Standing

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Titlesort descending Summary
New Hampshire General Laws 1878: Trespasses, Malicious Acts, etc. The New Hampshire session laws from 1878, chapter 281, covers the state's cruelty to animals laws. Specifically, the law covers cruelty to animals and the treatment of animals during transportation.
Nonhuman Rts. Project, Inc. v. Breheny This New York case centers on a petition of habeas corpus for an elephant named "Happy" who is housed at the Bronx Zoo. Petitioner Nonhuman Rights Project is a not-for-profit corporation with a mission of seeking to establish that “at least some nonhuman animals” are “legal persons” entitled to fundamental rights, including “bodily integrity and bodily liberty.” In 2018, petitioner commenced this habeas proceeding in Supreme Court against respondents James J. Breheny, Director of the Bronx Zoo, and the Wildlife Conservation Society, the organization that operates the Zoo. Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus “on behalf of Happy,” an Asian elephant that petitioner claimed was unlawfully confined at the Zoo in violation of her right to bodily liberty. Happy has resided at the Bronx Zoo for the last 45 years and has been held in captivity since she was approximately one year old. Petitioners request that she be transferred to an “appropriate sanctuary" where she could potentially be integrated with other elephants. To support its request, petitioner proffered affidavits from several experts specializing in elephant study and care attesting to the general characteristics of elephants. The Zoo respondents opposed petitioner's application and requested dismissal of the petition for lack of standing and failure to state a cause of action. Specifically, respondents argued that there was no legal basis for habeas relief and that Happy's living conditions comply with all relevant laws and accepted standards of care. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground “that animals are not ‘persons’ entitled to rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus” and that habeas relief is not available for an animal. On petitioner's appeal, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed, reasoning that “the writ of habeas corpus is limited to human beings.” While the court acknowledged that the law recognizes that animals are not mere "things," and existing animal protection laws underscore this conclusion, the scope of habeas corpus does not include animals. The court lastly noted that " this case has garnered extraordinary interest from amici curiae and the public . . . Though beyond the purview of the courts, we appreciate that the desire and ability of our community to engage in a continuing dialogue regarding the protection and welfare of nonhuman animals is an essential characteristic of our humanity. Such dialogue, however, should be directed to the legislature." As such, the order of the Appellate Division was affirmed
Pawing Open the Courthouse Door: Why Animals' Interests Should Matter


It is widely accepted that animals are viewed as property under the law. It is equally apparent, however, that animals are much more than the average inanimate piece of personal property. The law of standing should reflect that animals are creatures with interests worthy of legal protection in their own right. Thus, while the courts may inevitably continue to recognize animals as property, animals are qualitatively different and the courts can and must take this into consideration when deciding the issue of standing.
Pennsylvania Statute Law 1920: Article 14: Criminal Law Pennsylvania laws concerning the criminal punishment for cruelty to animals from 1921. The laws cover such topics as transportation of an animal to the powers of an agent from any anti-Cruelty society.
Pennsylvania Statute Laws 1920: Article 16: Agriculture Laws Pennsylvania laws concerning the treatment of animals in agriculture. The laws cover such topics as maiming and disfiguring animals to the transportation of an animal.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture Ten years after the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) took steps to apply Animal Welfare Act (AWA) protections to birds, the task remained incomplete. The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) sued the USDA, arguing that its inaction amounted to agency action “unlawfully withheld,” in violation of section 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The District Court granted the USDA's motion to dismiss, concluding that the USDA's enforcement decisions were committed by law to its discretion. On appeal, the court found PETA had standing, but had failed to plausibly allege that the USDA's decade-long inaction constituted agency action “unlawfully withheld” in violation of the APA. The United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, therefore affirmed the District Court's judgment of dismissal. For the District Court's opinion, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 60 F.Supp.3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Kansas State Fair Board


Upon being informed by the Kansas State Fair Board (KSFB) that it must shield a video depicting graphic images of animals being slaughtered, the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) sought a preliminary injunction in order to show the video at the Kansas State Fair. PETA argued the shield was unconstitutional. The KSFB sought a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the grounds of Eleventh Amendment Immunity, that PETA lacked Article Three Standing, and that the defendant was not a section 1983 person. Both motions were denied by the district court.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture


The People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) brought a suit against the USDA for failing to enforce the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) against bird abusers and for not promulgating regulations specific to the mistreatment of avians. While the district court found PETA had standing, it granted the USDA’s motion to dismiss because the AWA's enforcement provision strongly suggested that its implementation was committed to agency discretion by law and because section 2143 of the AWA did not require the USDA to issue avian-specific animal-welfare standards. For a reconsideration of this case, see People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, 60 F.Supp.3d 14 (D.D.C. 2014).

