Pet Damages

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Titlesort descending Summary
Every Dog Can Have Its Day: Extending Liability Beyond the Seller by Defining Pets as “Products” Under Products LIiability Theory


Is a pet a “product”? A pet is a product for purposes of products liability law in some states, and as this article will show, the remaining states should follow suit. Every year, thousands of “domesticated” animals are sold to consumers who are uninformed as to the animal’s propensities or to the proper method of animal care. In some instances, these animals are unreasonably dangerous in that they spread disease to humans or attack, and possibly kill, unwitting victims. Improper breeding and training techniques and negligence in sales have led to horrific injury. This comment will demonstrate how merely considering pets as products opens up new theories of liability for the plaintiff’s lawyer, offering a deeper base of defendants who are both morally and legally at fault. From the standpoint of a consumer advocate and with concern for both human and animal welfare, the author proposes employing products liability theory to the sale of domesticated animals. By making sellers of “defective” animals accountable for personal injury that these animals cause, the quality of the animals bred and sold will likely improve. Where it does not improve and injury results, the victim may have recourse beyond the confines of contract remedies. Products liability theory is a lawful and needed method for preventing future harm and providing for a healthier human and animal kingdom.

Fackler v. Genetzky


Plaintiffs sued defendant for the death of their racehorses resulting from alleged veterinary malpractice.  The court held that a genuine issue of material fact as to whether veterinarian's actions comported with professional standard of care in treating racehorses precluded summary judgment.  However, the owners were not entitled to recover damages for their emotional distress as result of veterinarian's alleged negligent destruction of horses.  Nebraska law has generally regarded animals as personal property and emotional damages cannot be had for the negligent destruction of personal property.

Feger v. Warwick Animal Shelter
In this New York case, a cat owner brought suit against an animal shelter and its employee for their alleged misconduct in knowingly placing a champion cat stolen from her home for adoption by unidentified family. In ruling that the lower court properly denied the plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment, the appellate court found that there are questions of fact,

inter alia

, as to whether “Lucy” is “Kisses." However, the Shelter defendants are correct that the plaintiff may not recover damages for the emotional harm she allegedly suffered from the loss of her cat.
Fido Seeks Full Membership in the Family: Dismantling the Property Classification of Companion Animals by Statute


This paper proposes that various state legislatures should progressively dismantle the property classification of companion animals by enacting statutes permitting animal guardians recovery for non-economic damages in torts, and requiring courts to apply the "best interests of the pet" standard in custody and visitation disputes. Section II of this paper sets forth the conflict between the social and legal views of companion animals, and the historical evidence supporting each. Section III analyzes court opinions that treat companion animals as property and illustrates how the conflicting views of companion animals are manifested in case law. Section IV identifies the current trend in court decisions and legislative actions suggesting that both judges and legislators acknowledge companion animals as more than property.

Folsom v. Barnett


Defendant-veterinarian sought appeal of a judgment against him for malpractice resulting from the injury to plaintiff’s thoroughbred colt that resulted in its destruction. The Court of Appeals held that an examination of the record revealed that sufficient evidence was produced to put in issue the question of whether appellant used such skill and attention as may ordinarily be expected of careful and skillful persons in his profession. Thus, the issue was correctly submitted to a jury.

Frequently Asked Questions on Local Dog Laws


This article answers some typical questions relating to local dog laws.

Friedli v. Kerr


This case involves two passengers who were injured when the horse-drawn carriage that they were riding in turned over after the horse was startled and the driver lost control of the horse.

 

The trial court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that the defendant’s carriage business was not immune from liability to its passengers under Tennessee’s equine liability statute.

 

There were three reasons for this decision:

 

1) the defendant is not an “equine activity sponsor,” 2) his business is not an “equine activity,” and 3) the plaintiffs were not “participants” engaging in an “equine activity” when they were injured.

FRITTS v. NEW YORK & N. E. R. CO.


Plaintiff's action results from defendant's alleged negligence in blowing the train whistle in a excessive manner such that it cause plaintiff's horses to run away with the plaintiff's carriage. There was judgment for plaintiff in a less sum than he thought he was entitled to, and both parties appeal. In reversing the lower court's decision, this court found that the lessened market value of the horses in consequence of the runaway was a proximate and legitimate element of damage.

Futch v. State


Defendant appealed conviction of cruelty to animals for shooting and killing a neighbor's dog. The Court of Appeals held that the restitution award of $3,000 was warranted even though the owner only paid $750 for the dog. The dog had been trained to hunt and retrieve, and an expert testified that such a dog had a fair market value between $3,000 and $5,000.

G.M. v. PetSmart, Inc.

In this case, plaintiffs filed a suit for damages on behalf of their son against the defendant, PetSmat, Inc., after their son contracted rat bite fever from the pet rats his parents purchased from PetSmart. Plaintiff’s purchased the pet rats in September of 2011 and their son was diagnosed with rat bite fever in April of 2012. Defendants moved for summary judgement and the court granted the motion. Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs needed to provide evidence from expert testimony in order to establish that their son had contracted rat bite fever from the pet rats. The defendants established that rat bite fever could be contracted in other ways aside from rats, including mosquitoes and ticks. As a result, the court found it crucial to have expert testimony in order to determine whether or not the rat bite fever was actually contracted from a rat. Since the plaintiffs had not introduced any expert testimony or other evidence to establish that the rate bite fever in fact was contracted from a rat, the court dismissed plaintiffs claim and held for the defendant.

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