Dogs: Related Cases
Case name |
Citation | Summary |
|---|---|---|
| People v. Iehl | 299 N.W.2d 46 (Mich. 1980) |
Defendant appealed his conviction for killing another person's dog. On appeal, defendant contended that the term "beast" provided by the anti-cruelty statue did not encompass dogs. The court disagreed, finding the statute at issue covered dogs despite its failure to explicitly list "dogs" as did a similar statute. |
| People v. Jornov | 65 A.D.3d 363, 881 N.Y.S.2d 776 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept.,2009) |
This New York case stems from an attack on Philip Mueller and his dog by Defendant-Appellant Jornov's "two pit bull-terrier mixed breed dogs.” During proceedings in City Court, the court determined that defendant's dogs were dangerous dogs and directed that they be euthanized. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fourth Department, affirmed the finding that the dogs were dangerous under Agriculture and Markets Law § 121 and Agriculture and Markets Law § 350[5] because there was clear and convincing evidence that the dogs attacked a companion animal and behaved in a manner that a reasonable person would believe posed a serious and imminent threat of serious physical injury or death. However, under the amended version of the statute, a judge or justice may not automatically direct humane euthanasia or permanent confinement of a dangerous dog where none of the aggravating circumstances are present. |
| People v. Land | 955 N.E.2d 538 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2011) |
In 2009, Jenell Land was found guilty by jury of aggravated cruelty to a companion animal, a Class 4 felony under Illinois’ Humane Care for Animals Act. Specifically, Land placed a towing chain around the neck of her pit bull, which caused a large, gaping hole to form in the dog’s neck (the dog was later euthanized). The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the defendant’s conviction and, in so doing, rejected each of Land’s four substantive arguments on appeal. Among the arguments raised, the appellate court found that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that the State had to prove a specific intent by Land to injure her dog did not rise to the level of "plain error." |
| People v. Larson | 885 N.E.2d 363 (Ill.App. 2008) | In December 2005, defendant Alan J. Larson was found guilty of possession of a firearm without a firearm owner's identification card and committing aggravated cruelty to an animal when he shot and killed the Larsons’ family dog Sinai in October 2004. Evidence included conflicting testimony among family members as to the disposition of the dog and whether he had a history of biting people, and a veterinarian who concluded that a gunshot to the brain was a conditionally acceptable method of euthanasia. Defendant appealed his conviction on the grounds that the aggravated-cruelty-to-an-animal statute was unconstitutionally vague because it fails to address how an owner could legally euthanize their own animal. The appellate court rejected this argument and affirmed defendant’s conviction. |
| People v. Lee (Unpublished) | 2004 WL 2914207 (Mich. App.) (Unpublished) |
Known and suspected dogfighters, Roderick Lee, Shedrick Lee, and Demar Garvin were jointly tried before a single jury for drug-related offenses. The jury convicted each defendant of conspiracy to deliver or possess with intent to deliver 650 or more grams of a controlled substance. The trial court sentenced each defendant to a prison term of 30 to 60 years. Defendants appealed on equal protection grounds, on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel, on grounds of insufficient evidence and of improper admission of prejudicial and/or irrelevant evidence, on grounds of improper jury instruction, and further argued that they were entitled to resentencing. The appellate court confirmed the convictions and sentences. |
| People v. Lewis | 23 Misc.3d 49, 881 N.Y.S.2d 586 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2009) | Defendants were charged in separate informations with multiple counts of injuring animals and failure to provide adequate sustenance. Plaintiff, the People of the State of New York, appealed the lower court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to suppress evidence obtained when a special agent of the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals approached one of the defendants at his home upon an anonymous tip and inquired about the condition of the animals and asked the defendant to bring the animals outside for inspection, while the incident was videotaped by a film crew for a cable television show. The Supreme Court, Appellate Term, 2nd and 11th, 13 Judicial Districts reversed the lower court’s decision, finding that Plaintiff met its burden of establishing that the defendant voluntarily consented to the search based on the fact that the defendant was not in custody or under arrest at the time of the search, was not threatened by the special agent, and there was no misrepresentation, deception or trickery on the special agent’s part. |
| People v. McCree | 2002 WL 276134 (Cal. 2002) |
Defendant was convicted, after a jury trial, of eight counts of possession and training of a
fighting dog and two counts of causing a dogfight
for gain. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeal, held that: (1) prosecutor's cross-examination of defense witness was proper; (2) prosecutor's closing arguments were proper; and (3) evidence supported the convictions.
