three-hour races. In other words, the Court was of the opinion that the express warranties defined by the Court in the charge to the Jury embraced and included any defined, implied warranty.

BROWN v. TOWN OF SOUTHBURY 53 Conn. 212, 1 A. 819 (1885)

This Connecticut decision in 1885 held consequential losses as a result of the harm to an animal (a horse) to be a proper element of damages in addition to the fair market value of the animal. Specifically, the court applied fair market value, but disallowed consequential damages for lost profits where plaintiff failed to show an effort to mitigate such damages.

Bueckner v. Hamel 886 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. App. 1994).

Texas law allows persons to kill without liability dogs that are attacking domestic animals. However, the attack must be in progress, imminent, or recent. This defense does not apply to the killing of dogs that were chasing deer or non-domestic animals.

Burgess v. Shampooch Pet Industries, Inc. 131 P.3d 1248 (Kan.App., 2006)

This Kansas case presents an issue of first impression as to the proper measure of damages recoverable for injury to a pet dog.  The plaintiff's dog, a 13-year old dog of negligible market value, suffered a dislocated hip after being groomed at defendant's establishment.  The appellate court found the lower court's award of damages based on the veterinary bills was proper where the bills were not disputed and represented an easily ascertainable measure.  Specifically, the court held that  when an injured pet dog with no discernable market value is restored to its previous health, the measure of damages may include, but is not limited to, the reasonable and customary cost of necessary veterinary care and treatment. The court was unconvinced by defendant's "hyperbolic" claim that such an award would lead to a floodgate of high-dollar litigation on behalf of animals with low market values.

Burgess v. Taylor 44 S.W.3d 806 (Ky. 2001)

Owner of pet horses sued boarders of horses who sold them for slaughter, asserting tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress.  The Court held that: (1) element of tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, requiring outrageous and intolerable conduct depends on conduct of wrongdoer, not subject of conduct; (2) boarders' actions constituted tort of outrage; and (3) award of $50,000 compensatory damages and $75,000 punitive damages was not excessive.

BURLINGTON & M.R.R.R. IN NEBRASKA v. CAMPBELL 59 P. 424 (Colo.App. 1899)

In Burlington & M.R.R.R. in Nebraska v. Cambell , 14 Colo. App. 141 (Colo. Ct. App. 1899), plaintiff’s horse was killed by a train. Although the court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff for failure to prove defendant’s negligence, the court allowed witness testimony on the market value of the mare.

C., M. M. M. s/ Denuncia Maltrato Animal; seguidos contra E. P. S., D.N.I. N° X- Causa Tita Fallo 481/2021 This court decision has two important aspects, where the judge recognizes families as multispecies, and non-human animals as sentient beings and subjects of rights. The facts of this case arose from a fatal encounter between the police officer and "Tita," a Pitbull-mix family dog, in March 2020 in the Province of Chubut in Argentina. "Tita" attacked an on-duty police officer, and, when Tita was walking away, the officer shot her in front of her family. The injury was so severe that Tita had to ultimately be put down. The judge, in this case, found that Tita was a non-human person and a daughter to her human family, as she and other companion animals had adapted so well to the family life, that it had turned the family into a multispecies one. Therefore, the loss of Tita was an irreparable one. The judge further stated that in today's world animals are not "things," they are sentient beings and they have the right that their life is respected. The holding of the court was also based on the case of Sandra, the orangutan, and the Universal declaration of animal rights. The police officer was sentenced to one year of suspended imprisonment, professional disqualification for two years, and to pay the attorney and court fees for the crimes of abuse of authority and damages. However, he was acquitted of the animal cruelty charges. Update: In September 2022, the Chubut's criminal chamber of the Superior Court of Justice (the highest tribunal in the province) heard the case on appeal. The court affirmed the verdict of the Trelew’s criminal chamber that set aside the guilty verdict entered against the police officer. The highest tribunal found that, at the incident, Tita was unleashed and unmuzzled. Also, she was aggressive toward the officer, barking and charging at him before he shot her. The tribunal concluded that the officer found himself in imminent danger, which justified his actions, and therefore, he was not guilty as he acted to defend himself. The tribunal found that Sandra's case and the Universal declaration of animal rights did not apply to Tita's case because there were circumstances in which it is necessary to end the life of an animal, and Sandra’s case was brought up as a habeas corpus on behalf of a hominid primate. The recognition of “subject of rights” was granted to Sandra based on the genetic similarity of her species to humans, which is 97%, as opposed to canines’ which is only 75%. It is important to note that the tribunal did not say anything in regard to the status of Tita as a member of her multispecies family.
Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station 632 P.2d 1066 (Hawaii, 1981)

The plaintiffs' dog died after being left in a hot van during transport from the Hawaii Quarantine Station to the veterinarian's office.  The court held that it was not necessary for plaintiffs to witness the dog's death to recover for serious mental distress and that medical testimony was not necessary to substantiate plaintiffs' claims of emotional distress.  In affirming the trial court's award for damages for the loss of property (the dog), the court held that the trial "court correctly applied the standards of law . . . and the issues of whether the damages were proximately caused by the defendant and have resulted in serious emotional distress to the plaintiffs are therefore within the discretion of the trier of fact."

