Endangered Species
Title | Summary |
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April in Paris v. Becerra | Plaintiffs are a collection of businesses that distribute and sell products made from alligator and crocodile parts. They brought this suit to enjoin the provisions of a California law that would criminalize the sale and possession of alligator and crocodile parts in California. They argue that these laws would cause them to lose sales, lead to inventory liquidation, and cause job loss. The court found that the injury plaintiff were alleging was economic in nature, and that they would be likely to suffer an irreparable injury by the California law. Plaintiffs also argue that the California law is expressly preempted by the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and that trade in these species is authorized by an exemption under the regulatory "special rules" of the ESA. The court found that these exceptions applied to plaintiff's trade and possession of the animal parts, granted the injunction to enjoin California from enforcing the laws until final disposition of the case. |
AR - Endangered Species - 002.00.1-05.27. Endangered Species Protected | This Arkansas regulation states that it is illegal to import, transport, sell, purchase, take or possess any endangered species of wildlife or parts thereof except as provided. |
AR - Endangered Species - Endangered, Threatened, and Nongame Species Preservation | Arkansas law provides that it is the intent of the State to protect rare, threatened, and endangered species. This policy also provides for the protection of critical habitat for these species. |
ARFF, Inc. v. Siegel |
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Arizona Cattle Growers' Association v. Salazar |
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Art and Antique Dealers of Am., Inc. v. Seggos | The plaintiffs are trade organizations representing arts and antique dealers. Plaintiff’s members have an “economic and professional interest in. . .the purchase, sale, distribution or trading of antique elephant ivory.” The Defendant is the Commissioner of DEC which is a state agency tasked with protecting New York’s natural resources and environment. The Endangered Species Act (ESA) prohibits the import and export of endangered species and the sale, offering for sale, or movement of endangered species in interstate or foreign commerce. The prohibitions, however, had exceptions for “antique articles” that are 100 years of age or older. Those wishing to import such antique articles needed to first obtain a federal permit. Under the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior, trade of African elephant ivory is generally prohibited. Only certain items containing a de minimus quantity of ivory are exempt. The state of New York imposed a ban on elephant ivory with even narrower exceptions than the ESA. The DEC only issued licenses authorizing trade in ivory pursuant to the State Ivory Law’s exceptions. The licenses actually issued by the DEC restricted the advertisement and display of ivory products. Plaintiff’s filed this action challenging the constitutionality of the State Ivory Law on preemption and First Amendment grounds. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment and the Defendants and Intervenors crossed-moved to dismiss. The Court examined the ESA and determined that section 1535(f) did not preempt the State Ivory Law because the ESA prohibitions only applied to interstate or foreign commerce while the State Ivory Law applied to intrastate commerce. As result, the exceptions contained in the State Ivory Law did not prohibit what was authorized by the ESA. The Court granted the Defendant’s motion to dismiss on Count I because it was not “the clear and manifest purpose of Congress to preempt state laws restricting purely intrastate commerce in ivory.” The Plaintiff’s second count alleged that the State Ivory Law’s permit requirement violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The display restriction in the license prohibited the physical display for sale of any item not authorized for intrastate sale under the State Ivory Law even if the merchant was authorized under the ESA to sell the item in interstate commerce. The Court determined that the in-store display of ivory products constituted commercial speech because the display constituted lawful activity, New York had a substantial interest in regulating the sale of ivory within its borders and the display restriction directly advanced that interest. The Court was unable to determine whether the display restriction burdened substantially more speech than was necessary to further the government’s legitimate interests. Ultimately the Court granted the Defendant’s and Intervenor’s cross-motions to dismiss with respect to preemption and denied both the Defendant’s and Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment with respect to the First Amendment Claim. |
AU - Threatened Species Protection Act 1995 (QLD) |
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AU - Wildlife Protection- Queensland Nature Conservation Act 1992 | |
AZ - Endangered, nongame - Illegal Taking or Wounding of Wildlife | Arizona assesses a monetary civil penalty for the possession or taking of listed species of wildlife and endangered/nongame wildlife (including eagles). This fine goes to the state wildlife theft prevention fund and is in addition to any other fine or penalty assessed by law. |
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon |
(edited from Syllabus of the Court) As relevant here, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA or Act) makes it unlawful for any person to “take” endangered or threatened species, § 9(a)(1)(B), and defines “take” to mean to “harass, harm, pursue,” “ wound,” or “kill,” § 3(19). In 50 CFR § 17.3, petitioner Secretary of the Interior further defines “harm” to include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife.” Respondents, persons and entities dependent on the forest products industries and others, challenged this regulation on its face, claiming that Congress did not intend the word “take” to include habitat modification. Held: The Secretary reasonably construed Congress' intent when he defined “harm” to include habitat modification. |