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GA - Wildlife, transportation - Article 3. Transportation |
This GA statute pertains to transporting wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife taken in this state without a license or permit. It is unlawful to transport wildlife by a carrier unless the person files with the carrier a written statement giving his name and address and the number of wildlife to be transported and specifying that he lawfully took the wildlife. It is unlawful to transport any wildlife (or parts) for propagation or scientific purposes without a valid scientific collecting permit. |
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Gill v. Prehistoric Ponds, Inc. |
In this Georgia case, the Court of Appeals held that, on issue of first impression, an alligator farm was not a "farm" within meaning of the state statute that exempted "farm laborers" or their employers from coverage under the Workers' Compensation Act (Gill was bitten while cleaning out a pen and subsequently developed both a bone infection and salmonella). In construing the relevant statutes, the court found that in the chapter on Employment Security Law (ESL), the legislature meant that individuals who raise or tend wildlife perform "agricultural labor," but only when they do so on a "farm," which is "used for production of stock, dairy products, poultry, fruit, and fur-bearing animals." Accordingly, the court concluded that when Gill cleaned out the alligator pens, he was caring for wildlife and thus performing "agricultural labor." However, his employer, an alligator farm, was not a "farm" because alligators are "wildlife," not "[live]stock ... [or] fur-bearing animals."
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Habeas Corpus para Chimpanzé - Íntegra (portuguese) |
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Hendricks v. Barlow |
Landowners were held in violation of a zoning regulation, established under a Hendricks County ordinance, which forbade having wild animals residing on residential property.
The trial court held that the county could not pass such a law, since it would be preempted by state and federal law.
However, on appeal, this Court found that federal (the AWA) and state law did not preempt the County from passing such ordinances.
The trial court erroneously attempted to interpret the law when it was not ambiguous, and, thus, preemption
by state and federal law should not have been found.
Thus, the zoning regulation was permitted.
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Hetrick v. Ohio Dep't of Agric. |
In this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to grant appellee Hetrick's dangerous wild animal (DWA) permits. Hetrick was the owner of DWA's on his property, and according to an Ohio law he was required to register the DWA's and apply for permits before a certain statutory deadline. This court held that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the Ohio Department of Agriculture (ODA) lacked a statutory basis to deny the application for a rescue facility permit on timeliness grounds but did not err in so finding on caging and care grounds. Further, the court reversed, in part, the judgment of the Wood County Court of Common Pleas in the rescue facility permit case; reversed, in toto, the judgment of the lower court in the wildlife shelter permit case; and with this decision, reinstated the ODA's denial of both permits. Judgments reversed. |
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HI - Exotic Wildlife - Subchapter 2. Non-Domestic Animal Introductions |
This chapter addresses the introduction of feral and other non-domestic animals into Hawaii. The regulations specify certain animals prohibited for introduction into the state and the process for permitted introductions. Certain animals require a bond with the department. |
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HI - Importation, quarantine - Chapter 150A. Plant and Non-Domestic Animal Quarantine and Microorganism Import |
These laws concern the importation of animals, plants, and microorganisms into the State of Hawaii. |
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HI - Shark fins; prohibited - Chapter 188. Fishing Rights and Regulations. |
Hawaii passed this law in 2010 prohibiting the sale, trade, or distribution of shark fins. Prior to July 1, 2011, any restaurant holding a valid certificate, permit, or license issued by the department of health may possess, sell, offer for sale, trade, or distribute shark fins possessed by that restaurant as of July 1, 2010 which are prepared for consumption. Any person violating this section or any rule adopted pursuant to this section incurs an administrative fine of not less than $5,000 and not more than $15,000 for first offense. The fine then increases to $15,000 - $35,000 for a second offense, and $35,000 - 50,000 or imprisonment for up to 1 year, or both, for a third or subsequent offense. |
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HI - Wildlife - Chapter 183D. Wildlife. |
These statutes comprise Hawaii's wildlife provisions. |
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Hill v. Coggins |
In 2013, Plaintiffs visited Defendants' zoo, the Cherokee Bear Zoo, in North Carolina where they observed four bears advertised as grizzly bears in what appeared to Plaintiffs as substandard conditions. As a result, Plaintiffs filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging the Zoo's practice of keeping the bears was a taking of a threatened species under the federal Endangered Species Act (ESA). In essence, Plaintiffs contend the Zoo's conduct was a form of harassment under the ESA, and so they sought injunctive relief. After denying the Zoo's motions for summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial where the court ruled against Plaintiffs on the issue of the Zoo's liability under the ESA. The manner in which the bears were kept did not constitute a taking for purposes of the ESA. On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, this Court first found Plaintiffs established Article III standing for an aesthetic injury. Second, the Court agreed with the district court that evidence showed these bears were grizzly bears. While the Defendant-Zoo's veterinarian testified at trial that they are European brown bears, the collective evidence including expert testimony, veterinary records, USDA reports, and the Zoo's own advertising justified the lower court's conclusion that the bears are threatened grizzly bears. As to the unlawful taking under the ESA, the Fourth Circuit vacated the lower court's holding and remanded the case to district court. The legal analysis used by the court was incorrect because the court did not first determine whether the Zoo's practices were "generally accepted" before it applied the exclusion from the definition of harassment. The lower court based its conclusion on the fact that the Zoo met applicable minimum standards under the Animal Welfare Act (AWA) and did not explore whether these standards were "generally accepted." Affirmed in part, vacated and remanded. |
