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U.S. v. Martinelli |
Court held the 1962 version of the BGEPA mandates a jury trial where defendant requests one, despite the fact it constitutes a "petty offense." For further discussion of criminal prosecutions under the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
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U.S. v. Moon Lake Electric Ass'n, Inc. |
Defendant on appeal contends that its conduct of electrocuting migratory birds does not fall within the ambit of either the MBTA or the BGEPA because each statute is directed at the more traditional "physical" takings of migratory birds through hunting and poaching. The court disagrees, finding the plain language of the statute and legislative history demonstrate an intent to include electrocutions. The court further delineates the differences in intent under each statute, finding that while the MBTA is a strict liability crime, the BGEPA is not. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
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U.S. v. Okelberry |
Defense counsel not deemed ineffective for failing to advise defendant that a conviction under the BGEPA could result in loss of grazing rights.
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U.S. v. Oliver |
Despite delays in receiving eagle parts through the federal permit process, the court rules the BGEPA does not violate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. There is nothing so peculiar about defendant's situation to allow a one-man exception. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. Smith |
Defendant was convicted of possessing Bald Eagle feathers in violation of Migratory Bird Treaty Act (MBTA) after receiving the feathers in the mail from a friend to complete a craft project. On appeal, defendant challenged her conviction, alleging that she did not possess the requisite knowledge and that the act itself was vague as to the level of intent, or
scienter
. The court affirmed defendant's conviction finding that the evidence established that defendant knowingly possessed eagle feathers in violation of MBTA, the conviction did not amount to punishment of wholly passive conduct contrary to defendant's suggestion, and that MBTA was not vague nor overbroad with regard to intent. For further discussion on the intersection of the MBTA and the Eagle Act, see
Detailed Discussion of the Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. St. Pierre |
Defendant challenged his felony indictment under the MBTA after selling an "invitation stick" that contained golden eagle feathers. The court held that the act encompasses migratory birds parts, not just whole birds so the indictment would stand. However, in a unique decision it held that the imposition of a felony conviction would violate due process where the statute does not specify any degree of intent. As a result, the court said it would sentence defendant under the misdemeanor provision of the statute if convicted. For further discussion on the intersection of the intent component of the MBTA with the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. Street |
The court held that the "second or subsequent conviction" component of the BGEPA applies to separate convictions charged in a single indictment. For further discussion on the enhanced penalty provision of the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act.
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U.S. v. Thirty-Eight Golden Eagles |
Defendant appeals a civil forfeiture action under the BGEPA. In applying the three-part
Callahan
test to defendant's free exercise claim, the court holds that while defendant's religious exercise is substantially burdened, the government has a compelling interest in protecting a rare species and effectuates this interest in the least restrictive means. The court declines to consider defendant's free exercise challenge to the permit process, as defendant failed to apply for a permit and thus lacks standing. For further discussion on religious challenges to the BGEPA by Native Americans, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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U.S. v. Todd |
Larry Todd and James Short appeal their convictions for conspiracy to violate the Lacey Act which prohibits the sale of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of federal law--here, The Airborne Hunting Act, 16 U.S.C. § 742j-1 (1976). The court held that the judge's failure to give instructions related to the dates of the alleged acts constituting the conspiracy did not raise an ex post facto challenge since the facts allege only two overt acts that occurred prior to the effective date of the Lacey Act amendments; all of the other acts occurred during the effective period of the amendments and most of the evidence focused on events that occurred within the effective date of the amendments. The appellants also contend that the government failed to establish that the game taken had a market value in excess of $350. The court held that the evidence was insufficient to support Short's conviction under the substantive violation of the Lacey Act because the government offered no evidence that the value of the dead eagle, deer, or javelina exceeded $350.
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U.S. v. Top Sky |
Defendant alleged that his treaty-based hunting rights incorporate a right to sell eagles. The court disagreed, finding such an interpretation of those treaty rights contrary to Indian custom and religion. Court also holds that defendant lacks standing to raise a religious challenge to the BGEPA based on the religious rights of others. Court is likewise unpersuaded by defendant's overbreadth claim. For further discussion on the abrogation of Indian treaty rights under the BGEPA, see
Detailed Discussion of Eagle Act
.
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