|
| People v. McKnight | 302 N.W.2d 241 (Mich. 1980) |
Defendant was convicted of willfully and maliciously killing animals for kicking a dog to death. Defendant argued on appeal that dogs were not included under the statute punishing the willful and malicious killing of horses, cattle, or other beasts of another. The court found that the term "other beasts" includes dogs. Further, defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding of the requisite willful and malicious intent to kill the dog. The court disagreed and held that inferences from the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to support a finding of malicious intent. The court affirmed his convictions. |
| People v. Meadows | 54 Misc. 3d 697, 46 N.Y.S.3d 843 (N.Y. City Ct. 2016), rev'd, No. 17-AP-002, 2017 WL 4367065 (N.Y. Co. Ct. Aug. 3, 2017) |
Defendant Amber Meadows allegedly neglected to provide dogs Athena, Buddy, and Meeko, with air, food, and water, and confined them in a bedroom where feces was found on the floor and furniture. Meadows was prosecuted for three counts of the unclassified misdemeanor of failure to provide proper food and drink to an impounded animal in violation of § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law (AML). Meadows moved to dismiss the Information as facially insufficient and stated that the Supporting Deposition indicated that the dogs were “in good condition.” The People of the State of New York argued that the allegations in both the Information and Deposition, taken together, provide a sufficient basis to establish the elements of the crime. The Canandaigua City Court, Ontario County, held that: (1) “impounded” as stated in § 356 of the Agriculture and Markets Law does not apply to individual persons, and (2) even if the statute applied to individual persons, the allegations in the Information were not facially sufficient. The court reasoned § 356 does not apply to individual persons, but instead applies only to “pounds” operated by not-for-profit organizations, or kennels where animals are confined for hire. The court also stated that even if § 356 were to apply to individuals, under no construction of the facts here could the charge be sustained, as it appeared that the animals were properly cared for in the Defendant's apartment up to the point where she was forcibly detained. The conditions observed by law enforcement authorities on the date alleged in the Information were apparently several days after Meadow's incarceration and after which she was unsuccessful in securing assistance for the dogs while incarcerated. The Information was dismissed with prejudice, and the People's application for leave to file an amended or superseding Information was denied. |
| People v. Minutolo | 215 A.D.3d 1260, 188 N.Y.S.3d 297 (2023) | Defendant appealed from a judgment convicting him of animal cruelty in violation of New York Agriculture and Markets Law § 353. The conviction stemmed from defendant's action in repeatedly striking one of his dogs out of "frustration" after the dog failed to come when called. On appeal, defendant called into question the authentication of surveillance video from a nearby gas station showing him striking the dog. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division found the portion of surveillance video showing defendant repeatedly striking one of his dogs was sufficiently authenticated. Further, other evidence established that he "cruelly beat" the dog by punching the dog with a closed fist three to five times. Finally, defendant's challenge to the penalty imposed under Agriculture and Markets Law § 374 (8)(c) (the possession ban provision) that prohibits defendant from owning or otherwise having custody of any other animals for 10 years was rejected by the court. The judgment was unanimously affirmed. |
| People v. Panetta | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 2018 WL 6627442, 2018 N.Y. Slip Op. 28404 (N.Y. App. Term. Dec. 13, 2018) | Defendant was convicted of animal cruelty, inadequate shelter, and failing to seek veterinary care for her numerous dogs. After an initial seizure of two dogs, defendant was served with a notice to comply with care and sheltering of her remaining dogs. Following inspections about a month later, inspectors found that defendant had failed to comply with this order, and dogs suffering from broken bones and other injuries (including one dog with "a large tumor hanging from its mammary gland area") were seized and subsequently euthanized. As a result, defendant was arrested and charged with 11 violations of Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 and local code violations. Defendant then moved to suppress the physical evidence and statements taken during the initial warrantless entry onto her property and the evidence obtained after that during the execution of subsequent search warrants, arguing that the initial warrantless entry tainted the evidence thereafter. At the suppression hearing, a building contractor who had visited defendant's residence testified that he contacted the Office for the Aging because he had concerns for defendant. An official at the Office for the Aging also testified that the contractor told her that he observed 6 dogs in the home and about 50-100 dogs in outdoor cages. The investigating officer who ultimately visited defendant's property reported that there were nearly 100 dogs living in "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property. Upon encountering defendant that day, the officer testified that defendant demanded a search warrant for further investigation (which the officer obtained and executed later that day). Following this hearing, the City Court held that while the officer's entry violated defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy, his actions were justified under the emergency exception warrant requirement and, thus, denied defendant's motion to suppress. On appeal here, defendant argues that the prosecution failed to establish the officer had reasonable grounds to believe there was an immediate need to protect life or property and that all the evidence obtained thereafter should have been suppressed. Relying on previous holdings that allow the emergency exception in cases where animals are in imminent danger of health or need of protection, this court found that the prosecution failed to establish the applicability of the emergency doctrine. In particular, the court was troubled by the fact that, on the first visit, the officers crossed a chain fence that was posted with a no trespassing sign (although they testified they did not see the sign). Because the officers only knew that there were "unhealthy conditions" on defendant's property in a house that the contractor testified that he thought should be "condemned," this did not support a conclusion of a "substantial threat of imminent danger" to defendant or her dogs. While in hindsight there was an emergency with respect to the dogs, the court "cannot retroactively apply subsequently obtained facts to justify the officers' initial entry onto defendant's property." As a result, the court remitted the matter to the City Court for a determination of whether the seizures of evidence after the initial illegal entry occurred under facts that were sufficiently distinguishable from the illegal entry so to have purged the original taint. |
