Cattle: Related Cases

Defendant convicted of cruelty for intentionally or knowingly torturing his cattle by failing to provide necessary food or care, causing them to die. Defendant lacked standing to challenge warrantless search of property because he had no expectation of privacy under open fields doctrine.

Plaintiff environmental advocacy organization sued the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for revisions to nationwide grazing regulations for federal lands. Plaintiff argued that the 2006 Regulations violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA). The Court of Appeals found for the plaintiff, holding that BLM violated NEPA by failing to take a “hard look” at the environmental consequences of the proposed regulatory changes. BLM also violated the ESA by failing to consult with Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) before approving the revisions. The FLPMA claim was remanded.

This is an appeal of a district court decision on property damages from plaintiff's car hitting defendant's cow.  On appeal, the Court determined that the animal owners did not violate a closed range statute merely because their cow was on a public highway, that the presence of an animal on a public highway does not establish that the animal owners were negligent, and that the driver of an automobile has a duty to maintain a reasonable outlook for animals on public highways.

While driving his motorcycle down a private road that had easement access, the plaintiff was injured by a charging cow. Arguing the defendant had a duty to warn of the presence of an unconfined and inherently dangerous animal, the plaintiff brought a negligence and a premise liability suit against the defendant. Upon appeal, the court held that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the defendant was negligent and that the defendant was strictly liable for the cow's actions; the court, therefore, ruled in favor of the defendant.

North Federal District Court of Texas ruled that the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) only empowered the Food Safety and Inspection Services to prevent the United States Department of Agriculture from allowing companies to sell adulterated meat to the public. To find meat adulterated under FMIA requires that the processor's plants conditions are insanitary, thus the FSIS should focus on the manufacturing process and not the final product to determine that a plant is insanitary.

The Defendant was charge with cruelty to animals for the killing of a certain spotted bull, belonging some person to the jurors unknow.  The lower court found the Defendant guilty.  The Defendant then appealed to the Supreme Court seeking review of whether the defense of provocation could be used.  The Court determined the answer to be yes. Thus the Court reversed and remanded the case.

A man was charged with failing to maintain a proper fence to contain his cattle.  Despite the man's efforts to fix the fence when notified his cattle had gone through it, the trial court found the man guilty on three counts of willfully permitting livestock to run at large.  The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction.

The defendant was indicted at spring term, 1883, for a violation of the act of assembly in reference to cruelty to animals. The indictment is substantially as follows: The jurors, &c., present that the defendant, with force and arms, &c., "did unlawfully and wilfully overdrive, torture, torment, cruelly beat and needlessly mutilate a certain cow, the property of, &c., by beating said cow and twisting off her tail," contrary, &c. The jury found the defendant guilty, and on his motion the judgment was arrested and the state appealed.  The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's descision to arrest the judgment.

This is an appeal from a circuit court decision where the appellant claimed error for failure to grant a nonsuit and directed verdict in a case involving livestock running at large.  Plaintiff brought suit under a state statute which provides that an livestock owner shall not permit an animal to run at large or go on the land of another.  The Court of Appeals held that the defendant permitted its cattle to run at large, the plaintiff's oat fields were the lands of another according to the statute, and that the plaintiff's loss was satisfactorily established.

Plaintiffs sought damages after having to slaughter dairy cows that were injured by defendant’s defective machine. The Court held that plaintiffs could recover 1) the fair market value less salvage value of the cows, 2) the loss of profit during the period after the incident when cows of comparable quality became available on the market, and 3) the calculable loss in milk production caused by the incident's negative impact on the milk production level of the remaining cows.

This appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court related to the mental state requirement in determining an animal owner's liability for escape of cattle.  The Oregon Supreme Court, on review, held that simple rather than criminal negligence was the correct level of culpability for determining an animal owner's liability, and damages are available under a statute making an animal owner liable if an animal is permitted to escape onto another's property.

The respondents were charged with nine counts of inflicting unnecessary suffering on an animal, a cow, and one count of of subjecting 50 cows to unnecessary suffering. The trial judge found the respondents wrongly charged and dismissed the charges without the prosecution clearly articulating its case. The trial judge was incorrect to dismiss the charges for want of particulars. The trial magistrate was also incorrect to dismiss the tenth charge for duplicity. In some circumstances it is possible to include multiple offences in the same charge where the matters of complaint are substantially the same.

Driver struck bull that had wandered onto a public highway and driver was killed.  Court of appeals ruled for wife in a wrongful death action against the bull's owner.  The owner had a duty to take reasonable precautions to prevent the bull's escape.

Defendant was convicted of wilfully and maliciously killing three cows.  The issue considered on review was: "Are the circumstances and testimony here, aliunde the confession of the respondent, sufficient to create such a probability that the death of the cattle in question was intentionally caused by human intervention and to justify the admission in evidence of the alleged confession of the respondent?"  The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Defendant argued that there was not sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction of cruelty to animals.  Specifically, he pointed out that there was no direct testimony with regard to the cause of the injuries to his cows.  The court disagreed and held that inattention to the condition of the animals was sufficient to constitute the offense of cruelty to animals. 

Upon being informed by the Kansas State Fair Board (KSFB) that it must shield a video depicting graphic images of animals being slaughtered, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) sought a preliminary injunction in order to show the video at the Kansas State Fair. PETA argued the shield was unconstitutional. The KSFB sought a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, that PETA lacked Article Three Standing, and that the defendant was not a section 1983 person. Both motions were denied by the district court.

In this case, defendant Neifert rented land to graze cattle.  Plaintiff owned billboards in the pasture that were often painted with lead-based paint.  Defendant's cattle ate the lead-contaminated paint left in the pails and the ground and subsequently died from poisoning.  The Court upheld the award of damages to defendant-Neifert on a negligence theory because plaintiffs should have reasonably known that the cattle would ingest the paint left in the pails and on the field. 

This is an interlocutory appeal brought by the State of California and defendant-intervenors The Humane Society, et al., from a preliminary injunction prohibiting the enforcement of California Penal Code § 599f, which bans the slaughter and inhumane handling of nonambulatory animals, against federally regulated swine slaughterhouses. The district court granted the preliminary injunction. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) did not expressly preempt California statute banning slaughter of nonambulatory animals. On the humane handling requirement of section 599f, the court did find that Section 599f(e) prohibits dragging of unconscious downer animals which the federal law does not. However, NMA failed to show a likelihood of irreparable injury or that the balance of the equities and the public interest tip in its favor for this provision. This court found that the lower court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction, and the injunction was vacated. This case was later vacated by: National Meat Ass'n v. Harris , 680 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir., 2012).

A veterinary student was kicked by a cow while trying to perform a medical procedure.  The student brought a personal injury lawsuit against the professor and university for negligently allowing the university-owned cow to kick her and not providing timely medical treatment.  Defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.