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Christine Valpiani and Anthony Valpiani, husband and wife, plaintiffs v. Lisa K. Reising, D.V.M. a Washington State veterinarian |
This King County, Washington motion for summary judgment sought dismissal of several of plaintiff's claims as well as a limitation to the damages that are recoverable. Plaintiffs claim that the negligence of defendant-veterinarian caused the death of their dog (defendant admitted negligence so the issue here centers on damages). The court held that plaintiffs may assert claims for loss of use, but not loss of companionship.
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CITIZENS' RAPID-TRANSIT CO. v. DEW |
In 1898, this court affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that, "Large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and they are extensively the subjects of trade and traffic. They are the negro's associates, and often his only property, the poor man's friend, and the rich man's companion, and the protection of women and children, hearthstones and hen roosts. In the earlier law books it was said that "dog law" was as hard to define as was "dog Latin." But that day has passed, and dogs have now a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law."
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Citizens' Rapid-Transit Co. v. Dew |
This is an action for negligently injuring and killing a dog by the driver of a streetcar. The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed a verdict for $200 after defendant train killed plaintiff’s dog. The Court reasoned that since large amounts of money are now invested in dogs, and since they are regarded as companions to many in society, they now have "a distinct and well established status in the eyes of the law." Thus, the owner of a dog has property rights in that dog to maintain an action at law. The Supreme Court of Tennessee found that the defendant company was guilty of negligence in the killing of Dew's dog, that his death could have been prevented by the exercise of proper care and diligence.
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City of Garland v. White |
Police officers were trespassers and could be held civilly liable for damages when they entered a dog owner's property with the intent to unlawfully kill the dog. Reports had been made that the dog was attacking other animals but because the attacks were not imminent, in progress, or recent, the killing of the dog was not lawful.
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Clark v. Cardinal Animal Care |
This is a complaint for veterinary malpractice. The cat had been checked in for a routine flea treatment. The cat ended up with a severe problem, which the veterinarian lied to the owner about. The veterinarian performed an unauthorized surgery on the cat. The cat died. |
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Colleen Harrington v. David Hovanec, and DOES 1 through 20 inclusive |
This California complaint for damages raises five causes of action: (1) gross negligence; (2) trespass to chattel; (3) conversion; (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (5) violation of California Civil Code Section 3340 (related to damage to animals as property). The lawsuit arose from the negligent and/or intentional shooting of plaintiff's dog by defendant in May of 2004. According to the complaint, plaintiff's dog was shot at least thirteen times by defendant's two different guns. |
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COLUMBUS R. CO. v. WOOLFOLK |
In this Georgia case, Woolfolk brought a suit to recover the value of a dog that he alleged was willfully and wantonly killed by the running of a street car on defendant's line of road. The defendant demurred specially to the paragraph that alleged the value of the dog to be $200. Defendant argued that the measure of damages could not be based on the value of the dog because dogs have no market value. The court disagreed, first noting that, by the common law a dog is property, for an injury to which an action will lie and the modern trend is to value dogs in the same way other domestic animals are valued. Further, the court found a "better rule" for ascertaining the measure of damages: “The value of a dog may be proved, as that of any other property, by evidence that he was of a particular breed, and had certain qualities, and by witnesses who knew the market value of such animal, if any market value be shown. Judgment affirmed.
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Commonwealth v. Epifania |
Defendant appealed his conviction of arson for setting fire to a dwelling house, and wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person. The Appeals Court held that testimony that the cat belonged to the victim was sufficient to support a conviction of wilfully and maliciously killing the animal of another person.
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COMMONWEALTH v. MASSINI |
In this Pennsylvania case, defendant was prosecuted for killing a cat that belonged to his neighbor. The section under which he was prosecuted prohibited the killing of a 'domestic animal of another person.' However, a cat was not one of the animals defined as a ‘domestic animal’ by the Act. Using rules of statutory interpretation, the court found that the omission of 'cat' from the listed species of the penal code provision was intentional by the legislature, and thus the defendant's sentence was discharged.
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COMPANION ANIMAL |
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