| People v. Parker (Unpublished) | 1999 WL 33435342 (Unpublished Mich. 1999) |
Defendants-appellees, who were bound over on the charge of knowingly attending an animal fight and of knowingly organizing, promoting, or collecting money for the fighting of an animal, filed a motion to suppress evidence and motions to quash the information. The trial court granted the motions and dismissed the case. The prosecution appealed and the appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence to create an issue of fact, and that evidence that had been obtained in violation of defendant Parker's Fourth Amendment rights was admissible against all defendants except Parker. Finally, as to the defendants' challenge that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, the court declared that it had already determined that the language was neither vague nor overbroad. Reversed and remanded for trial. |
| People v. Restifo | --- N.Y.S.3d ----, 220 A.D.3d 1113, 2023 WL 7028284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2023) | This is an appeal of a verdict to convict defendant of aggravated cruelty to animals. Defendant was walking his two pit bull dogs and allowed the dogs enough leash space to reach a pet cat resting on the steps of its owner’s porch. The cat’s owners, who were witnesses to this event, watched as the pit bulls mauled their pet cat. When the witnesses asked defendant to stop his dogs, defendant attempted to flee with his dogs still carrying the cat’s body in its mouth. The witnesses pursued and eventually, the dog dropped the deceased cat’s body. Defendant was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals and overdriving, torturing and injuring animals, and failure to provide proper sustenance. Defendant was convicted, and appealed the aggravated animal cruelty charge. Defendant argues that the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence. The court here found that defendant was well aware that the dogs were aggressive, even keeping them separate from his young son because of their propensity to attack smaller animals. There was also testimony from another neighbor of defendant allowing his dogs to chase feral cats off her porch without stopping them, and testimony regarding defendant’s dog previously mauling a smaller dog without defendant intervening to stop them. Defendant was warned by animal control to muzzle them, but refused to do so. Defendant also bragged to co-workers about how he let his pit bulls go after other dogs and attack wild and old animals. Accordingly, the court found that defendant was aware of the dogs’ aggressive behavior and affirmed the holding of the lower court. |
| People v. Richardson | 155 A.D.3d 1595, 66 N.Y.S.3d 757 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017), leave to appeal denied, 30 N.Y.3d 1119 (2018) | In this New York case, defendant appeals from a three-county felony animal fighting conviction. Defendant's dog fighting activities came to light when police were dispatched to defendant's residence after defendant's wife reported a burglary in progress. Upon entry by consent, police found, in plain view, a wounded dog in a cage, several modified treadmills for use by dogs, blood on a water heater, and apparent dogfighting paraphernalia. After seeking a search warrant, the items were photographed and other evidence (supplements, training sticks, etc.) was collected. On appeal, the court rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress all of the physical evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree. The court noted that the dogfighting paraphernalia were observed in plain view by responding policy officers. Additionally, police officers remaining at the house after the protective sweep to prevent the destruction of evidence while the search warrant was issued did not render the search unlawful. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish that defendant intended to engage in dogfighting and that the dogs were deprived of medical treatment. In addition to the paraphernalia and collection of literature on dogfighting, defendant's dogs had extensive scarring and healing consistent with dogfighting and inconsistent with defendant's proffered "cat-scratch" and "broken window" explanations. Defendant's convictions and judgment of sentence were affirmed. |
| People v. Robards | 97 N.E.3d 600 (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 12, 2018) | This case is an appeal from an animal cruelty conviction against defendant Ms. Regina Robards. She seeks appeal on the grounds that the State failed to prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Robards was charged with aggravated animal cruelty when her two dogs, Walker and Sparky, were discovered in her previous home emaciated, dehydrated, and dead. She had moved out of the home and into Ms. Joachim’s home in July 2014, telling Joachim that she was arranging for the dogs to be taken care of. However, when Joachim went over to the prior home in November 2014, she discovered Walker’s emaciated body on the living room floor. She called the police, who discovered Sparky’s body in a garbage bag in the bedroom. Robards’ conviction required that it was proven beyond a reasonable doubt that she intentionally committed an act that caused serious injury or death to her two dogs, and failing to seek adequate medical care for them. On appeal, Robards concedes that the dogs both died from dehydration and starvation, and that she was the only person responsible for the dogs’ care. However, she argues that for her conviction to stand, the prosecutor must prove that she intended to cause serious injury or death to the dogs. The court disagrees, stating that for conviction only the act need be intentional, and that the act caused the death or serious injury of an animal. Notably, the court observed that "defendant is very fortunate to have only received a sentence of 12 months' probation for these heinous crimes," and criticized the circuit court for its "unjustly and inexplicably lenient" sentence simply because defendant only caused harm to an animal and not a human being. |
