Municipal Ordinances

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Titlesort descending Summary
Overview of Pet Number Restrictions in Municipal Ordinances


This legal discussion overviews the typical elements in municipal ordinances that restrict the number of pets a person can own. It analyzes the relevant cases and provides examples ordinances that limit the number of dogs a person can own. Both nuisance regulations and zoning regulations are discussed, as well as the broad police powers municipalities enjoy.
Overview of the Laws Regulating Rescue and Foster Care Programs for Companion Animals This overview examines how states deal with foster care and other non-profit rescue organizations. It details how states define such organizations and what laws may affect their operations. The paper also discusses potential legal issues that arise with pet rescue and fostering.
PA - Dog - § 550. General immunity from noise This Pennsylvania statute provides that all owners and operators of dog training and special retriever training areas licensed by the Pennsylvania Game Commission shall be exempt and immune from any civil action or criminal prosecution in any manner relating to noise provided they were and remain in compliance with any applicable noise control laws or ordinances at the time the permit for establishment of the training area was authorized.
PA - Ordinances - § 23144. To tax and destroy dogs This briefly worded Pennsylvania statute presumably gives municipalities the authority "[t]o regulate and provide for taxing the owners and harborers of dogs, and to destroy dogs found at large contrary to any ordinance."
PA - Ordinances - § 459-1201. Applicability to cities of the first class, second class, second class A and third class This Pennsylvania statute provides that cities of the first and second class are not affected by state dog licensing programs; existing city-level programs remain in effect. With cities of the third class, certain provisions of the state article on dog licensing shall not apply if the city has established a licensing program by ordinance.
PA - Ordinances - § 66530. Regulation of dogs This Pennsylvania statute provides that the board of supervisors may by ordinance prohibit and regulate the running at large of dogs.
Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources


Fearing potential prosecution under a county ordinance and a state statute for carrying out a Stipulated Order that protects an endangered species (the Palila), defendants, joined substantially by the plaintiffs, sought a motion for declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court granted the defendants’ motion because federal law, the Stipulated Order, preempted both state and county law. The court therefore stated that so long as defendants, or their duly-appointed agents, were acting to enforce the specific terms of the Stipulated Order, they may conduct an aerial sighting over the Palila's critical habitat and shoot any ungulates sighted in that area without fear of violating (1) Hawaii County Code §§ 14–111, –112, & 1–10(a); or (2) HRS § 263–10.
Panattieri v. City of New York

Ceasar, a mixed breed dog, was seized by police after he killed another dog and injured the other dogs’ owner. Petitioners, Kristina & Douglas Panattieri, owned Ceasar and demanded his return to their custody. They also challenged the determination by Respondent, Department of Health & Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), to execute Ceasar pursuant to the New York City Health Code (24 RCNY) § 161.07. The Petitioners argued that Ceasar’s execution would be unconstitutional under the City Code because it was preempted by the state statute, Agriculture & Markets Law § 123.The Supreme Court, New York County, denied their petition and held that the New York City Health Code was not preempted by the state statute. The Court reasoned that the Agriculture and Markets Law § 107(5), which governed licensing, identification, and control of dogs, expressly allowed municipalities to enact their own Codes governing dangerous dogs. However the City Codes were to incorporate standards that were as or more protective of public health and safety than those set forth in the state statute. The New York City Code met the requirement and was therefore not preempted by state law.
Park Pet Shop, Inc. v. City of Chicago Local pet stores and breeders brought an action against the validity of a city ordinance limiting the sources from which they may obtain dogs, cats, and rabbits for resale. They stake their claim on the grounds that the ordinance goes beyond Chicago’s home-rule powers under the Illinois Constitution and violates the implied limits on the state power imposed by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Petitioners appeal the district court’s dismissal of case for failure to state a claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Illinois Constitution allows Chicago to regulate animal control and welfare concurrently with the state so long as no state statute specifically limits the municipality. Further, the court reject the argument that the ordinance discriminates against interstate commerce. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suit for failure to state a claim.
People v. Strobridge


In this Michigan case, the defendant appealed his conviction of keeping more than three dogs on his premises without a kennel license in violation of Grandville ordinances, § 21, No. 159-A.  On appeal, defendant asserted that the trial court improperly denied his “nonconforming use” defense; that is, he claimed the ordinance at issue was a zoning ordinance rather than a regulatory ordinance.

 

Relying on a case that held that prior nonconforming use (where a person has been using property in a nonconforming way prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance), the court found that indeed defendant was entitled to present such a defense, as he owned the dogs on the property prior to adoption of the ordinance.  Defendant next argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the ordinance was a constitutional exercise of the city's police power.  While the court observed that criminal ordinances are to be more strictly construed than ordinances involving a civil penalty, it still found that the ordinance at issue was a valid exercise of police power, especially considering that a previous case had upheld a similar ordinance that limited ownership to only two dogs.

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