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Connecticut General Statutes: Chapter 331: Section 6367 |
Section 6367 of Chapter 329 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers the transportation of wild animals. Specifically, the statute establishes the duty of care that must be given to the public when transporting a wild animal. |
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Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 96: Sections 1879-1886 |
Sections 1879-1886 of Chapter 96 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers in general the Humane Society for Connecticut. Specifically, the sections cover the following topics: the powers of an agent from the society, the definition of an animal, and funding of the society. |
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Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 337: Section 6546 |
Section 6546 of Chapter 337 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers jurisdiction and powers of courts. Specifically, the statute states the power of the court to issue search warrants for animal cruelty.
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Connecticut General Statutes 1918: Chapter 329: Section 6268 |
Section 6268 of Chapter 329 from the 1918 General Laws of Connecticut covers the unlawful injury to certain property of another. Specifically, the statute states the punishment for hurting, maiming, poisoning anther's cattle, ox, horse, and mule. |
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Connecticut General Statutes 1902: Sections 2807-2816 |
The 1902 General Statutes of Connecticut sections 2807-2816 cover the following topics: definition of an animal, powers of an agent from humane society, and funding of the humane society.
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Comm'n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities ex rel. Pizzoferrato v. Mansions |
The Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, Wendy and Rudy Pizzoferrato, holding that they failed to establish their housing discrimination claim under General Statutes § 46a-64c. The case arose when the defendants, The Mansions, LLC, initially approved the Pizzoferratos’ request for an accommodation to keep two emotional support dogs—despite a "no pets" policy—but later rescinded approval for the second dog, demanding additional documentation to justify its necessity. The trial court found that the defendants violated fair housing laws by constructively denying the accommodation request, ruling that Wendy had a mental disability under § 46a-51(20) either because she had a "record of" generalized anxiety disorder or was "regarded as" disabled by the defendants, and that two dogs were necessary for her equal enjoyment of the dwelling. On appeal, the Appellate Court agreed that Wendy qualified as disabled under the "record of" prong based on her therapist’s diagnosis, even if imperfectly documented, but rejected the trial court’s conclusion that two dogs were "necessary" under the statute. Relying on federal precedent, particularly Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Assn., the court held that "necessary" means indispensable, not merely preferable, and the plaintiffs failed to show that both dogs were essential rather than simply beneficial. Because the defendants offered to allow one dog—an alternative that would have satisfied Wendy’s needs—the court found no violation of fair housing laws and reversed the judgment. The decision clarifies that while housing providers must reasonably accommodate disabilities, plaintiffs must demonstrate that requested accommodations are truly essential, not just advantageous, to secure legal protection. |
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Carrasquillo v. Carlson |
A Connecticut motorist brought a negligence action against a dog owner, seeking to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained when he took evasive action to avoid hitting dog. The Superior Court, Judicial District of Waterbury, granted the dog owner's motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Appellate Court held that the record was adequate for appellate review; the dog owner exercised reasonable control while walking dog; the statute allowing imposition of fine or imprisonment or both on owner of dog that interferes with motor vehicle did not apply; and the dog owner demonstrated that motorist would be unable to cure legal defects in complaint even if permitted to replead.
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BROWN v. TOWN OF SOUTHBURY |
This Connecticut decision in 1885 held consequential losses as a result of the harm to an animal (a horse) to be a proper element of damages in addition to the fair market value of the animal. Specifically, the court applied fair market value, but disallowed consequential damages for lost profits where plaintiff failed to show an effort to mitigate such damages.
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Brockett v. Abbe |
Defendant-farmer filed a counterclaim for damages for the erroneous determination by the veterinarian that certain cow was not pregnant (plaintiff veterinarian used a "punch test" - where a fist is struck against the abdomen of a cow to determine pregnancy rather than the industry-standard rectal examination). As a result, defendant-farmer sold the cow for $170 versus the $550 he could have received for a pregnant cow. The Court found that it was erroneous for the circuit court to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, as diagnoses and scientific treatment are improper subjects for the doctrine. The mere proof that the diagnosis later on turned out to be erroneous is insufficient to support a judgment, the court stated.
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Brisson v. These Guys New York Deli Corp. |
The Superior Court of Connecticut considers defendants' motion to strike plaintiffs' claims for emotional distress arising from the death of their pet dog. Plaintiffs argue that previous Connecticut case law (Myers v. Hartford, 84 Conn. App. 395) left open the question of whether courts could consider a claim for emotional distress damages due to the loss of a pet. The incident giving rise to the litigation occurred in 2021, where a driver for the defendants' company ran over plaintiffs' pet dog while making a delivery. The complaint states that one of the plaintiffs directly witnessed the driver speed down the driveway and kill the dog by dragging. The court began its analysis by first observing a dog is chattel and is unambiguously defined as personal property in the state. Myers left often the issue of recovery of damages when a "bystander" owner witnesses a "fatal injury." The court then examined the factors articulated by the Connecticut Supreme Court for recovery of emotional damages by a bystander. In doing so, the court here determined that the relationship between a pet and its owner does not meet the "closely related" element articulated by the Supreme Court. The court stated: "Absent appellate clarification that this factor includes other relationships, including the one at issue here between a pet owner and pet, this court cannot conclude that such a relationship is sufficiently like the close human relationships required under Clohessy." The court noted that it agreed with defendants that allowing plaintiffs' claim would amount to creating a new cause of action without legislative or appellate authority. Defendants' motion to strike was granted. |