| People v. Rogers | 708 N.Y.S.2d 795 (N.Y. 2000) | Defendant was convicted following jury trial in the Criminal Court of the City of New York of abandonment of animals. On appeal, the Supreme Court, Appellate Term, held that the warrantless entry into pet shop was justified under emergency doctrine and sufficient evidence supported his convictions. |
| People v. Romano | 908 N.Y.S.2d 520 (N.Y.Sup.App.Term,2010) |
Defendant appealed a conviction of animal cruelty under Agriculture and Markets Law § 353 for failing to groom the dog for a prolonged period of time and failing to seek medical care for it. Defendant argued that the term “unjustifiably injures” in the statute was unconstitutionally vague, but the Court held the term was not because a person could readily comprehend that he or she must refrain from causing unjustifiable injury to a domestic pet by failing to groom it for several months and seeking medical care when clear, objective signs are present that the animal needs such care. |
| People v. Sanchez | 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 437 (Cal. App. 2001) |
Defendant on appeal challenges six counts of animal cruelty. The court affirmed five counts which were based on a continuing course of conduct and reversed one count that was based upon evidence of two discrete criminal events. |
| People v. Schneider | 2004 WL 2191322 (Ca. App. 3 Dist.) |
Defendant's dogs escaped from Defendant's yard and attacked and killed a six-year-old boy. The trial court convicted Defendant of owning a mischievous animal that causes death and involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the trial court's conviction for owning a mischievous animal that causes death due to erroneous jury instructions. |
| People v. Smalling | --- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2019 WL 2400413 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. May 30, 2019) | Defendant was cited for allowing a dog controlled or owned by her to cause injury or death to a service dog in violation of California’s Penal Code. The offense was an infraction. The defendant pled no contest and was fined $157. The service dog’s owner requested a restitution hearing, but the trial court denied the request stating that since the offense was an infraction, a restitution hearing was not permissible. The service dog owner appealed the decision of the trial court. The Court ultimately found that the trial court incorrectly stated that a victim of an infraction is not entitled to restitution. Both the California Constitution and the California Penal Code (the very statute that the Defendant was convicted of violating) entitle the victim to restitution. The California Constitution specifically states that restitution shall be ordered in every case regardless of the sentence or disposition of a crime in which a victim suffers a loss. The Court stated that an infraction is a crime, therefore, a restitution hearing is mandatory. The statute that the Defendant violated (section 600.2 of California’s Penal Code) also stated that a defendant shall be ordered to make restitution. The trial court abused its discretion in erroneously concluding that a crime victim is not entitled to restitution if the offense committed is an infraction and ultimately denying the victim restitution. The Defendant argued that an order for payment of restitution would be improper because she was never advised that victim restitution would be a consequence of her plea and that such an order would violate her plea agreement. She also argued that the trial court found, in good faith, that restitution was unnecessary. The Court, however, found the Defendant’s arguments unpersuasive. The Court reversed the order denying victim restitution and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to conduct a restitution hearing. |
| People v. Strobridge | 339 N.W.2d 531 (Mich.App.,1983) |
In this Michigan case, the defendant appealed his conviction of keeping more than three dogs on his premises without a kennel license in violation of Grandville ordinances, § 21, No. 159-A. On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court improperly denied his “nonconforming use” defense; that is, he claimed the ordinance at issue was a zoning ordinance rather than a regulatory ordinance. Relying on a case that held that prior nonconforming use (where a person has been using property in a nonconforming way prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance), the court found that indeed defendant was entitled to present such a defense, as he owned the dogs on the property prior to adoption of the ordinance. Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the ordinance was a constitutional exercise of the city's police power. While the court observed that criminal ordinances are to be more strictly construed than ordinances involving a civil penalty, it still found that the ordinance at issue was a valid exercise of police power, especially considering that a previous case had upheld a similar ordinance that limited ownership to only two dogs. |
| People v. Tohom | 969 N.Y.S.2d 123 (N.Y.A.D. 2 Dept.,2013) |
This case, as a matter of first impression, considers whether a trial court was authorized to allow a "therapeutic comfort dog" to be present on witness stand for a 15-year-old-girl who was the victim in a predatory sexual assault and child endangerment case. Prosecutors sought to allow a Golden Retriever named Rose to accompany the child on the witness stand while she testified at the defendant’s trial. Prosecutors cited Criminal Procedure Law provisions regarding special witnesses and pointed to Executive Law §642-a, which allows a person supportive of a special witness to be “present and accessible” during testimony by such a witness. On appeal, defendant again argued that the dog would prejudice the jury against the defendant and would convey to the jury that the witness was under stress as a result of testifying and that this stress resulted from telling the truth. In finding that the comfort dog did not violate defendant's right to a fair trial, the appellate court agreed that the trial court's interpretation of Executive Law § 642-a "special witness" provision was correct. Further, the defendant failed to show that the dog Rose's presence was inherently prejudicial. |