Reece v. Edmonton (City) This case dealt with the procedure the applicants used to get their claim heard by the court. The respondent City holds a licence under the Wildlife Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. W‑10 to operate a zoo, which houses a lone Asian elephant named Lucy. The appellants commenced this action by originating notice for an order. The chambers judge concluded that the proceedings were an abuse of process because a private litigant cannot seek a declaration that the respondent is in breach of a penal provision in a statute, namely that the elephant was kept in distress because of health concerns. Alternatively, he concluded that the application should have been brought by way of statement of claim, not originating notice. Further, the chambers judge concluded that the appellants had no private interest standing, and that there were barriers to them being awarded public interest standing. On appeal, the parties raised two issues: (1) whether the chambers judge erred in denying the appellants standing to seek a declaration; and (2) whether the chambers judge erred in concluding that the proceedings were an abuse of process. This court held that the chambers judge came to the correct conclusion that these proceedings are an abuse of process. APPEAL DISMISSED.
Rowley v. City of New Bedford This opinion concerns the City of New Bedford, Massachusetts' motion to dismiss plaintiff Rowley's (formerly plaintiff "Friends of Ruth & Emily, Inc.") citizen suit for injunction under the federal Endangered Species Act. Plaintiffs allege that two Asian Elephants, Ruth and Emily, were mistreated by the Buttonwood Park Zoo in New Bedford by chaining their legs, housing them in inadequate facilities, failing to provide proper socialization, and failing to provide adequate veterinary care, which gives rise to a "taking" under Section 9 of the ESA. Rowley claims that she is a member of the zoological society there and visits the elephants on a "near daily basis," resulting in “an aesthetic, emotional, and spiritual relationship with Ruth and Emily over the years.” The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts asked both parties to brief on the issue of standing for the instant action. The court first noted that the ESA expressly authorizes citizen suits for injunctive relief. To survive a motion to dismiss, Rowley must, through facts, clearly demonstrate standing, and then the court must analyze those facts under a multi-pronged approach. To begin, the court distinguished cases that established the proper "animal nexus" for injury in fact with those that did not meet that finding. Here, Rowley's complaint established injury in fact because she lives in New Bedford, is a member of the Zoo's Zoological Society, and observes the elephants on a near daily basis. Rowley alleges that the maltreatment of Ruth and Emily injures this ability because she observes their ongoing suffering while in substandard captivity. The court was not persuaded by New Bedford's claim that Rowley has not established injury in fact because she has no specialized training in wildlife or animal welfare. In fact, this claim ignored precedent from this very circuit that "aesthetic injury" can be established by viewing animals in inhumane conditions. In addition, the court rejected New Bedford's "nonexistent requirement into the injury in fact analysis" that Rowley must have observed or will observe Asian elephants in their native habitats. As a result, the court found Rowley properly established injury in fact. As to the next requirement of causation, the court found that Rowley sufficiently alleged that the Zoo's actions caused the harm complained of for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss. Finally, as to redressability, the court found that Rowley's request for a declaratory judgment as to the Zoo's treatment of Ruth and Emily, and an injunction prohibiting the Zoo from euthanizing the elephants met this prong. New Bedford's contention that Rowley's further suggestion of moving the elephants to a sanctuary in Tennessee impaired her redressability argument because Rowley did not propose how the cost of relocation would be funded was also rejected. At this stage, the court does not need to determine whether this solution is necessary or feasible. The District Court ultimately held that Rowley demonstrated sufficient standing to pursue her claims. Hence, New Bedford's motion to dismiss was denied.

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