Municipal Ordinances

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Titlesort descending Summary
Luper v. City of Wasilla


Plaintiff appealed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Wasilla, Alaska's enforcement action over zoning ordinances. The facts stem from the City's denial of plaintiff's application for a use permit in 2005 to run an eighteen-dog kennel. Plaintiff argued on appeal that Wasilla's former three-dog limit infringed on her property rights in both her land and her dog. This court agreed with the lower court that the provision here bore a "fair and substantial relationship" the government purposes of controlling dog noise, reducing dog odor and pollution, and preventing loose dogs. Further, the court found that it was not reasonable for the plaintiff to rely on the city clerk's statement that she only needed a kennel license to operate a hobby kennel.
Malane Wilson v. City of St. Louis; Dian K. Sharma, Health Commissioner, City of St. Louis Department of Health and Hospitals; R This action concerns the release of a dog who was impounded and classified as “dangerous” without a chance for his owner to argue against the action. Plaintiff Malane Wilson filed a petition for a preliminary and permanent injunction, a petition for declaratory judgment, and a petition for replevin against the City of St. Louis and the Animal Regulation Center, among others. The subject of the petitions concerned her American Pit Bull Terrier named Max who was seized by agents of the Animal Regulation Center as an apparent “dangerous dog.” Plaintiff contends that Max’s alleged actions in killing the neighbor’s dog did not qualify under the St. Louis City Ordinance as a “dangerous dog.” Further, plaintiff was not given any legal or administrative hearing once her dog was seized, contrary to due process requirements. She also sought in her declaratory petition to have the ordinance declared illegal, void, and unconstitutional for its failure to adequately define “dangerous dog” and “potentially dangerous dog.”

The Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis found that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction was not granted. Thus, the City was enjoined from killing or otherwise harming Max. They were also ordered to release Max, remove his “dangerous” designation, and have him instead classified as “potentially dangerous.” The plaintiff was required to comply with enclosure and other safety requirements for Max.
McCall v. Par. of Jefferson Defendant appeals a judgment from the 24th Judicial District Court (JDC) for violations of the Jefferson Parish Code. In 2014, a parish humane officer visited defendant's residence and found over 15 dogs in the yard, some of which were chained up and others who displayed injuries. Initially, defendant received a warning on the failure to vaccinate charges as long as he agreed to spay/neuter the animals. Defendant failed to do so and was again found to have numerous chained dogs that did not have adequate food, water, shelter, or veterinary care. He was ordered to surrender all dogs in his possession and was assessed a suspended $1,500 fine. On appeal, defendant claims he was denied a fair hearing because he was denied the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and present evidence. This court disagreed, finding that the JDC functioned as a court of appeal on the ordinance violations and could not receive new evidence. Before the JDC hearing, this court found defendant was afforded a hearing that met state and local laws. The JDC judgment was affirmed.
MD - Licenses - Article 24. Political Subdivisions--Miscellaneous Provisions. This law, enacted in 2013, replaces a former section that dealt with the running at large of dogs. The new section concerns Calvert County and establishes guidelines for the issuance of dog and kennel licenses and dog tags. The "Animal Matters Hearing Board" was also created under this law. The Board's duty is to "resolve disputes and controversies arising under animal control ordinances adopted under subsection (c) of this section." The law also makes a dog running at large in Calvert County without a properly attached licensed a "nuisance," subject to seizure, detention, and euthanasia. A holding period for seized dogs (72 hours) is also established under the new law.
Merced v. Kasson


Plaintiff José Merced, a Santeria Oba Oriate, or priest, brought action against the City of Euless alleging that city ordinances prohibiting the keeping of animals for slaughter and the slaughtering of animals prevented him from performing animal sacrifices essential to Santeria religious practice. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled in favor of the city, but denied its request for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision in favor of the city and affirmed the denial of attorney fees. The court found that the city did not prove that the burden it placed on the plaintiff advanced a compelling interest and was the least restrictive means of doing so. In fact, the Court noted that prior to the ban, Merced had performed these sacrifices for sixteen years without creating health hazards or unduly harming any animals. The City's purported interest was further undermined by the fact that hunters are allowed to butcher dead animals at their homes. Thus, Euless failed to assert a compelling governmental interest in support of its ordinances that burden Merced's religious conduct. 
MI - Ordinances - CHAPTER 287. ANIMAL INDUSTRY. DOG LAW OF 1919. This Michigan law provides that a board of county commissioners may establish, by ordinance, an animal control agency. The animal control agency shall have jurisdiction to enforce this act in any city, village or township which does not have an animal control ordinance. The county's animal control ordinance shall provide for animal control programs, facilities, personnel and necessary expenses incurred in animal control.
MI - Ordinances - CHAPTER 287. ANIMAL INDUSTRY. DOG LAW OF 1919. This Michigan statute enables a city, village or township to adopt an animal control ordinance to regulate the licensing, payment of claims and providing for the enforcement thereof.
MI - Ordinances - Chapters 81 to 113 Fourth Class Cities. This Michigan statute provides that a city incorporated under the provisions of this act has, and the council may pass ordinances relating to, the following general powers: To provide for the issuing of licenses to the owners and keepers of dogs and to require the owners and keepers of dogs to pay for and obtain such licenses; and to regulate and prevent the running at large of dogs, to require dogs to be muzzled, and to authorize the killing of dogs running at large or not licensed in violation of an ordinance of the city.
Missouri Pet Breeders Association v. County of Cook Cook County passed an ordinance that required a “pet shop operator” to only sell animals obtained from a breeder that (among other requirements) held a USDA class “A” license and owned or possessed no more than 5 female dogs, cats, or rabbits capable of reproduction in any 12-month period. Plaintiffs, a professional pet organization and three Cook County pet shops and their owners, sued Cook County government officials, alleging that the ordinance violated the United States and Illinois Constitutions. Defendants moved to dismiss the action. After concluding that plaintiffs had standing to pursue all of their claims, with the exception of the Foreign Commerce Claim, the Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss all claims, but gave Plaintiffs a chance to cure their complaint's defects by amendment.
MN - Ordinances - 366.01.Chapter 366. Town Board; Board of Audit. Town Board. This Minnesota statute provides that the supervisors of each town constituting a town board are empowered to license and regulate the presence or keeping of dogs or domestic animal pets when deemed to be in the public interest.

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