| People v. Zamora | 175 N.E.3d 700 (Ill.App. 1 Dist., 2020) | Defendant Juan Zamora was found guilty of failing to provide humane care and treatment for, and abusing, his 10 dogs in violation of the Humane Care for Animals Act. On appeal, defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the it generally showed that he treated his dogs well and they had not sustained physical or psychological injuries. Additionally, he argues that section 3(a)(4) of the act, which criminalizes the failure to provide “humane care and treatment,” is unconstitutionally vague. The conviction stems from defendant's conduct with his 10 pit bull type dogs. When the investigating officer executed a search warrant on defendant's residence, they found the ten dogs heavily chained in the basement standing on newspaper completely saturated with feces and urine, along with breeding harnesses and training treadmills indicative of dog fighting. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant suggests the evidence showed he was a "considerate dog owner with healthy dogs." However, the court was unconvinced, finding the slates of the metal and wooden makeshift cages were not appropriate for indoor or outdoor housing. Further, the accumulation of dog waste also supported the officer's testimony and the presence of dog fighting supplies supported a conclusion that "defendant's treatment of the dogs reflected something other than mere companionship." As to the vagueness challenge, the court found that defendant did not demonstrate that section 3(a)(4) fails to sufficiently enable a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what conduct the statute criminalizes or that it fails to provide police officers and the courts explicit standards. In fact, the court found that "defendant did not demonstrate compassion, sympathy or consideration for the dogs when he failed to provide an adequate habitat or ensure that bodily waste did not accumulate" and that this conduct fell squarely in the conduct addressed by the law. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment and rejected defendant's claims on appeal. |
| Peoria County v. Capitelli | 494 N.E.2d 155 (Ill.App. 3 Dist.,1986) |
This Illinois case concerns the appeal of a conviction for allowing a cat to run at large in violation of an ordinance enacted by the plaintiff, Peoria County. The defendant contends on appeal that the county as a non-home-rule unit of government lacked the authority to enact the ordinance. The court disagreed, finding the counties were given the express power to establish animal pounds and to dispose of stray animals pursuant to the provisions of the Impounding and Disposition of Stray Animals Act which concerns pet dogs and cats, and the Illinois Animal Control Act, which deals with stray animal control, rabies protection, liability for animal bites and related topics. More interesting is the dissent's position, which finds that the statute makes no mention of the power to regulate cats. Moreover, there can be no logical implication of authority to regulate cats running-at-large from the delegation of authority to regulate dogs running-at-large. |
| Pepper v. Triplet | 864 So.2d 181 (La. 2004) |
Neighbor sued dog owner for injuries resulting from dog bite. Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must show that, first, that the injuries could have been prevented by the dog owner and that the plaintiff did not provoke the dog to attack, second, that the dog presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and third, that the owner failed to exercise reasonable care. Plaintiff did not accomplish this. Reversed. (Extensive history of state dog bit law.) |
| Perfect Puppy, Inc. v. City of East Providence | 98 F.Supp.3d 408 (D.R.I. 2015) | Due to public concern about puppy mills, City passed an ordinance banning pet stores located within its limits from selling dogs and cats unless those animals were owned by a city animal shelter or animal control agency, humane society, or non-profit rescue organization and the pet store maintained those animals for the purpose of public adoption. In its Amended Complaint, Plaintiff, a pet store, raised numerous challenges to the ordinance under the Constitutions of the United States and of Rhode Island, claiming that it violated the dormant Commerce Clause, the Contract Clause, the Takings Clause, and Plaintiff's equal protection and due process rights, and that it was preempted by state statute. Plaintiff and Defendant both sought summary judgment to all challenges. Plaintiff's motion was DENIED and Defendant's motion was GRANTED to all counts in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint except Count Three, the Takings claim, which was REMANDED to the Rhode Island Superior Court. (2016: Affirmed in part and appeal dismissed in part at 807 F.3d 415, 417 (1st Cir. 2015)). |
| Perkins v. Hattery | 155 N.E.2d 73 (Ohio App. 1958) |
This Ohio case examined the propriety of a county dog warden killing a dog that had killed a sheep nine hours before such seizure. The Court of Appeals held that dog warden was not authorized to destroy or otherwise dispose of a duly licensed dog found and seized by such warden upon the premises of its owner following a complaint made to the warden by the owner of sheep that the dog had killed certain of his sheep approximately nine hours before such seizure. |
| Pet Dealers Ass'n of New Jersey, Inc. v. Division of Consumer Affairs, Dept. of Law and Public Safety, State of N. J. | 373 A.2d 688 (N.J. 1977) |
By this appeal Pet Dealers Association of New Jersey, Inc. challenges the validity of the Attorney General's regulations governing the sale of pet cats and dogs adopted pursuant to the Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8--4. Pet Dealers first contends that the regulations in question conflict with Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (N.J.S.A. 12A:2--101 Et seq.) in that the regulations provide the consumer with broader remedies than are available under the Code. The court disagreed, finding that the UCC is intended to give stability and certainty to commercial transactions, not to limit otherwise valid exercise of police powers by the State. Appellant also maintains that the regulations create an invalid classification, contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. The court held the regulations are a valid act of police power that does not evince any invidious discrimination the state's part. |
| Pet Fair, Inc. v. Humane Society of Greater Miami | 583 So.2d 407 (Fl. 1991) |
The owner of allegedly neglected or mistreated domestic animals that were seized by police could not be required to pay for costs of animals' care after it was determined that owner was in fact able to adequately provide for the animals, and after the owner declined to re-possess the animals. The Humane Society can require an owner to pay it costs associated with caring for an animal if the owner re-claims the animal, but not if the animal is adopted out to a third party.
