State v. Chilinski |
After a call reporting the poor health of over 100 dogs at a large Malamute breeding operation and the recruitment of the Humane Society of the United States, including several volunteers, to help execute a warrant, defendant was charged with one misdemeanor count of cruelty to animals and 91 counts of felony cruelty to animals pursuant to § 45–8–211, MCA. Defendant was convicted by a jury of 91 counts of animal cruelty and sentenced to the Department of Corrections for a total of 30 years with 25 years suspended. A prohibition from possessing any animals while on probation was also imposed on the defendant, as well as an order to forfeit every seized dog and all puppies born after the execution of the warrant. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Montana, defendant argued the District Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Supreme Court held, however, that the search warrant authorizing seizure of “any and all dogs” and “any and all records pertaining to dogs” was not impermissibly overbroad; that the participation by civilian volunteers and Humane Society personnel in execution the warrant was not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment or the Montana Constitution; and that the use of civilian volunteers to assist in execution of search did not violate defendant's right to privacy. The Supreme Court therefore held that the lower court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the evidence. Next, the defendant argued that the District Court abused its discretion when it improperly determined that the results of an investigation of his kennels in 2009 were irrelevant pursuant to M.R. Evid. 403. The court, however, agreed with the District Court, despite defendant's claim that 2009 inspection would show that the poor conditions of the kennels and the dogs in 2011 were justified due to economic hardship and health issues. Finally, defendant argued that the District Court was not authorized to order forfeiture of the defendant’s dogs that were not identified as victims of animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, however, held that the statute authorizing forfeiture of “any animal affected” as part of sentence for animal cruelty did not limit forfeiture of defendant's dogs to only those that served as basis for underlying charges, nor did it implicate the defendant's right to jury trial under the Apprendi case. The Supreme Court therefore held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the defendant to forfeit all of his dogs. The lower court’s decision was affirmed. |
State v. Kingsbury |
A cruelty to animals case. The State alleged that the appellees tortured four dogs by leaving them without food and water, resulting in their deaths. Examining section 42.09 of the Texas Penal Code, Cruelty to Animals, the Court found that “torture” did not include failure to provide necessary food, care, or shelter. The Court held that the criminal act of failing provide food, care and shelter does not constitute the felony offense of torture.
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State v. Siliski |
The defendant operated a dog breeding business, “Hollybelle's Maltese,” in which she bred purebred Maltese dogs in her Franklin home, advertised the resulting puppies on an Internet website, and shipped the puppies to buyers located around the country. She was convicted by a Williamson County Circuit Court jury of eleven counts of animal cruelty. The main issue on appeal concerned the imposition of sentence, which included both consecutive terms of probation and a permanently prohibition from engaging in any commercial activity involving animals. The appellate court affirmed the defendant's convictions but concluded that the trial court erred by ordering consecutive periods of probation in conjunction with concurrent sentences. However, the court found that the trial court's permanent prohibition against her buying, selling, breeding, or engaging in any commercial activity involving animals was authorized by the animal cruelty statute. As the court stated, "Given this proof and the court's findings, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred in ordering that the defendant be permanently barred from engaging in commercial activity with respect to dogs."
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State v. Siliski |
In this Tennessee case, the defendant, Jennifer Siliski, was convicted of nine counts of misdemeanor animal cruelty. Williamson County Animal Control took custody of over two hundred animals forfeited by the defendant as a result of her criminal charges and convictions. Third parties claiming ownership of some of the animals appeared before the trial court and asked for the return of their animals. This appeal arises from third parties claiming that they were denied due process by the manner in which the trial court conducted the hearing regarding ownership of the animals and that the trial court erred in denying their property claims. The appellate court concluded that the trial court did not have jurisdiction in the criminal case to dispose of the claims, and reversed the judgment.
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State v. Warren |
Cathie Iris Warren was convicted of three felony counts of aggravated animal cruelty, five felony counts of aggravated cruelty, and a misdemeanor cruelty to animals count. Warren appealed contending that the district court erred by denying Warren’s motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless search of her commercial kennel property, denying Warren’s Baston challenge, and in imposing costs to be reimbursed by Warren under Montana law. Cathie Iris Warren operated a kennel on her residential property in Libby, Montana. Warren obtained her initial license to operate her business in 2013. In 2016 it was discovered that Warren was operating her kennel despite the fact that her business license had expired in October of 2015. In order to obtain a new license, Warren needed to have an inspection of her property. Warren ended up having three separate inspections of her property. After each inspection, Warren had failed to meet the requirements. The members of the Health Department who were involved in the inspections became concerned that the animals were not being adequately cared for and were not of good health. Warren could not provide appropriate vaccination records for all of her animals. A search warrant was executed on Warren’s property on August 2, 2016. Warren’s animals were seized the same day. Warren moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained arguing that a warrant was required for each inspection that had been conducted on her property. The court concluded that there was no search because Warren did not have an expectation of privacy in her commercial kennel operation that society would consider objectively reasonable. The trial court convicted Warren and found that Warren owed statutorily-imposed costs, including veterinary care, food and supplies, excess hours worked by county employees, and travel costs as well as the shelter’s lost revenue. Warren appealed her conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court of Montana found that Warren treated parts of her home as part of her kennel, therefore, those areas of her home that were searched were considered commercial property which is subject to a less significant expectation of privacy. The Court concluded that the administrative inspection fell within the applicable warrant exception, was reasonable, and did not require a search warrant. Warren also challenged the State’s peremptory challenge of a minority juror (Baston Challenge). The Court concluded that the District Court reached the right conclusion on the Baston challenge but for the wrong reason. Warren’s third challenge was whether the District Court erred in calculating the statutory costs owed by Warren. The Court found that the costs approved by the District Court were reasonably supported by the evidence. The Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the District Court. |
Table of Pet Purchaser Protection Acts |
As of 2023, 22 U.S. states have enacted Pet Purchaser Protection Acts, which are commonly known as Puppy Lemon Laws, for the purpose of exactly what the name implies: purchaser protection. In order to accomplish this goal, a typical Pet Purchaser Protection Act requires the seller to make certain disclosures about an animal that is offered for sale, while also affording the purchaser a remedy if a diseased animal is purchased from the seller. This table reveals the types of animals and sellers covered under these acts, as well as the types of remedies that are available and the limitations to these remedies. |
Table of State Commercial Pet Breeders Laws |
This table covers state laws and administrative regulations affecting commercial dog breeders. The table defines a commercial breeder, describes whether a state has an upper limit of dogs a breeder can possess at one time, whether a state has minimum standards of care, inspection provisions, and penalties for violations. |
Table of State Laws Concerning Minimum Age for Sale of Puppies |
This table summarizes state laws and administrative regulations concerning the minimum age to sell a puppy. Approximately 28 states and D.C. have a law or regulation that addresses the sale of puppies under a certain age (usually 8 weeks). |
The South African Predator Breeders Association v. The Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism |
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TN - Breeder -Part 7. Commercial Breeder Act |
(Expired June 30, 2014). In 2009, Tennessee enacted its Commercial Breeder Act. The act defines a commercial breeder as means any person who possesses or maintains, under the person’s immediate control, twenty (20) or more unsterilized adult female dogs or cats in this state for the purpose of selling the offspring as companion animals. Commercial breeders must maintain and display licenses to operate in accordance with the act. Further, the act requires commercial breeders to keep on file at all times the number of dogs and cats in their possession and how many were sold during the reporting period. Inspections may occur under the act, but are not mandatory. |