Municipal Ordinances
Displaying 161 - 170 of 240
Title |
Summary |
|---|---|
| RI - Dangerous Dog - § 4-13.1-9. Penalties for violation--Licensing ordinances and fees | This Rhode Island statute provides that a vicious dog may be confiscated by a dog officer and destroyed in an expeditious and humane manner after the expiration of a five day waiting period if an owner does not secure liability insurance, have his or her dog properly identified, or properly enclose/restrain the dog. If any dog declared vicious under Sec. 4-13.1-11, when unprovoked, kills, wounds, or worries or assists in killing or wounding any described animal, the owner shall pay a five hundred fifty dollar fine. The dog officer is empowered to confiscate the dog. The statute further provides that municipalities may enact vicious dog licensing ordinances and provide for impoundment of dogs that violate such ordinances. It also outlines other actions owners of vicious dogs must take, including the posting of vicious dog signs and the maintenance of proper insurance. |
| RI - Impound - § 4-13-15. Collaring of dogs--Impoundment and disposition of uncollared dogs | This Rhode Island statute provides that every owner of a dog must collar his or her dog around its neck and distinctly marked with its owner's name and its registered number. Interestingly, it states that "any person" may cause any dog not so collared to be impounded in the public pound of the town or city where the dog is found. Further, if the dog is not claimed by its owner within a period of five days after the impoundment, the dog may be disposed of or destroyed. This statute also provides additional specific provisions for the towns of Glocester, West Warwick, and Exeter. |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-1.1. Towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick, and Middletown and city of Woonsocket--Vicious dog ordinance | This Rhode Island statute provides that the town councils of the towns of Portsmouth, West Warwick and Middletown may, by ordinance, provide that the owner or keeper of any dog that assaults any person shall be fined an amount not less than one hundred dollars ($100) nor more than two hundred dollars. The investigation must prove that the dog was off the owner's property or that the assault was the result of owner negligence. It further provides that, in the city of Woonsocket, an owner shall not be declared negligent if an injury is sustained by a person who was committing a trespass or other tort upon the owner's premises or was teasing, tormenting, provoking, abusing or assaulting the dog or was committing or attempting to commit a crime. |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-15.1. Ordinances concerning unrestricted and vicious dogs prohibited--Leash laws | This Rhode Island statute provides that city or town councils may make any ordinances concerning dogs in their cities or towns as the councils deem expedient, pertaining to the conduct of dogs. The statute outlines specifically what the ordinances may address, including regulations relating to unrestricted dogs, leash laws, confinement, and destruction of vicious dogs. The statute also adds additional provisions relating to the towns of Westerly and Exeter. |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-3. Prior ordinances preserved | This Rhode Island statute provides that nothing in the state laws concerning dogs shall be construed as to repeal any ordinance concerning dogs, which has been passed by any town or city council. |
| RI - Ordinances - § 4-13-8. Disposition of license fees | This Rhode Island statute provides that towns and cities may adopt ordinances or regulations concerning the use of money received for dog licenses. |
| RI - Rabies - § 4-13-29.1. Responsibility for local rabies control | This Rhode Island statute provides that towns and cities are required to provide for the control of rabies in cats, dogs, and ferrets within its boundaries. The municipality may elect to adopt into ordinance provisions at least as stringent as this chapter. |
| Roalstad v. City of Lafayette | The origins of this matter began when the City of Lafayette (City) charged Defendant/Appellant with violating its municipal ordinance regarding vicious animals. Defendant/Appellant requested a jury trial pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. The municipal court denied the request. Defendant/Appellant appealed the district court's dismissal of her C.R.C.P. 106 and declaratory judgment action in which she challenged the municipal court's denial of her request for a jury trial. The sole issue on appeal was whether the offense for which Defendant was charged under the City's ordinances was a “petty offense” under C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109, which would entitle her to a jury trial under that statute. Since the municipal ordinance imposed fines that met that definition and because it was not a crime at common law, the court concluded the offense met the definition of “petty offense;” Defendant/Appellant was therefore entitled to a jury trial in municipal court pursuant to C.R.S.A. § 16-10-109. Further, because the ordinance and the state Dangerous Dog law were counterparts and because the ordinance was criminal in nature, the vicious animal offense was not exempt from the “petty offense” definition. Accordingly, the district court’s order was reversed. |
| Robinson v. City of Bluefield | An Animal Control Officer responded to a complaint about two dogs at defendant's residence. While investigating the complaint at defendant's residence, the animal control officer was attacked by one of defendant's dogs. The officer sought medical treatment following the incident. The City of Bluefield subsequently brought charges against defendant in its municipal court, charging her with having a dangerous animal in violation of city ordinances. The municipal court ordered the dog killed. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Mercer County affirmed the municipal court's decision. Defendant then appealed the Circuit Court's decision arguing that that Circuit Court erred in concluding that the municipal court had the authority to order the destruction of her dog. After review, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia agreed with defendant and found that under the plain language of W.Va.Code § 19–20–20, the City of Bluefield was required to set forth satisfactory proof that defendant’s dog was “vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons” before a circuit court or a magistrate, not a municipal court. The court therefore found that ordinance was void to the extent that it allowed a municipal court to order the destruction of the dog. The circuit court's order affirming the municipal court's order to kill Ms. Robinson's dog was therefore reversed. Justice Loughry dissents. |
| Rosenfeld v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Mendon |
|