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| Petco Animal Supplies, Inc. v. Schuster | 144 S.W.3d 554 (Tex.App.-Austin,2004) |
In this Texas case, a dog owner brought an action against a Petco groomer for damages when her dog was killed after escaping from the pet groomer and running into traffic. The trial court entered a default judgment in favor of the owner and awarded damages. The Court of Appeals, held that the dog owner was not entitled to damages for mental anguish, absent pet store's ill-will, animus or desire to harm her personally. Moreover, the owner was not entitled to intrinsic value damages, lost wages, or counseling expenses. |
| PetConnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas | Not Reported in Fed. Supp., 2020 WL 2832468 (S.D. Cal. June 1, 2020) | PetConnect Rescue, Inc., Lucky Pup Dog Rescue.com and Sarah Gonzalez (“Plaintiffs”) alleged that the Defendants fraudulently represented dogs that the Defendants sold as rescue animals in order to circumvent California law prohibiting the sale of non-rescue dogs in pet stores. On April 6, 2020, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against the Defendants alleging trademark infringement and dilution under the Lanham Act, unfair business practices under California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”) and violations of California’s Consumer Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), fraud, and accounting. Several Defendant filed motions to dismiss and to strike sections of the amended complaint. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that Plaintiff PetConnect alleged a cognizable injury in fact in that the Defendants’ use of an infringing mark harmed Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue’s reputation and caused consumer confusion. The Defendants’ Pet Connect Rescue, Inc. brokered the sale of dogs from puppy mills rather than rescue dogs which affected Plaintiff PetConnect’s reputation. The Court also found that Plaintiff PetConnect Rescue raised a claim within the Lanham Act’s zone of interests because the Lanham Act’s protections extended to non-profit organizations’ use of marks, even when those marks do not accompany a sale. The Court refused to dismiss Plaintiffs claims regarding trademark infringement. The Court also refused to dismiss the Plaintiff’s claims under the Lanham Act because the matter of whether Plaintiff’s mark was distinct and had acquired a secondary meaning was a matter more appropriate when the evidentiary record becomes further developed. As for the Unfair Competition claim, the Court found that the Plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts to state a UCL violation. The Court subsequently rejected the Defendants’ motions to strike thirty-four lines or phrases from the amended complaint because Plaintiff’s use of the terms “puppy mill,” and the allegations that Defendants operate “fake” entities that “induce” purchases, reflected Plaintiff’s allegations of fraud and misrepresentation. The Court found that the Plaintiffs’ references were pertinent to the Plaintiff’s allegations. The Court ultimately denied each of the Defendant’s motions to dismiss and strike. |
| Petconnect Rescue, Inc. v. Salinas | Slip copy, 2021 WL 5178647 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2021) | Plaintiffs are animal rescue organizations and an individual consumer alleging that the Defendants import non-rescue dogs into California and sell these dogs under the fraudulent misrepresentation that the dogs are rescued animals. Plaintiffs allege that the Rothman Defendants broker the sale of dogs bred for profit from “puppy mills” in the Midwest to pet stores in southern California which harms consumers by defrauding them and making them believe they are adopting a "rescue animal" (what the Plaintiffs have termed as "pet laundering"). In addition, plaintiffs alleged Lanham Act violations for trademark infringement. Before the court is a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court held that Plaintiffs alleged sufficient facts to state a claim that the Moving Defendants engaged in a fraudulent scheme to sell non-rescue dogs as rescue dogs under the “Pet Connect Rescue” name. |
| Pfeil v. Rogers | 757 F.2d 850 (7th Cir. 1985) |
Where sheriffs deputies acted in accordance with applicable state laws, there was no violation of Fourth Amendment rights in the shooting of plaintiff's dogs. |
| Pflaum v. Summit Cty. Animal Control | 92 N.E.3d 132 (OhioApp.2017) | Defendant appealed a trial court determination that his dog was dangerous under Ohio law. The designation stemmed from an incident in 2015, where defendant's dog and another dog began to fight. A neighbor attempted to break up the fight and was subsequently bitten on the hand. A week after that incident, the local deputy dog warden gave the defendant notice that there was cause to believe his dog was dangerous due to the bite on the hand. The magistrate found the dog did not meet the statutory definition of a dangerous dog. Animal control then appealed the magistrate's decision and the trial court agreed, finding that animal control demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that the dog was dangerous. At the Court of Appeals, Pflaum argued that the trial court abused its discretion in overturning the magistrate's decision. The court observed that the neighbor's striking of the Pflaum's dog during the fight fell within the concept of "torment" for purposes of determining provocation. While the neighbor's action were "well-intentioned," the issue of whether a person "tormented" a dog does not depend on whether there was a malicious intent. Thus, there was not clear and convincing evidence that the dog acted without provocation when it caused injury to a person. The trial court was reversed and the cause remanded. |
