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AR - Ordinances - § 14-54-1102. Dogs running astray. |
This Arkansas statute provides that municipal corporations have the power to prevent the running at large of dogs and the injuries and annoyances associated with them. Further, this statute allows municipalities to authorize the destruction or impoundment of dogs if found in violation of ordinance. However, prior to destroying the dog, the municipality shall give the dog's owner at least five (5) days' notice of the date of the proposed destruction of the dog by certified mail if the dog carries the owner's address. |
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AZ - Dog Ordinances - Powers and duties of board of supervisors (dogs/animals) |
This Arizona statute provides that each county board of supervisors may regulate dogs, including the designation of a county enforcement agent, contracting with any city or town to enforce the provisions of any ordinance enacted by such city or town for the control of dogs, and for the unincorporated areas of the county, by ordinance, regulate, restrain and prohibit the running at large of dogs and the excessive and unrestrained barking of dogs. They may also establish either civil or criminal penalties for violations of the above ordinances and establish a rabies quarantine zone. |
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AZ - License and Vaccination Ordinances - Exemption of cities, towns and counties (dogs/animals) |
This Arizona statute exempts cities or towns from the provisions of this article if they impose a license fee and vaccination on dogs by ordinance, provided that such ordinance is equal to or more stringent than the provisions of this article. Further, the provisions of this article shall not apply to counties which regulate the running at large of dogs in the unincorporated areas of the county by ordinance provided that such ordinance is equal to or more stringent than the provisions of this article.
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AZ - Municipalities - Dog Regulations |
This Arizona statute allows common councils to regulate dogs running at large. |
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AZ - Ordinances - Article 2. Board of Trustees Government After Disincorporation. |
§§ 9-211 to 9-226. Repealed by Laws 2016, Ch. 62, § 9, eff. Jan. 1, 2017 (related to powers of the board of trustees) |
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Barnes v. City of Anderson |
Virginia Barnes and Jan Swearingen appealed a trial court's decision in favor of the City of Anderson, Ind., granting a permanent injunction enjoining the women from keeping and maintaining Swearingen's pet Vietnamese pot-belly pig, Sassy, and ordering Sassy's removal from the residence. Appeals Court found for pig owner, holding that the phrase "raising or breeding" in an Anderson livestock ordinance refers to a commercial enterprise and not to the keeping of pigs as pets.
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Becker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. |
Motorist sued dog owner after he was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by dog. The Court of Appeals held that the “injury by dog” statute creates strict liability for any injury or damage caused by dog if owner was negligent (with public policy exceptions). Here, the dog owner was not strictly liable because he was not negligent when his dog escaped from its enclosure.
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Bloomfield Estates Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Birmingham |
In this Michigan case, a property association brought an action against the city of Birmingham to enforce a deed restriction. The association alleged that the city's plan to build a dog park violated the residential use restriction in the deed. The Circuit Court of Oakland County granted the city's motion for summary disposition; the Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court held that the city's use of the lot as a “dog park" (a fenced area where dogs could roam unleashed with their owners) did indeed violate the deed restriction limiting use of land to “strictly residential purposes only.” Further, despite the association's failure to contest the previous use of the land as a vacant park, the association could contest the dog park violation because the former use was deemed a "less serious" violation.
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Boyle Ventures, LLC v. City of Fayetteville |
This case involved a constitutional challenge to a Fayetteville ordinance that would have prohibited pet stores from selling dogs and cats unless obtained from approved shelters or rescues. The plaintiff pet store operator argued the ordinance violated both the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Consumer Protection Act and Working Animal Protection Act, constituting an unconstitutional municipal law contrary to state law. The Arkansas Supreme Court held the case was moot since the ordinance was repealed before taking effect, but clarified in dicta that the city's authority to prevent animal cruelty under Ark. Code Ann. § 14-54-103 does not extend to passing ordinances that conflict with state laws protecting lawful animal enterprises. The court reversed the circuit court's finding that the ordinance violated state law and remanded with instructions to dismiss, while dismissing the direct appeal as moot. Chief Justice Baker concurred in the result but diverged from the mootness rationale, arguing the ordinance did not conflict with the Arkansas Retail Pet Store Act or Working Animal Protection Act under a proper statutory interpretation. She contended the circuit court erred in its statutory analysis, making Boyle’s ACRA claim fail as a matter of law without reaching immunity or damages. Justice Womack dissented, asserting the circuit court erred by not first addressing the jurisdictional issue of the City’s statutory immunity under Ark. Code Ann. § 21-9-301. Justice Womack criticized the majority for conflating statutory immunity with federal qualified immunity and urged remand for a factual determination on whether the City had liability insurance, which would nullify immunity. The dissent viewed the merits discussion as advisory absent this threshold ruling.
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Brief Summary of Emerging Issues in Municipal Ordinances |
This summary covers the historic purpose of animal control in municipalities and how this has changed as the view of animals has evolved. The reasons behind state versus local control are explored as well as the issues typically covered by local laws.
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