Carbasho v. Musulin 618 S.E.2d 368 (W. Va. 2005)

Owner's dog was killed by a negligently driven car.  The owner sued to recover damages for loss of companionship.  The court held that dogs are personal property and damages for sentimental value, mental suffering, and emotional distress are not recoverable.

Cardenas v. Swanson 531 P.3d 917 (Wyo., 2023) The Cardenas family (Appellants) owned three St. Bernard dogs. Appellants lived on a home adjacent to large tracts of state land, and would allow the dogs to roam the land unleashed, but the dogs would return each night. One afternoon, the dogs were let outside to run, but one dog did not return. Appellants found the dog caught in a snare, where it died from a broken neck. Appellants attempted to free the dog from the snare, and one of the Cardenas children was injured in the process. While appellants were attempting to free their dog from the snare, the other two dogs were also caught in snares, and died from their injuries. Appellants filed suit against the trapper who set the snares (Appellee), asserting claims of negligence, willful and wanton misconduct, violation of statutes, infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights violations. Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted and denied in part, finding that appellee’s conduct was not willful and wanton and that appellants could not recover emotional damages for the loss of the dogs. On appeal, the court considered: (1) whether the members of the Cardenas family can recover damages for emotional injuries for the loss of their dogs, and (2) whether this court should allow the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of a pet. The court held that (1) emotional injuries for the loss of property are not recoverable, under this court’s precedent emotional damages are only recoverable for certain limited situations. Dogs are considered personal property under state law, and damage to personal property is not one of the situations in which emotional damages are recoverable. Next, the court held that (2) it would not create a precedent to allow people to recover emotional distress damages when animate personal property is harmed, as that change would be best suited for the legislature to make. The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court and dismissed the case.
Carroll v. Cnty. of Monroe 712 F.3d 649 (2d Cir. 2013) The Plaintiff-Appellant appeals a decision/order by the lower court to deny her motion to set aside the jury verdict or grant a new trial. At the original trial, a jury found plaintiff failed to prove her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim that the shooting of her dog during the execution of a search warrant was an unconstitutional seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff's dog was shot during a "no-knock" search warrant at plaintiff's residence, but the warrant team was aware that a dog would be present during the search. On appeal, this court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial because she failed to provide any “legally sufficient evidentiary basis” to show that the jury would find in her favor. The court believed that it was unlikely that a jury would find in her favor because of the fact that the dog was killed during a “no-knock” search of the home and the dog “quickly and aggressively” ran towards the police officer after he entered the home. Although the court agreed that the officers should have advised a plan to deal with the dog in a non-lethal way, it maintained that a jury would unlikely find that the officer’s use of force was unreasonable given the circumstances of this case. Affirmed.
Carroll v. Rock 469 S.E.2d 391 (Ga. App., 1996)

After plaintiff's cat escaped while at the defendant's animal hospital, Rock sued Dr. Carroll d/b/a The Animal Care Clinic for conversion or breach of bailment and emotional distress, seeking punitive damages and attorney fees.  The court agreed with Carroll that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on punitive and vindictive damages, as vindictive or punitive damages are recoverable only when a defendant acts maliciously, wilfully, or with a wanton disregard of the rights of others.  Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim also must fail because defendant's conduct was not outrageous or egregious. 

Cavallini v. Pet City and Supply 848 A.2d 1002 (Pa. 2004)

Appellant, Pet City and Supplies, Inc. appealed from the judgment in the amount of $1,638.52 entered in favor of Appellee, Christopher A. Cavallini following a bench trial. The trial court determined that Cavallini was entitled to damages due to Pet City's violations of the Dog Purchaser Protection provisions of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Cavallini purchased a Yorkshire terrier puppy from Pet City that was represented as a pure bred. After several attempts, Pet City failed to supply Cavallini with the requisite registration papers. On appeal, Pet City contended that the trial court erred as a matter of law by determining a private action can be brought under the Dog provisions of the UTPCPL, and erred as a matter of law by imposing a civil penalty against Pet City under the UPTCPL. In finding that the statute does provide a private cause of action, the court looked to the purpose of the statute rather than the plain language. However, the court found the inclusion of a civil penalty in the part that allows a private action was inconsistent with the statute.