| Phillip v. State | 721 S.E.2d 214 (Ga.App., 2011) |
Defendant was sentenced to 17 years imprisonment after entering a non-negotiated guilty plea to 14 counts of dogfighting and two counts of aggravated cruelty to animals. Upon motion, the Court of Appeals held that the sentence was illegal and void because all counts, which were to run concurrently, had the maximum prison sentence of five years. |
| Phillips v. San Luis Obispo County Dept. | 228 Cal.Rptr. 101 Cal.App. (2 Dist.,1986) |
In this case, the owners of dog petitioned for writ of mandamus requesting vacation of destruction order and declaration that ordinances under which the dog was seized were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeal held that due process required that owners have hearing prior to seizure of or destruction of dog (a property interest) and that a "courtesy hearing" did not satisfy due process requirements. Further, the court concluded that the ordinances here were unconstitutional for failing to provide for notice and a hearing either before or after the seizure of an uncontrollable biting or vicious dog. |
| Pickford v. Masion | 98 P.3d 1232 (Wa. 2004) |
Plaintiffs' dog was mauled by Defendants' dogs and sustained permanent injuries. The trial court granted summary judgment against Plaintiffs' claims of negligent and malicious infliction of emotional distress. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment and further held the destruction of the companionship relationship could not be extended to dogs. |
| Pitts v. State | 918 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. App. 1995). |
Right of appeal is only available for orders that the animal be sold at public auction. The statutory language does not extend this right to seizure orders. |
| Pless v. State | 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006) | In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. Defendant appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court found that the evidence showed that in the months prior to the July 14 and August 1 incidents, Pless's dogs were repeatedly found loose in neighbors' yards and garages. Accordingly, evidence supported the conviction on the charge of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance under § 3-4-7(5). ("Public nuisance" is defined, among other things, as any animal which "[i]s found repeatedly at large."). On certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Pless, 646 S.E.2d 202 (Ga. 2007) reversed judgment of Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App. 2006), and the case was then sent to Pless v. State, 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) on remand. |
| Pless v. State | 648 S.E.2d 752 (Ga. App. 2007) |
In this Georgia case, the defendant was convicted by a jury in the trial court of two counts of failure to keep an animal under restraint and one count of allowing an animal to become a public nuisance. On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the defendant's conviction with the exception of that portion of his sentence requiring him to reimburse the county for his court-appointed attorney fees. The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, reversed the appellate court's holding and ruled that the trial court was authorized to impose the reimbursement of attorney fees as part of the sentence. On remand, the appellate court vacated that portion of its opinion that reversed the imposition of attorney fees and adopted the Supreme Court's opinion as its own; all other respects of the appellate decision, Pless v. State, 633 S.E.2d 340 (Ga. App., 2006), remain undisturbed. |
| Plotnik v. Meihaus | 146 Cal.Rptr.3d 585 (Cal. App. 3 Dist.) |
A long history of bad neighborly relations resulted in the plaintiffs' dog sustaining injuries from being hit with a baseball; the injuries required surgery and post-operative care. While the plaintiffs brought many causes of actions against their neighbors, a father and his two sons, this case is significant in the realm of animal law because it held that a pet owner may recover for emotional distress under the trespass to personal property cause of action. The court, however, would not allow the plaintiffs to recover for their dog's injuries under the intentional infliction of emotional distress cause of action because they would have recovered duplicative damages for the same transactional event. |
| Portillo v. Aiassa | 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 755 (1994) |
In this California case, the plaintiff delivered beer to Race Street Liquors. As he was leaving the store, he was attacked by a German shepherd owned by the tenant. The jury found appellant-landlord did not have actual knowledge of the dog's dangerous propensities prior to renewing the commercial lease. However, the jury found that he would have learned of the dog's dangerous propensities if he had exercised reasonable care in the inspection of his property and that he was negligent in failing to eliminate this dangerous condition. |
| Powell v. Adlerhorst Int'l, Inc. | 2015 WL 6756126 (D. Or. Nov. 4, 2015) (unpublished) | The plaintiff in this case brought suit after suffering a dog bite from a service dog that was purchased from defendant. The defendant was a corporation that purchased dogs from Europe and then sold them to police agencies to be used as service dogs. Plaintiff (a police officer with the Sherwood Police Department) filed suit asserting both a strict product liability and negligence claim for injuries sustained from dog bites. At issue here is whether the dog was defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time the defendant sold it to the City of Sherwood. Defendant moved for summary judgment and the court denied the motion. The court ultimately held that a reasonable jury could find that defendant should have known about the dog’s aggressive behavior before selling it to plaintiff, thus making it liable for damages. |
