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Chase v. State |
Appellant and his wife were walking their two dogs when two neighbor dogs attacked the group. After the attack, appellant slashed the attacking dog's throat with a knife, which resulted in the dog's death. Appellant was then charged with and convicted of cruelty to non-livestock animals under Texas law. The appellant appealed to the Texas Court of Appeals and the case was reversed and remanded. The State filed a petition for discretionary review with the Court of Criminal Appeals. The issue before that court was whether § 822.013(a) of the Texas Health and Safety Code, a non-penal code, provided a defense to criminal prosecution. The court held that § 822.013(a)—which allows an attacked animal's owner or a person witnessing an attack to kill a dog that is attacking, is about to attack, or has recently attacked a domestic animal—is a defense against cruelty to non-livestock animals. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was therefore affirmed. The dissenting opinion disagreed. The dissent argued the goal of this statute was to protect farmers and ranchers against the loss of their livelihood by allowing them to protect their livestock from attacking dogs without fear of liability to the dog's owner, not to allow individuals in residential neighborhoods to kill a neighbor's dog after an attack with criminal impunity.
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Chambers v. Justice Court Precinct One |
In this Texas case, a justice court divested an animal owner of over 100 animals and ordered that the animals be given to a nonprofit organization. The owner sought review of the forfeiture in district court. The district court subsequently dismissed appellant's suit for lack of jurisdiction. Under the Texas Code, an owner may only appeal if the justice court orders the animal to be sold at a public auction. Thus, the Court of Appeals held that the statute limiting right of appeal in animal forfeiture cases precluded animal owner from appealing the justice court order.
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Celinski v. State |
Criminal conviction of defendant who tortured cats by poisoning them and burning them in microwave oven. Conviction was sustained by circumstantial evidence of cruelty and torture.
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Bushnell v. Mott |
In this Texas case, the plaintiff (Bushnell) brought an action against the defendant (Mott) for her injuries sustained when defendant's dogs attacked plaintiff. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant. The Texas Supreme Court reversed, and held that the owner of a dog
not known to be vicious
owes a duty to attempt to stop the dog from attacking a person after the attack has begun, and Mott's behavior after the attack had begun raises an issue of material fact whether Mott failed to exercise ordinary care over her dogs.
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Bueckner v. Hamel |
Texas law allows persons to kill without liability dogs that are attacking domestic animals. However, the attack must be in progress, imminent, or recent. This defense does not apply to the killing of dogs that were chasing deer or non-domestic animals.
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Brief Summary of Texas Animal Cruelty Laws |
High school level summary of Texas animal cruelty laws. The article touches on Texas criminal and civil cruelty laws, the limited scope of the Texas criminal provisions, and the newly enacted laws that deal with dangerous wild animals.
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Bormaster v. Henderson |
This appeal arises out of a suit brought under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA) and for breach of expressed and implied warranties after plaintiff purchased an allegedly defective umbrella cockatoo from a pet shop. Prior to purchase, appellee-seller stated the cockatoo was healthy and gave the appellant an "Official Health Certificate for Animals and Fowl" with a 72-hour expressed warranty on the health of the cockatoo. Two weeks later the cockatoo began showing signs of poor health so appellant took it to a veterinarian (it later died). This court concluded the trial court had sufficient rebuttal evidence upon which to hold appellant failed to prove the cockatoo's death by a preponderance of the evidence. Further, this court agreed with the trial court's finding that appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the appellees committed any false, misleading or deceptive acts under the DTPA, or breached any expressed or implied warranties.
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Boehm v. State |
The appellant, Dr. Boehm, challenged her misdemeanor conviction for cruelty to a non-livestock animal under Texas Penal Code § 42.092(b)(3), arguing the evidence was insufficient to prove she unreasonably failed to provide necessary care to a bulldog in her custody during boarding. She contended that the jury charge erroneously included the manner and means of prescribing contraindicated medications, asserting such acts cannot constitute an offense under a statute criminalizing omissions, and that the charge improperly included the culpable mental state of recklessness. The court rejected these arguments, holding that the statute's definition of "necessary care" encompasses acts of care that are inadequate to maintain an animal's good health, and that the plain language of the statute includes recklessness as a culpable mental state. Reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a rational jury could conclude the appellant recklessly failed to remove the animal from its waste, resulting in urine scald and infected wounds. The court further held that the inclusion of the contraindicated medication theory was supported by expert testimony regarding the risks of administering Galliprant and prednisone concurrently. Finding no error in the jury charge and the evidence sufficient to support the conviction, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment. |
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Bell v. State |
Defendant convicted of cruelty to animals by knowingly and intentionally torturing a puppy by amputating its ears without anesthetic or antibiotics. Defense that "veterinarians charge too much" was ineffective.
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Batra v. Clark |
In this Texas case, the appellant-landlord appealed a verdict that found him negligent for injuries suffered by a child visiting a tenant's residence. The lower court found the tenant and landlord each 50% liable for the girl's injuries. The Court of Appeals, in an issue of first impression, if a landlord has actual knowledge of an animal's dangerous propensities and presence on the leased property, and has the ability to control the premises, he or she owes a duty of ordinary care to third parties who are injured by this animal. In the present facts, the court found that Bantra had no duty of care because there was no evidence showing that Batra either saw the dog and knew that it was a potentially vicious animal or identified the dog's bark as the bark of a potentially vicious animal. The judgment was reversed.
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