CHAPMAN v. DECROW 93 Me. 378, 45 A. 295 (1899)

In this Maine case, the defendant was found liable for trespass after he killed the plaintiff's dog. Defendant asserted that the dog was trespassing on his premises, and was “then, or had been immediately before the shooting, engaged, with two other dogs, in chasing and worrying his domesticated animals, to wit, tame rabbits." As a result, he claimed that the killing was justified. This court first disagreed with defendant's claim that an unlicensed dog is not property because it constitutes a nuisance.  This court found that, by the common law, a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie.  Moreover, the statute to which defendant claims authority to kill an unlicensed dog only allows a constable to do so after a proscribed lapse.

Citizens' Rapid-Transit Co. v. Dew 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn.1898)

This is an action for negligently injuring and killing a dog by the driver of a streetcar. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that since large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and since they are regarded as companions to many in society, they now have "a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." Thus, the owner of a dog has property rights in that dog to maintain an action at law. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the killing of Dew's dog, that his death could have been prevented by the exercise of proper care and diligence.

CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW 45 S.W. 790 (Tenn. 1898)

In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law."

City of Garland v. White 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).

Police officers were trespassers and could be held civilly liable for damages when they entered a dog owner's property with the intent to unlawfully kill the dog. Reports had been made that the dog was attacking other animals but because the attacks were not imminent, in progress, or recent, the killing of the dog was not lawful.

COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WOOLFOLK 58 S.E. 152 (Ga.1907)
In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph that alleged the value of the dog to be $200. Defendant argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because dogs have no market value. The court disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found a "better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: “The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Epifania 951 N.E.2d 723 (Mass.App.Ct.,2011)

Defendant appealed his conviction of arson for setting fire to a dwelling house, and wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. The Appeals Court held that testimony that the cat belonged to the victim was sufficient to support a conviction of wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person.

COMMONWEALTH v. MASSINI 188 A.2d 816 (Pa.Super 1963)

In this Pennsylvania case, defendant was prosecuted for killing a cat that belonged to his neighbor. The section under which he was prosecuted prohibited the killing of a 'domestic animal of another person.' However, a cat was not one of the animals defined as a ‘domestic animal’ by the Act. Using rules of statutory interpretation, the court found that the omission of 'cat' from the listed species of the penal code provision was intentional by the legislature, and thus the defendant's sentence was discharged.

Connor v. Bogrett 596 P.2d 683 (Wyo., 1979)

This Wyoming case concerns the application of the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in Wyoming (ss 34-21-201 through 34-21-299.5, W.S.1977) to a sale of a registered Black Labrador retriever which was intended for competition in field trials. More specifically the question is whether the continued physical ability of this retriever, as a matter of law, was precluded from becoming part of the basis for the bargain of the parties. The court agreed with the district court in this instance that, as a matter of law, the expressions of the seller relative to the potential of this retriever were only expressions of opinion or commendation and not an express warranty.

Corso v. Crawford Dog and Cat Hospital, Inc. 415 N.Y.S.2d (182 N.Y.City Civ.Ct., 1979)

Plaintiff sued for mental suffering after she discovered a dead cat in the casket that was meant for her dead dog in an elaborate funeral for the dog.  In ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to damages beyond market value for this actionable tort, the court found that plaintiff Ms. Corso did suffer shock, mental anguish and despondency due to the wrongful destruction and loss of the dog's body.  The court specifically distinguished a pet from other sentimental inanimate objects as they are not capable of returning love and affection.

Crump v Equine Nutrition Systems Pty Ltd t/as Horsepower [2006] NSWSC 512

The plaintiffs claimed that they purchased horse feed from the first respondent and that the feed was contaminated with monensin. The second respondent manufactured the feed. They claimed that as a result, one of their horses died and five others were permanently injured so that they could not be used for the desired purpose. After addressing several factual issues, the trial judge found for the plaintiffs in regards to the issue of negligence by the second respondent and proceeded to assess damages with regard to the economic value of the horses to the plaintiffs, the cost of replacement, loss of profits and maintenance.

Daughen v. Fox 539 A.2d 858 (Pa. Super. 1988)

Plaintiffs brought a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and loss of companionship after defendant animal hospital performed unnecessary surgery based on a mix-up of x-rays.  The court denied the first claim, finding the defendant's conduct did not meet the "extreme and outrageous" conduct test.  With regard to plaintiff's claim for loss of a unique chattel and for loss of the dog's companionship and comfort, the court observed that, under Pennsylvania law, a dog is personal property, and, under no circumstances under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be recovery for loss of companionship due to the death of an animal.  

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