| Prasad v. Wepruk | 2004CarswellBC946 |
Plaintiff Prasad, an elderly newpaper-deliverer, was attacked in the street by defendant owner Wepruk's usually chained guard-dog, which escaped due to a rusted chain. The court found the defendant strictly liable under the doctrine of scienter's subjective test: he knew the dog was aggressive, but kept it anyway and it harmed Prasad. He was also liable under the objective test for negligence, for not taking reasonable precautions to ensure the dog's chain was in good repair, in order to prevent foreseeable harm to others. damages of $35,000 were awarded for Prasad's injuries and lost future earnings. |
| Pratt v. Pratt | 1988 WL 120251 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1998) (unpublished opinion). |
A childless, divorcing couple sought divorce; trial court awarded couple's registered dogs to wife based on the best interest standard used for determination of custody of children. Appellate court held the best interest statute inapplicable to dogs, but stated that the trial court can award dogs based on evidence of mistreatment of the dogs by one of the parties. Because the trial court's determination had a reasonable basis in fact, the appellate court affirmed its decision. |
| Pray v. Whiteskunk | 801 N.W.2d 451 (S.D., 2011) |
In this South Dakota case, the plaintiff suffered a broken knee after Defendant's Rottweiler brook loose from its owner and ran toward the street, causing plaintiff to fall. Plaintiff brought an action for damages against both the dog owner and the city, specifically alleging the the city knew the dog was dangerous and failed to enforce its vicious animal ordinance. On appeal of the granting of summary judgment for the city, this court found that plaintiff failed to establish that the action taken by the city caused the harm to Pray or exposed her to greater risks, thereby leaving her in a worse position than she was in before the city took action. While this Court found that the city had actual knowledge of the dog's dangerousness, this alone is insufficient. |
| Prays v. Perryman | 262 Cal.Rptr. 180 (Cal.App.2.Dist.) |
In an action by a commercial pet groomer against a dog owner for injuries suffered by a dog bite, the trial court found as a matter of law that plaintiff had assumed the risk of a dog bite, and on that basis granted summary judgment in defendant's favor. At the time plaintiff was bitten, she had not yet begun to groom the dog and, in fact, had expressed to defendant her concern whether it was safe for her to do so since the dog was excited and growling. The Court of Appeal reversed. Assuming the veterinarian's rule extended to pet groomers, making the defense of assumption of risk available, it held that plaintiff had not as a matter of law assumed the risk of being bitten since, at the time of the bite, the dog was still under the exclusive control of defendant, who had uncaged it and was holding it on a leash. |
| Price v. Brown | 680 A.2d 1149 (Pa. 1996) |
The issue presented in this appeal is whether a complaint based upon an alleged breach of a bailment agreement states a cause of action for injury or death suffered by an animal that has been entrusted to a veterinarian for surgical and professional treatment. The court agreed with the trial court that the purpose for which an animal is entrusted to the care of a veterinarian is a material fact that must be considered in determining whether a plaintiff's complaint states a cause of action as a matter of law, and that Price's complaint failed to state a cause of action for professional negligence. The court held that allegations of breach of a bailment agreement are insufficient to state a cause of action against a veterinarian who has performed surgery on an animal when the animal suffers an injury as a result or does not survive the surgery. |
| Price v. Brown, V.M.D. | 131 Montg. Co. L. R. 150 (1994) | Plaintiff's bull dog went to defendant veterinarian for surgery to correct a prolapsed urethra. The dog died a few days later. The plaintiff then sought to recover the value of the dog on a strict theory of bailment. Defendant filed a preliminary objection asserting that this doctrine was inapplicable and could not afford relief. The court held that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim from which relief could be sought and dismissed the complaint. The court, however, allowed the plaintiff to amend the compliant.In holding to sustain the defendant's preliminary objection, the court reasoned that since veterinarians are part of a professional discipline, in order to recover damages for the injury or the death to an animal entrusted to a veterinarian's care, a plaintiff must prove professional negligence instead of a bailiff arrangement. |
| Price v. State | 911 N.E.2d 716 (Ind.App.,2009) |
In this Indiana case, appellant-defendant appealed his conviction for misdemeanor Cruelty to an Animal for beating his 8 month-old dog with a belt. Price contended that the statute is unconstitutionally vague because the statute's exemption of “reasonable” training and discipline can be interpreted to have different meanings. The court held that a person of ordinary intelligence would also know that these actions are not “reasonable” acts of discipline or training. Affirmed. |