New York

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Article 70 of CPLR for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, The Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. ex rel. Hercules and Leo v. Stanley Petitioner brought this proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 and under the common law for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees in the custody of respondent State University of New York at Stony Brook. It sought an order directing respondents to demonstrate the basis for detaining Hercules and Leo, and an order directing their release and transfer to a sanctuary in Florida. Respondents opposed the petition and cross moved to change venue. While the Supreme Court of New York County found that neither CPLR 7002(b)(3) nor CPLR 7004(c) required a change of venue to Suffolk County; that the petitioner had standing to bring the case; and that prior proceedings did not bar this case from being heard, the substance of the petition required a finding as to whether a chimpanzee was a legal person entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus. Since the Court found it was bound by the Third Department in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. Lavery, which ruled that chimpanzees were not “legal persons” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by a writ of habeas corpus, it denied the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the proceeding.
Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Aubertine Petitioners seek, among other things, a declaration that force-fed foie gras is an adulterated food product and an order prohibiting the state respondents from allowing foie gras into the human food supply. Pre-answer motions to dismiss asserted, among other things, that petitioners lacked standing. Supreme Court granted dismissal upon such ground and petitioners appealed. Petitioner Stahlie contended he had standing based upon allegations that he occasionally ate foie gras at parties and other events and that this might increase his risk of developing secondary amyloidosis. The court, however, found the risk of exposure to be minimal and the indication of harm uncertain since Stahlie had no underlying medical conditions that might be related to an increased risk of secondary amyloidosism, that his exposure to foie gras was infrequent, and that he did not cite a situation of any person ever suffering secondary amyloidosis that was linked to foie gras. The Animal Legal Defense Fund argued that since it used its resources to investigate and litigate the alleged conduct of the state respondents, it had standing. The court, however, found that a finding of standing under this situation would essentially eliminate the standing requirement any time an advocacy organization used its resources to challenge government action or inaction. Lastly the court found that petitioners had not alleged ‘a sufficient nexus to fiscal activities of the state to allow for State Finance Law § 123-b standing.’ The lower court’s decision was therefore affirmed.
Animal Hospital of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco


In this New York case, defendant presented his puppy to plaintiff-animal hospital for treatment. After discussions between about the cost of the care, defendant apparently felt that he would not be allowed to retrieve the puppy from the hospital's possession. As a consequence, plaintiff sent a letter to defendant describing the balance owed, and stating that the hospital would retain the puppy for 10 more days after which it would "take care of the dog in accordance with the legal methods available to dispose of abandoned dogs." The issue on appeal is whether this letter qualified as noticed required by the Agriculture and Markets Act, Sec. 331. The court found that it did not comply with the statutory requirements and thus, plaintiff was responsible for defendant's loss of his puppy valued at $200 at trial. Plaintiff was entitled to a judgment on its complaint for the costs of care amounting to $309.
American Soc. for Cruelty to Animals v. Board of Trustees of State
In New York, an animal protection organization sought a judgment that would allow the public to attend meetings for a university’s animal use organization.

 

Such attendance was required under the New York Consolidated Law.

 

However, because the university meetings did not involve matters affecting the public or public policy, and since the animal protection organization was not considered a “public body,” public attendance was not ordered.

 
Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos v. New York City Police Dept Kaporos is a customary Jewish ritual which entails grasping a live chicken and swinging the bird three times overhead while saying a prayer. Upon completion of the prayer, the chicken's throat is slit and its meat is donated. The practice takes place outdoors, on public streets in Brooklyn. The Plaintiffs include the Alliance to End Chickens as Kaporos and individual Plaintiffs who reside, work or travel, within Brooklyn neighborhoods. The Defendants included City defendants such as the New York City Police Department and non-City defendants such as individual Orthodox Jewish rabbis. The Plaintiffs alleged that Kaporos is a health hazard and cruel to animals. Plaintiffs requested the remedy of mandamus to compel the City Defendants to enforce certain laws related to preserving public health and preventing animal cruelty. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York affirmed the Supreme Court's dismissal of the proceedings against the City defendants. The Court reasoned that none of the laws or regulations that the Plaintiffs relied on precluded the City Defendants from deciding whether or not to engage in Kaporos. Also, the Plaintiffs did not have a “clear legal right” to dictate which laws are enforced, how, or against whom. The Court stated that determining which laws and regulations might be properly enforced against the non-City defendants without infringing upon their free exercise of religion could not be dictated by the court through mandamus.

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